Why does the code that is spawned need to download some payload or use existing files? Why can't it make its own win32 calls?
From: Andrew S. Baker [mailto:asbz...@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, April 16, 2012 10:26 AM To: NT System Admin Issues Subject: Re: Whitelisting Here's one typical scenario: * WinWord.exe has a a buffer overflow vulnerability. * WinWord.exe is a whitelisted app, so the vulnerability can be exploited. * Bad guy creates a hand-crafted data file that takes advantage of the buffer overflow vulnerability * User opens bad data file, which exploits the vulnerability In a traditional environment, the exploit of the vulnerability would likely include the uploading or installation of some files to the exploited machine for the purpose of controlling it more directly. In an environment that makes use of whitelisting technology, the code that is spawned by the exploit (either because it is embodied in the bad data, or because it is downloaded from some remote server) will be unable to run -- because it is not an approved application/code. This is a key benefit of whitelisting. Now, if the malware exploit only attempts to make use of existing files (CMD, etc) then these executions will be subject to whether or not they are approved from a whitelisting perspective, but the scope of the exploit is still greatly reduced. (Read Only or Blocked Attack vs full system compromise) ASB http://XeeMe.com/AndrewBaker Harnessing the Advantages of Technology for the SMB market... On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 11:12 AM, James Rankin <kz2...@googlemail.com<mailto:kz2...@googlemail.com>> wrote: Ah yes, I recall this debate before. So it's not that if you used a Word exploit, for example, you could get winword.exe to do bad stuff under the context of that process - it would have to be remote code execution under its own badapp.exe - which even if you called it winword.exe would get caught by a hash value rule or check for signed code, am I thinking along the right lines? On 16 April 2012 15:54, Andrew S. Baker <asbz...@gmail.com<mailto:asbz...@gmail.com>> wrote: Yes, but if the bad data is used to perform a buffer overflow so that custom *code* can be executed to do nefarious acts, then that last step will fail because the custom malicious code is not authorized to run -- even in a zero day. No, it doesn't solve every last malware issue known to man, and there can be some management overhead depending on the implentation, but it addresses more issues than blacklisting does, and does so more effectively. Of course, we've been saying the same thing for a while here: http://www.mail-archive.com/ntsysadmin@lyris.sunbelt-software.com/msg72561.html http://www.mail-archive.com/ntsysadmin@lyris.sunbelt-software.com/msg106004.html ASB http://XeeMe.com/AndrewBaker Harnessing the Advantages of Technology for the SMB market... On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 10:28 AM, James Rankin <kz2...@googlemail.com<mailto:kz2...@googlemail.com>> wrote: Agreed, if you've got a malicious Word document that exploits a flaw in MS Word itself, then the only defence is good patching or some other form of exploit detection. If it's a zero-day, then there's probably nothing except exploit detection. Don't want to plug it too much but AppSense Application Manager does a good job of detecting execution beyond the "expected" capabilities of an application, but I've never been able to test it much beyond the types of things like malicious PDFs with Java exploits or exploits that call out to malicious dll files. Wonder how much work it would be to craft an Office document that tries to exploit a vulnerability to see if it can stop this sort of vector as well? On 16 April 2012 15:19, Alex Eckelberry <al...@eckelberry.com<mailto:al...@eckelberry.com>> wrote: >But, if we ever get to a world where whitelisting is the predominant >means of execution control, the bad guys will, out of necessity, be >relegated to exploiting flaws in applications through data files. I don't understand how you can have an exploit in a data file resulting in anything else but code execution. Data itself is harmless; it's the executables that cause harm. There will always be code executed, in some form or another (unless I'm misunderstanding your point). Alex From: Crawford, Scott [mailto:crawfo...@evangel.edu<mailto:crawfo...@evangel.edu>] Sent: Monday, April 16, 2012 12:25 AM To: NT System Admin Issues Subject: RE: Whitelisting Possibly...even probably. But, if we ever get to a world where whitelisting is the predominant means of execution control, the bad guys will, out of necessity, be relegated to exploiting flaws in applications through data files. A scanner that looks for signatures of exploits in files will be a useful tool. Assuming of course, all applications aren't secure. Sent from my Windows Phone ________________________________ From: Andrew S. Baker Sent: 4/15/2012 1:08 PM To: NT System Admin Issues Subject: Re: Whitelisting You can't. :) ASB http://XeeMe.com/AndrewBaker Harnessing the Advantages of Technology for the SMB market... On Sat, Apr 14, 2012 at 1:24 PM, Rankin, James R <kz2...@googlemail.com<mailto:kz2...@googlemail.com>> wrote: How do you blacklist all possible bad data files? ------Original Message------ From: Crawford, Scott To: NT System Admin Issues ReplyTo: NT System Admin Issues Subject: RE: Whitelisting Sent: 14 Apr 2012 18:02 A combination is needed. Whitelisting for traditional executable code and blacklisting for data files that exploit vulnerable white listed applications. -----Original Message----- From: Alex Eckelberry [mailto:a...@eckelberry.com<mailto:a...@eckelberry.com>] Sent: Saturday, April 14, 2012 10:10 AM To: NT System Admin Issues Subject: Whitelisting I'm curious, what's the general feeling about about whitelisting? As a former AV guy, I tend to prefer blacklisting, but I'm seeing signs things might be changing. Thoughts? ~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~ ~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/> ~ --- To manage subscriptions click here: http://lyris.sunbelt-software.com/read/my_forums/ or send an email to listmana...@lyris.sunbeltsoftware.com<mailto:listmana...@lyris.sunbeltsoftware.com> with the body: unsubscribe ntsysadmin ~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~ ~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/> ~ --- To manage subscriptions click here: http://lyris.sunbelt-software.com/read/my_forums/ or send an email to listmana...@lyris.sunbeltsoftware.com with the body: unsubscribe ntsysadmin
