I notice that a few of my emails to the OAuth WG list have come through with 
the From field from “oauth-bounces”:

From: OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Neil Madden

Is this normal? I checked my subscription status on mailman and I’m posting 
from the same email address that I subscribed from.

Cheers,

Neil

> On 7 May 2019, at 10:25, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@arm.com> wrote:
> 
> No, it is definitely not too late for your comment
>  
> From: OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Neil Madden
> Sent: Dienstag, 7. Mai 2019 11:18
> To: IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth security topics
>  
> Is it too late to add the observation below to the OAuth security topics BCP 
> draft?
>  
> 
> 
> Begin forwarded message:
>  
> From: Neil Madden <neil.mad...@forgerock.com 
> <mailto:neil.mad...@forgerock.com>>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt-00
> Date: 7 May 2019 at 09:37:29 BST
> To: Vittorio Bertocci <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org 
> <mailto:Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>>
> Cc: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu 
> <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>>, Karl McGuinness <kmcguinn...@okta.com 
> <mailto:kmcguinn...@okta.com>>, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com 
> <mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com>>, IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org 
> <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>>
>  
> I wasn’t at IIW so I may be missing some context.
>  
> There is a potential security issue if the client_id is used as the “sub” for 
> an AT obtained via client_credentials. If the client can register itself with 
> a self-chosen client_id then it may deliberately chose a client_id that 
> matches the user name of a privileged user. An RS that just blindly looks at 
> the “sub” claim may then erroneously let the client perform privileged 
> actions.
>  
> Is this the context of the discussion?
>  
> Given that there are a lot of RSes in existence, many of which are probably 
> just looking at the “sub” claim to identify the resource owner, I think the 
> onus is on the AS to ensure that no such ambiguity can arise in the first 
> place by ensuring that the space of “sub” values for client credentials is 
> disjoint with the space for genuine users or by disallowing the 
> client_credentials grant altogether.
>  
> This issue already arises in token introspection though, so maybe ought to be 
> mentioned in the OAuth security topics draft rather than specific to the JWT 
> AT draft?
>  
> — Neil
> 
> 
> On 6 May 2019, at 18:32, Vittorio Bertocci 
> <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org 
> <mailto:Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
>  
> Hi all,
> thanks for your patience during this month long hiatus, and thanks for the 
> comments.
> Last week at IIW I had the opportunity to discuss this with many of the 
> people on the list. Here's a summary of where the discussion landaed on the 
> subject of the sub (pun intended).
>  
> - It seems that RFC 7519 has pretty clear language on the use of sub- I 
> didn't check it back when we started the discussion. I do agree with the 
> people saying that we shouldn't violate existing specifications, hence it 
> looks like we do need to have sub also in the case in which we have app-only 
> tokens carrying claims about the app itself. I understand this will cause 
> some implementation to break, but unfortunately that's intrinsic in the 
> process of coming up with a common approach and standards compliance is 
> probably one of the strongest reasons to tolerate that.
> - That said, I am strongly committed to preserve existing functionality. One 
> of the main reasons that was brought up for including sub only for user based 
> ATs was to use it as heuristic for telling those tokens apart from app-only 
> ones. To that end, Karl MCGuinness suggested that we include grant_type as a 
> return claim, which the RS could use to the same effect. I find the proposal 
> very clever, and the people at IIW thought so as well. What you think?
> Note, John Bradley observed that in some cases this might lead to ambiguous 
> results if an extension grant is used (say an assertion profile) but that 
> seems like a relatively fringe occurrence.
>  
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:11 PM Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu 
> <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>> wrote:
> I also meant to say that (of course) the JWT standard doesn't say that the 
> JWT is supposed to be about the client or about the resource owner, hence 
> both are valid
>  
> Hans.
>  
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 10:09 PM Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com 
> <mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>> wrote:
> I get that existing practice is likely to be all over the map, but if we’re 
> to create a JWT access token standard, it’s reasonable to require that the 
> claims usage comply with the JWT standards.
