An AS (and also an OP) MUST ensure uniqueness of any id that may end up in a “sub". OpenID Connect even states that explicitly. That way the recipient of the data (token, assertion, introspection response, …) does not need to know anything about account types.
Having the same sub value for a user and a client (service account) violates
that requirement.
> On 8. May 2019, at 10:57, Neil Madden <neil.mad...@forgerock.com> wrote:
>
> Why does the RS need to know if the subject is a client vs a user? I suspect
> the answers to that question are about as problematic as the RS needing to
> know about the grant type.
>
> I’m not a fan of the client_credentials grant, better off using a real
> service account in most cases. Hopefully no new grants will be added that
> repeat that mistake.
>
> Not sure I understand the point about JWT assertion grant type. If you use a
> JWT assertion for client authentication then that’s just the
> client_credentials grant again with a different token auth method, right?
>
> — Neil
>
>> On 8 May 2019, at 08:51, Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladi...@connect2id.com> wrote:
>>
>> grant_type would be horrible for RS developers to deal with, just to find
>> out whether "sub" effectively == "client_id".
>>
>> Why?
>> • RS developers will need to learn more OAuth stuff - there are better
>> ways to motivate people than that :)
>> • The OAuth grant types are unbounded. If at some point a new grant
>> gets devised / implemented, RS developers will need to update the code that
>> maps grant_types to ("sub" effectively == "client_id")
>> • We have at least one grant - JWT assertion - where checking the grant
>> type is not sufficient to determine if "sub" effectively == "client_id"
>> I believe we should aim for a spec where RS developers shouldn't be required
>> to know more than how to process JWTs.
>>
>> The AS has all the necessary information to indicate whether "sub"
>> effectively == "client_id". We don't need to push that logic to the RS.
>> Vladimir
>>
>> On 07/05/2019 12:16, Neil Madden wrote:
>>> Ah, that makes sense. Well, we already add a grant_type claim to our
>>> JWT-based access tokens, so I’m in favour of that solution :-)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> On 7 May 2019, at 09:48, Vittorio Bertocci <vitto...@auth0.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Thanks Neil, one more reason to avoid that.
>>>> TL;DR,
>>>> The context is the discussion we had pre-IIW about whether sub should be
>>>> included always or only for tokens issued to ROs. Some exiting
>>>> implementations rely on that heuristic.
>>>> Turns out that 7519 has language suggesting sub should be there for both
>>>> tokens issued for the RO and for apps (via client creds, etc).
>>>> We don't want to contradict 7519 but we also want to preserve the ability
>>>> for a RS to tell whether an AT was issued via RO auth or app auth, hence
>>>> the discussion. Suggestions ranged from adding a grant_type claim (Vlad
>>>> made a convincing argument against it), to relying to the client_id==sub
>>>> heuristic (which i pushed back on) to the introduction of a new claim
>>>> (name TBD given that sub_type is taken already) that can explicitly
>>>> declare whether the token has been issued authenticating th RO or via app
>>>> credentials.
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 1:37 AM Neil Madden <
>>>> neil.mad...@forgerock.com <mailto:neil.mad...@forgerock..com>
>>>> > wrote:
>>>> I wasn’t at IIW so I may be missing some context.
>>>>
>>>> There is a potential security issue if the client_id is used as the “sub”
>>>> for an AT obtained via client_credentials. If the client can register
>>>> itself with a self-chosen client_id then it may deliberately chose a
>>>> client_id that matches the user name of a privileged user. An RS that just
>>>> blindly looks at the “sub” claim may then erroneously let the client
>>>> perform privileged actions.
>>>>
>>>> Is this the context of the discussion?
>>>>
>>>> Given that there are a lot of RSes in existence, many of which are
>>>> probably just looking at the “sub” claim to identify the resource owner, I
>>>> think the onus is on the AS to ensure that no such ambiguity can arise in
>>>> the first place by ensuring that the space of “sub” values for client
>>>> credentials is disjoint with the space for genuine users or by disallowing
>>>> the client_credentials grant altogether.
