So one of our cases is that we want to use a proof key to protect the symmetric 
key that is used to protect messages, so yes this would be application specific 
but that is the nature of OAuth in general, not much interop except at the 
application level

From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of 
Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 10:47 AM
To: ext prateek mishra; oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Holder-of-the-Key for OAuth

Hi Prateek,

why do you care about the symmetric key case?
Specifying more variants requires more code and decreases interoperability.

Ciao
Hannes


From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org> 
[mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org]<mailto:[mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org]> On 
Behalf Of ext prateek mishra
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 8:42 PM
To: oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Holder-of-the-Key for OAuth

As Phil Hunt suggests, there is a need for a discussion of the use-cases 
involved

How to bind the key to the requestor may have several variations, I would hope 
the work would cover a broad range

Given the importance of the symmetric key case, I would also be interested in 
key establishment methods as well



When I say arguably,  I expect you to argue.



John B.



Sent from my iPhone



On 2012-07-10, at 1:01 PM, Anthony Nadalin 
<tony...@microsoft.com><mailto:tony...@microsoft.com> wrote:



Binding the key to the channel is arguably the most secure



Not really, there are hardware options that give good security properties



-----Original Message-----

From: John Bradley [mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com]

Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 9:55 AM

To: Hannes Tschofenig

Cc: Anthony Nadalin; Hannes Tschofenig; OAuth WG

Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Holder-of-the-Key for OAuth



Binding the key to the channel is arguably the most secure.



SSL offloading and other factors may prevent that from working in all cases.



I suspect that we will need two OAuth bindings. One for TLS and one for signed 
message.



John B.



Sent from my iPhone



On 2012-07-10, at 12:11 PM, Hannes Tschofenig 
<hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net><mailto:hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net> wrote:



If we do not bind the key to the channel than we will run into all sorts of 
problems. The current MAC specification illustrates that quite nicely. On top 
of that you can re-use the established security channel for the actual data 
exchange.



On Jul 10, 2012, at 5:29 PM, Anthony Nadalin wrote:



One question is if we want to do a generic proof of possession for JWT that is 
useful outside OAuth,  or something OAuth specific.    The answer may be a 
combined approach.



Depends if we want OAuth to support the concept of a request/response for a 
proof token and keep the actual binding for a separate specification, in most 
of our cases the keying material is opaque (and just a blob), where we care 
about the key material  is in the key agreement (entropy) cases.



-----Original Message-----

From: John Bradley [mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com]

Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 3:34 AM

To: Hannes Tschofenig

Cc: Anthony Nadalin; OAuth WG

Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Holder-of-the-Key for OAuth



I agree that there are use-cases for all of the proof of possession mechanisms.



Presentment methods also need to be considered.



TLS client auth may not always be the best option.  Sometimes message signing 
is more appropriate.



One question is if we want to do a generic proof of possession for JWT that is 
useful outside OAuth,  or something OAuth specific.    The answer may be a 
combined approach.



I think this is a good start to get discussion going.



John B.

On 2012-07-09, at 3:05 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:



Hi Tony,



I had to start somewhere. I had chosen the asymmetric version since it provides 
good security properties and there is already the BrowserID/OBC work that I had 
in the back of my mind. I am particularly interested to illustrate that you can 
accomplish the same, if not better, characteristics than BrowserID by using 
OAuth instead of starting from scratch.



Regarding the symmetric keys: The asymmetric key can be re-used but with a 
symmetric key holder-of-the-key you would have to request a fresh one every 
time in order to accomplish comparable security benefits.



Ciao

Hannes



On Jul 9, 2012, at 9:57 PM, Anthony Nadalin wrote:



Hannes, thanks for drafting this, couple of comments:



1. HOK is one of Proof of Possession methods, should we consider others?

2. This seems just to handle asymmetric keys, need to also handle symmetric keys





-----Original Message-----

From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org> 
[mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Hannes Tschofenig

Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 11:15 AM

To: OAuth WG

Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Holder-of-the-Key for OAuth



Hi guys,



today I submitted a short document that illustrates the concept of 
holder-of-the-key for OAuth.

Here is the document:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-oauth-hotk



Your feedback is welcome



Ciao

Hannes



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