>  
>                                                                 -- Mike
>  
> From: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu 
> <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>> 
> Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 12:59 PM
> To: Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com 
> <mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>>
> Cc: George Fletcher <gffletch=40aol....@dmarc.ietf.org 
> <mailto:40aol....@dmarc...ietf.org>>; Vittorio Bertocci 
> <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>>; 
> IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt-00
>  
> the definition of RFC 7519 is actually "petitio principii" and a lot of 
> deployments put claims about the Resource Owner in the access token (as a 
> Resource Server implementer I've suffered a lot from this)
>  
> Hans.
>  
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 9:48 PM Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com 
> <mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>> wrote:
> I agree with George that the subject of a token must be the principal of that 
> token.  That what the JWT “sub” claim is for.  Indeed, the first sentence of 
> the “sub” definition at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.2 
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.2> is:
> The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the subject of the 
> JWT.
>  
> If an access token uses “sub”, its usage must comply with the definition from 
> RFC 7519.
>  
>                                                                 -- Mike
>  
> From: OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>> On 
> Behalf Of George Fletcher
> Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 8:51 AM
> To: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu 
> <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>>
> Cc: Vittorio Bertocci <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org 
> <mailto:40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>>; IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org 
> <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt-00
>  
> The more I think about this the more I land in the "No" camp.
> 
> The subject of a token should be the principal of that token. It shouldn't 
> matter whether that is a machine, a user, or a device. Trying to separate out 
> "humans" as a special class will just make things more complicated. If we 
> need a claim to identify the subject is a "human" then why not just add that. 
> This doesn't break anything and makes it easy for people to detect this case 
> in those use cases where it's required.
> 
> Thanks,
> George
> 
> On 4/3/19 4:56 PM, Hans Zandbelt wrote:
> I will argue that in a way such deployments are already broken e.g. in the 
> typical use case of onboarding client accounts in the same 
> directory/OU/namespace as user accounts and we don't need to cater for that. 
>  
> Hans.
>  
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 10:48 PM George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com 
> <mailto:gffle...@aol.com>> wrote:
> I agree that this will break a lot of existing flows... especially those 
> using any form of the client_credentials flow. In that sense I'm not 
> completely on board yet :)
> 
> On 3/26/19 12:56 PM, Hans Zandbelt wrote:
> great summary! this will hurt quite a few existing m2m deployments but I do 
> like the rigidness of it all: it is very explicit, cannot misinterpreted and 
> thus prevents failure (which is really what Dominick is after); I'm on board 
>  
> Hans.
>  
> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 5:49 PM Vittorio Bertocci 
> <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>> 
> wrote:
> thank you Steinar and everyone else for the comments on this!
> To summarize the situation so far: Dominick, Steinar, Rob, David, Nov, 
> Bertrand recommend using sub only for users. Martin would like to have the 
> sub for app only flows as well. Hans is neutral.
> That does sound like the sub as user has more consensus, tho before changing 
> it I'd wait for the people currently at IETF104 to have more time to comment 
> as well.
> Clarification. If the goal is to be able to apply the logic "if there's a 
> sub, it's a user flow", we have to explicitly disallow (MUST NOT) the use of 
> sub when that's not the case. Are all OK with it?
>  
> Dave, the suggestion of having explicit typing for app only vs user only is 
> interesting! For the purpose of putting together an interoperable profile, 
> tho, I would suggest we table it for v1 in the interest of getting to 
> something easy to adopt (hence with small delta vs existing implementations) 
> faster.     
>  
> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 1:40 AM Steinar Noem <stei...@udelt.no 
> <mailto:stei...@udelt.no>> wrote:
> Hi Vittorio, we  (the national federation-gateway for the health services in 
> norway - "HelseID")  think his is a really valuable initiative!