>>>>
>>>> This issue already arises in token introspection though, so maybe ought to
>>>> be mentioned in the OAuth security topics draft rather than specific to
>>>> the JWT AT draft?
>>>>
>>>> — Neil
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On 6 May 2019, at 18:32, Vittorio Bertocci
>>>>> <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org
>>>>> <mailto:Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>> thanks for your patience during this month long hiatus, and thanks for
>>>>> the comments.
>>>>> Last week at IIW I had the opportunity to discuss this with many of the
>>>>> people on the list. Here's a summary of where the discussion landaed on
>>>>> the subject of the sub (pun intended).
>>>>>
>>>>> - It seems that RFC 7519 has pretty clear language on the use of sub- I
>>>>> didn't check it back when we started the discussion. I do agree with the
>>>>> people saying that we shouldn't violate existing specifications, hence it
>>>>> looks like we do need to have sub also in the case in which we have
>>>>> app-only tokens carrying claims about the app itself. I understand this
>>>>> will cause some implementation to break, but unfortunately that's
>>>>> intrinsic in the process of coming up with a common approach and
>>>>> standards compliance is probably one of the strongest reasons to tolerate
>>>>> that.
>>>>> - That said, I am strongly committed to preserve existing functionality.
>>>>> One of the main reasons that was brought up for including sub only for
>>>>> user based ATs was to use it as heuristic for telling those tokens apart
>>>>> from app-only ones. To that end, Karl MCGuinness suggested that we
>>>>> include grant_type as a return claim, which the RS could use to the same
>>>>> effect. I find the proposal very clever, and the people at IIW thought so
>>>>> as well. What you think?
>>>>> Note, John Bradley observed that in some cases this might lead to
>>>>> ambiguous results if an extension grant is used (say an assertion
>>>>> profile) but that seems like a relatively fringe occurrence.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:11 PM Hans Zandbelt <
>>>>> hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>> I also meant to say that (of course) the JWT standard doesn't say that
>>>>> the JWT is supposed to be about the client or about the resource owner,
>>>>> hence both are valid
>>>>>
>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 10:09 PM Mike Jones <
>>>>> michael.jo...@microsoft.com <mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>> I get that existing practice is likely to be all over the map, but if
>>>>> we’re to create a JWT access token standard, it’s reasonable to require
>>>>> that the claims usage comply with the JWT standards.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -- Mike
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Hans Zandbelt <
>>>>> hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>
>>>>> >
>>>>> Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 12:59 PM
>>>>> To: Mike Jones <
>>>>> michael.jo...@microsoft.com <mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>
>>>>> >
>>>>> Cc: George Fletcher <
>>>>> gffletch=40aol....@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40aol....@dmarc...ietf.org>>;
>>>>> Vittorio Bertocci <Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org
>>>>> <mailto:40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>>; IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org
>>>>> <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
>>>>> >
>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt-00
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> the definition of RFC 7519 is actually "petitio principii" and a lot of
>>>>> deployments put claims about the Resource Owner in the access token (as a
>>>>> Resource Server implementer I've suffered a lot from this)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 9:48 PM Mike Jones <
>>>>> michael.jo...@microsoft.com <mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree with George that the subject of a token must be the principal of
>>>>> that token. That what the JWT “sub” claim is for. Indeed, the first
>>>>> sentence of the “sub” definition at
>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.2
>>>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.2>
>>>>> is:
>>>>>
>>>>> The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the subject of
>>>>> the JWT.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If an access token uses “sub”, its usage must comply with the definition
>>>>> from RFC 7519.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -- Mike
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: OAuth <
>>>>> oauth-boun...@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>
>>>>> > On Behalf Of George Fletcher
>>>>> Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 8:51 AM
>>>>> To: Hans Zandbelt <
>>>>> hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>
>>>>> >
>>>>> Cc: Vittorio Bertocci <
>>>>> Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>>;
>>>>> IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
>>>>> >
>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt-00
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The more I think about this the more I land in the "No" camp.
