As Phil Hunt suggests, there is a need for a discussion of the use-cases
involved
How to bind the key to the requestor may have several variations, I
would hope the work would cover a broad range
Given the importance of the symmetric key case, I would also be
interested in key establishment methods as well
When I say arguably, I expect you to argue.
John B.
Sent from my iPhone
On 2012-07-10, at 1:01 PM, Anthony Nadalin <tony...@microsoft.com> wrote:
Binding the key to the channel is arguably the most secure
Not really, there are hardware options that give good security properties
-----Original Message-----
From: John Bradley [mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 9:55 AM
To: Hannes Tschofenig
Cc: Anthony Nadalin; Hannes Tschofenig; OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Holder-of-the-Key for OAuth
Binding the key to the channel is arguably the most secure.
SSL offloading and other factors may prevent that from working in all cases.
I suspect that we will need two OAuth bindings. One for TLS and one for signed
message.
John B.
Sent from my iPhone
On 2012-07-10, at 12:11 PM, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net> wrote:
If we do not bind the key to the channel than we will run into all sorts of
problems. The current MAC specification illustrates that quite nicely. On top
of that you can re-use the established security channel for the actual data
exchange.
On Jul 10, 2012, at 5:29 PM, Anthony Nadalin wrote:
One question is if we want to do a generic proof of possession for JWT that is
useful outside OAuth, or something OAuth specific. The answer may be a
combined approach.
Depends if we want OAuth to support the concept of a request/response for a
proof token and keep the actual binding for a separate specification, in most
of our cases the keying material is opaque (and just a blob), where we care
about the key material is in the key agreement (entropy) cases.
-----Original Message-----
From: John Bradley [mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2012 3:34 AM
To: Hannes Tschofenig
Cc: Anthony Nadalin; OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Holder-of-the-Key for OAuth
I agree that there are use-cases for all of the proof of possession mechanisms.
Presentment methods also need to be considered.
TLS client auth may not always be the best option. Sometimes message signing
is more appropriate.
One question is if we want to do a generic proof of possession for JWT that is
useful outside OAuth, or something OAuth specific. The answer may be a
combined approach.
I think this is a good start to get discussion going.
John B.
On 2012-07-09, at 3:05 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
Hi Tony,
I had to start somewhere. I had chosen the asymmetric version since it provides
good security properties and there is already the BrowserID/OBC work that I had
in the back of my mind. I am particularly interested to illustrate that you can
accomplish the same, if not better, characteristics than BrowserID by using
OAuth instead of starting from scratch.
Regarding the symmetric keys: The asymmetric key can be re-used but with a
symmetric key holder-of-the-key you would have to request a fresh one every
time in order to accomplish comparable security benefits.
Ciao
Hannes
On Jul 9, 2012, at 9:57 PM, Anthony Nadalin wrote:
Hannes, thanks for drafting this, couple of comments:
1. HOK is one of Proof of Possession methods, should we consider others?
2. This seems just to handle asymmetric keys, need to also handle symmetric keys
-----Original Message-----
From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Hannes Tschofenig
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 11:15 AM
To: OAuth WG
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Holder-of-the-Key for OAuth
Hi guys,
today I submitted a short document that illustrates the concept of
holder-of-the-key for OAuth.
Here is the document:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tschofenig-oauth-hotk
Your feedback is welcome
Ciao
Hannes
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