> We also agree with Dominick concerning definition of the "sub" claim.
>  
> <mvh>Steinar</mvh>
>  
> tir. 26. mar. 2019 kl. 07:25 skrev Dominick Baier <dba...@leastprivilege.com 
> <mailto:dba...@leastprivilege.com>>:
> From an access token consumer (aka API) developer point of view, I prefer 
> this logic
>  
> "If sub is present - client acts on behalf of a user, if not - not."
>  
> Anything more complicated has a potential of going wrong.
>  
> 
> On 26. March 2019 at 01:34:53, Nov Matake (mat...@gmail.com 
> <mailto:mat...@gmail.com>) wrote:
> 
> Hi Vittorio,
>  
> Yeah, I’m concerning user & client ids collision.
> I haven’t seen such implementations, but user-select username as sub, or 
> incremental integer as sub & client_id will be easily collide.
>  
> If you can enforce collision resistant IDs between user & client instances, 
> it’ll works fine. I feel its overkill though.
>  
> Sent from my iPhone
> 
> On Mar 26, 2019, at 8:51, Vittorio Bertocci <vitto...@auth0.com 
> <mailto:vitto...@auth0.com>> wrote:
> 
> Hey Nov, Dominick, Hans-
> thanks for the comments. That was an area I was expecting to cause more 
> discussion, and I am glad we are having this opportunity to clarify.
> The current language in the draft traces the etymology of sub to OpenID 
> Connect core, hence Dominick observation is on point. However in the 
> description I express something in line with 7519, which was in fact my 
> intent.
>  
> The idea was to provide an identifier of the calling subject that is 
> guaranteed to be present in all cases- this would allow an SDK developer to 
> use the same code for things like lookups and membership checks regardless of 
> the nature of the caller (user in a delegated case, app in app-only grants). 
> The information to discriminate between user and app callers is always 
> available in the token (say, the caller is a user if sub!=client_id, where 
> client_id is always guaranteed to be present as well) hence there's no loss 
> in expressive power, should that difference be relevant for the resource 
> server.
>  
> Dominick, Hans- I probably missed the security issue you guys are thinking of 
> in this case. Of course, if this would introduce a risk I completely agree it 
> should be changed- I'd just like to understand better the problem. Could you 
> expand it in a scenario/use case to clarify the risk?
> Nov- playing this back: is the concern that a user and a client might have 
> the same identifier within an IDP? When using collision resistant IDs, as it 
> is usually the case, that seems to be a remote possibility- did you stumble 
> in such scenario in production?
>  
> Thanks
> V. 
>  
>  
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 7:44 AM Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu 
> <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>> wrote:
> I believe there are plenty of OAuth 2.0 only use cases out there... but 
> nevertheless I agree with the potential confusion and thus security problems 
> arising from that (though one may argue the semantics are the same).
>  
> Hans.
>  
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 3:39 PM Dominick Baier <dba...@leastprivilege.com 
> <mailto:dba...@leastprivilege.com>> wrote:
> Yes I know - and I think in hindsight it was a mistake to use the same claim 
> type for multiple semantics.
>  
> All the “this is OIDC not OAuth” arguments are making things more complicated 
> than they need to be - in my experience almost no-one (that I know) does OIDC 
> only - nor OAuth only. They always combine it.
>  
> In reality this leads to potential security problems - this spec has the 
> potential to rectify the situation.
>  
> Dominick
> 
> On 25. March 2019 at 14:58:56, Hans Zandbelt (hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu 
> <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>) wrote:
> 
> Without agreeing or disagreeing: OIDC does not apply here since it is not 
> OAuth and an access token is not an id_token.
> The JWT spec says inhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.2 
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.2>:
>  
> "The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the
>    subject of the JWT.  The claims in a JWT are normally statements
>    about the subject.  The subject value MUST either be scoped to be
>    locally unique in the context of the issuer or be globally unique.