>>>>>
>>>>> The subject of a token should be the principal of that token. It
>>>>> shouldn't matter whether that is a machine, a user, or a device. Trying
>>>>> to separate out "humans" as a special class will just make things more
>>>>> complicated. If we need a claim to identify the subject is a "human" then
>>>>> why not just add that. This doesn't break anything and makes it easy for
>>>>> people to detect this case in those use cases where it's required.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> George
>>>>>
>>>>> On 4/3/19 4:56 PM, Hans Zandbelt wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I will argue that in a way such deployments are already broken e.g. in
>>>>> the typical use case of onboarding client accounts in the same
>>>>> directory/OU/namespace as user accounts and we don't need to cater for
>>>>> that.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 10:48 PM George Fletcher <
>>>>> gffle...@aol.com <mailto:gffle...@aol.com>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree that this will break a lot of existing flows... especially those
>>>>> using any form of the client_credentials flow. In that sense I'm not
>>>>> completely on board yet :)
>>>>>
>>>>> On 3/26/19 12:56 PM, Hans Zandbelt wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> great summary! this will hurt quite a few existing m2m deployments but I
>>>>> do like the rigidness of it all: it is very explicit, cannot
>>>>> misinterpreted and thus prevents failure (which is really what Dominick
>>>>> is after); I'm on board
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 5:49 PM Vittorio Bertocci <
>>>>> Vittorio=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org <mailto:40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> thank you Steinar and everyone else for the comments on this!
>>>>>
>>>>> To summarize the situation so far: Dominick, Steinar, Rob, David, Nov,
>>>>> Bertrand recommend using sub only for users. Martin would like to have
>>>>> the sub for app only flows as well. Hans is neutral.
>>>>>
>>>>> That does sound like the sub as user has more consensus, tho before
>>>>> changing it I'd wait for the people currently at IETF104 to have more
>>>>> time to comment as well.
>>>>>
>>>>> Clarification. If the goal is to be able to apply the logic "if there's a
>>>>> sub, it's a user flow", we have to explicitly disallow (MUST NOT) the use
>>>>> of sub when that's not the case. Are all OK with it?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Dave, the suggestion of having explicit typing for app only vs user only
>>>>> is interesting! For the purpose of putting together an interoperable
>>>>> profile, tho, I would suggest we table it for v1 in the interest of
>>>>> getting to something easy to adopt (hence with small delta vs existing
>>>>> implementations) faster.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 1:40 AM Steinar Noem <
>>>>> stei...@udelt.no <mailto:stei...@udelt.no>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Vittorio, we (the national federation-gateway for the health services
>>>>> in norway - "HelseID") think his is a really valuable initiative!
>>>>>
>>>>> We also agree with Dominick concerning definition of the "sub" claim.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> <mvh>Steinar</mvh>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> tir. 26. mar. 2019 kl. 07:25 skrev Dominick Baier <
>>>>> dba...@leastprivilege.com <mailto:dba...@leastprivilege..com>
>>>>> >:
>>>>>
>>>>> >From an access token consumer (aka API) developer point of view, I
>>>>> >prefer this logic
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "If sub is present - client acts on behalf of a user, if not - not."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Anything more complicated has a potential of going wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 26. March 2019 at 01:34:53, Nov Matake (
>>>>> mat...@gmail.com <mailto:mat...@gmail.com>
>>>>> ) wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Vittorio,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yeah, I’m concerning user & client ids collision.
>>>>>
>>>>> I haven’t seen such implementations, but user-select username as sub, or
>>>>> incremental integer as sub & client_id will be easily collide.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If you can enforce collision resistant IDs between user & client
>>>>> instances, it’ll works fine. I feel its overkill though.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mar 26, 2019, at 8:51, Vittorio Bertocci <
>>>>> vitto...@auth0.com <mailto:vitto...@auth0.com>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hey Nov, Dominick, Hans-
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks for the comments. That was an area I was expecting to cause more
>>>>> discussion, and I am glad we are having this opportunity to clarify.
>>>>>
>>>>> The current language in the draft traces the etymology of sub to OpenID
>>>>> Connect core, hence Dominick observation is on point. However in the
>>>>> description I express something in line with 7519, which was in fact my
>>>>> intent.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The idea was to provide an identifier of the calling subject that is
>>>>> guaranteed to be present in all cases- this would allow an SDK developer
>>>>> to use the same code for things like lookups and membership checks
>>>>> regardless of the nature of the caller (user in a delegated case, app in
>>>>> app-only grants). The information to discriminate between user and app
>>>>> callers is always available in the token (say, the caller is a user if
>>>>> sub!=client_id, where client_id is always guaranteed to be present as
>>>>> well) hence there's no loss in expressive power, should that difference
>>>>> be relevant for the resource server.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Dominick, Hans- I probably missed the security issue you guys are
>>>>> thinking of in this case. Of course, if this would introduce a risk I
>>>>> completely agree it should be changed- I'd just like to understand better
>>>>> the problem. Could you expand it in a scenario/use case to clarify the
>>>>> risk?
>>>>>
>>>>> Nov- playing this back: is the concern that a user and a client might
>>>>> have the same identifier within an IDP? When using collision resistant
>>>>> IDs, as it is usually the case, that seems to be a remote possibility-
>>>>> did you stumble in such scenario in production?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks
>>>>>
>>>>> V.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 7:44 AM Hans Zandbelt <
>>>>> hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe there are plenty of OAuth 2.0 only use cases out there... but
>>>>> nevertheless I agree with the potential confusion and thus security
>>>>> problems arising from that (though one may argue the semantics are the
>>>>> same).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 3:39 PM Dominick Baier <
>>>>> dba...@leastprivilege.com <mailto:dba...@leastprivilege..com>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes I know - and I think in hindsight it was a mistake to use the same
>>>>> claim type for multiple semantics.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> All the “this is OIDC not OAuth” arguments are making things more
>>>>> complicated than they need to be - in my experience almost no-one (that I
>>>>> know) does OIDC only - nor OAuth only. They always combine it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In reality this leads to potential security problems - this spec has the
>>>>> potential to rectify the situation.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Dominick
>>>>>
>>>>> On 25. March 2019 at 14:58:56, Hans Zandbelt (
>>>>> hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>
>>>>> ) wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Without agreeing or disagreeing: OIDC does not apply here since it is not
>>>>> OAuth and an access token is not an id_token.
>>>>>
>>>>> The JWT spec says in
>>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.2
>>>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.2>
>>>>> :
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "The "sub" (subject) claim identifies the principal that is the
>>>>>
>>>>> subject of the JWT. The claims in a JWT are normally statements
>>>>>
>>>>> about the subject. The subject value MUST either be scoped to be
>>>>>
>>>>> locally unique in the context of the issuer or be globally unique.
>>>>>
>>>>> The processing of this claim is generally application specific"
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> which kind of spells "client" in case of the client credentials grant but
>>>>> I also do worry about Resource Servers thinking/acting only in terms of
>>>>> users
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hans.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 2:41 PM Dominick Baier <
>>>>> dba...@leastprivilege.com <mailto:dba...@leastprivilege..com>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> IMHO the sub claim should always refer to the user - and nothing else.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OIDC says:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Subject - Identifier for the End-User at the Issuer."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> client_id should be used to identify clients.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> cheers
>>>>>
>>>>> Dominick
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 25.. March 2019 at 05:13:03, Nov Matake (
>>>>> mat...@gmail.com <mailto:mat...@gmail.com>
>>>>> ) wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Vittorio,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for the good starting point of standardizing JWT-ized AT.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> One feedback.
>>>>>
>>>>> The “sub” claim can include 2 types of identifier, end-user and client,
>>>>> in this spec.