>    The processing of this claim is generally application specific"
>  
> which kind of spells "client" in case of the client credentials grant but I 
> also do worry about Resource Servers thinking/acting only in terms of users
>  
> Hans.
>  
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 2:41 PM Dominick Baier <dba...@leastprivilege.com 
> <mailto:dba...@leastprivilege.com>> wrote:
> IMHO the sub claim should always refer to the user - and nothing else.
>  
> OIDC says:
>  
> "Subject - Identifier for the End-User at the Issuer."
>  
> client_id should be used to identify clients.
>  
> cheers
> Dominick
>  
> On 25.. March 2019 at 05:13:03, Nov Matake (mat...@gmail.com 
> <mailto:mat...@gmail.com>) wrote:
> 
> Hi Vittorio,
>  
> Thanks for the good starting point of standardizing JWT-ized AT.
>  
> One feedback.
> The “sub” claim can include 2 types of identifier, end-user and client, in 
> this spec.
> It requires those 2 types of identifiers to be unique each other in the IdP 
> context.
>  
> I prefer omitting “sub” claim in 2-legged context, so that no such constraint 
> needed.
>  
> thanks
>  
> nov
>  
> 
> On Mar 25, 2019, at 8:29, Vittorio Bertocci 
> <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org 
> <mailto:vittorio.bertocci=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
>  
> Dear all,
> I just submitted a draft describing a JWT profile for OAuth 2.0 access 
> tokens. You can find it in 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt/ 
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt/>.
> I have a slot to discuss this tomorrow at IETF 104 (I'll be presenting 
> remotely). I look forward for your comments!
>  
> Here's just a bit of backstory, in case you are interested in how this doc 
> came to be. The trajectory it followed is somewhat unusual.
> Despite OAuth2 not requiring any specific format for ATs, through the years I 
> have come across multiple proprietary solution using JWT for their access 
> token. The intent and scenarios addressed by those solutions are mostly the 
> same across vendors, but the syntax and interpretations in the 
> implementations are different enough to prevent developers from reusing code 
> and skills when moving from product to product.
> I asked several individuals from key products and services to share with me 
> concrete examples of their JWT access tokens (THANK YOU Dominick Baier 
> (IdentityServer), Brian Campbell (PingIdentity), Daniel Dobalian (Microsoft), 
> Karl Guinness (Okta) for the tokens and explanations!).
> I studied and compared all those instances, identifying commonalities and 
> differences. 
> I put together a presentation summarizing my findings and suggesting a rough 
> interoperable profile 
> (slides:https://sec.uni-stuttgart.de/_media/events/osw2019/slides/bertocci_-_a_jwt_profile_for_ats.pptx
>  
> <https://sec..uni-stuttgart.de/_media/events/osw2019/slides/bertocci_-_a_jwt_profile_for_ats.pptx>)
>  - got early feedback from Filip Skokan on it. Thx Filip!
> The presentation was followed up by 1.5 hours of unconference discussion, 
> which was incredibly valuable to get tight-loop feedback and incorporate new 
> ideas. John Bradley, Brian Campbell Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Torsten Lodderstedt, 
> Nat Sakimura, Hannes Tschofenig were all there and contributed generously to 
> the discussion. Thank you!!!
> Note: if you were at OSW2019, participated in the discussion and didn't get 
> credited in the draft, my apologies: please send me a note and I'll make 
> things right at the next update.
> On my flight back I did my best to incorporate all the ideas and feedback in 
> a draft, which will be discussed at IETF104 tomorrow. Rifaat, Hannes and 
> above all Brian were all super helpful in negotiating the mysterious syntax 
> of the RFC format and submission process.
> I was blown away by the availability, involvement and willingness to invest 
> time to get things right that everyone demonstrated in the process. This is 
> an amazing community. 
> V.
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>  
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>  
> Steinar Noem
> Partner Udelt AS
> Systemutvikler
>  
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