>>>>>
>>>>> It requires those 2 types of identifiers to be unique each other in the
>>>>> IdP context.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I prefer omitting “sub” claim in 2-legged context, so that no such
>>>>> constraint needed.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> thanks
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> nov
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mar 25, 2019, at 8:29, Vittorio Bertocci <
>>>>> vittorio.bertocci=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org
>>>>> <mailto:vittorio.bertocci=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>
>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>>
>>>>> I just submitted a draft describing a JWT profile for OAuth 2.0 access
>>>>> tokens. You can find it in
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt/
>>>>> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth-access-token-jwt/>
>>>>> .
>>>>>
>>>>> I have a slot to discuss this tomorrow at IETF 104 (I'll be presenting
>>>>> remotely). I look forward for your comments!
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Here's just a bit of backstory, in case you are interested in how this
>>>>> doc came to be. The trajectory it followed is somewhat unusual.
>>>>>
>>>>> Despite OAuth2 not requiring any specific format for ATs, through the
>>>>> years I have come across multiple proprietary solution using JWT for
>>>>> their access token. The intent and scenarios addressed by those solutions
>>>>> are mostly the same across vendors, but the syntax and interpretations in
>>>>> the implementations are different enough to prevent developers from
>>>>> reusing code and skills when moving from product to product.
>>>>> I asked several individuals from key products and services to share with
>>>>> me concrete examples of their JWT access tokens (THANK YOU Dominick Baier
>>>>> (IdentityServer), Brian Campbell (PingIdentity), Daniel Dobalian
>>>>> (Microsoft), Karl Guinness (Okta) for the tokens and explanations!).
>>>>> I studied and compared all those instances, identifying commonalities and
>>>>> differences.
>>>>> I put together a presentation summarizing my findings and suggesting a
>>>>> rough interoperable profile (slides:
>>>>> https://sec.uni-stuttgart.de/_media/events/osw2019/slides/bertocci_-_a_jwt_profile_for_ats.pptx
>>>>>
>>>>> <https://sec..uni-stuttgart.de/_media/events/osw2019/slides/bertocci_-_a_jwt_profile_for_ats.pptx>
>>>>> ) - got early feedback from Filip Skokan on it. Thx Filip!
>>>>> The presentation was followed up by 1.5 hours of unconference discussion,
>>>>> which was incredibly valuable to get tight-loop feedback and incorporate
>>>>> new ideas. John Bradley, Brian Campbell Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Torsten
>>>>> Lodderstedt, Nat Sakimura, Hannes Tschofenig were all there and
>>>>> contributed generously to the discussion. Thank you!!!
>>>>> Note: if you were at OSW2019, participated in the discussion and didn't
>>>>> get credited in the draft, my apologies: please send me a note and I'll
>>>>> make things right at the next update.
>>>>> On my flight back I did my best to incorporate all the ideas and feedback
>>>>> in a draft, which will be discussed at IETF104 tomorrow. Rifaat, Hannes
>>>>> and above all Brian were all super helpful in negotiating the mysterious
>>>>> syntax of the RFC format and submission process.
>>>>> I was blown away by the availability, involvement and willingness to
>>>>> invest time to get things right that everyone demonstrated in the
>>>>> process. This is an amazing community.
>>>>>
>>>>> V.
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>
>>>>>
>>>>> ZmartZone IAM -
>>>>> www.zmartzone.eu <http://www.zmartzone.eu/>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>
>>>>>
>>>>> ZmartZone IAM -
>>>>> www.zmartzone.eu <http://www.zmartzone.eu/>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> Vennlig hilsen
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Steinar Noem
>>>>>
>>>>> Partner Udelt AS
>>>>>
>>>>> Systemutvikler
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> |
>>>>> stei...@udelt.no <mailto:stei...@udelt..no> | h...@udelt.no
>>>>> <mailto:h...@udelt.no> | +47 955 21 620 | www.udelt.no
>>>>> <http://www.udelt.no/>
>>>>> |
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>
>>>>>
>>>>> ZmartZone IAM -
>>>>> www.zmartzone.eu <http://www.zmartzone.eu/>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu <mailto:hans.zandb...@zmartzone.eu>
>>>>>
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