cds merambat ke indo? rasanya sih gak ada bank2 di indo yg jualan cds. cds itu kayak derivative lainnya, risiko paling gede ada di seller. ini kan bentuk asuransi. buyer cds dapat jaminan investasi di bond/loan kembali 100% kalau issuer/borrower default. kalau everything ok, buyer kehilangan biaya proteksi, sedangkan seller dapet premi yg di kondisi normal di bawah 1%. kalau issuer default si seller cds harus nanggung risiko besar karena harus nambahin dana ke buyer supaya bond/loan bisa kebayar 100%. contohnya kasus lehman bros. waktu lehman collapse kemudian bondnya cuma dihargai 8,625 cents per dollar. artinya seller cds harus bayar klaim 91,375 cents per dollar ke buyer cds supaya buyer/investor balik modal 100 cents per dollar. total nilai klaim yg harus dibayar sekitar $365 milyar. tapi seller cds katanya udah hedging eksposur mereka di cds.
soal cds roi bond yg naik itu kan dampak fear di market. mungkin juga efek dari indover atau riset jp morgan. berapa sih hutang valas govt indo? $2-3 milyar maybe? itu kan bisa kebayar, cadangan devisa indo > $55 milyar. cd itu mainannya spekulan. waktu jaman normal itu easy money buat investment bank, insurance company (aig). belum tentu juga seller cds ada kaitannya sama bondnya govt indo. ini ada artikel dari yahoo finance soal mortgage crisis n cds: Start around 1995. Groups involved with civil rights issues and activities for poor people began to complain that poor people and especially non-white poor people got mortgages much less often than white well to do people. Many economists, including me, explained that it was not at all surprising that poorer, less credit worthy people were often turned down for credit. That's how credit is supposed to work: you lend to people who will pay you back. But the advocates for poor and black people had immense political clout. Under President Bill Clinton, they passed legislation that called on banks to be required to lend to non credit worthy borrowers. The laws, including the Community Reinvestment Act, the CRA, required two large government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to buy those lower quality mortgages from the banks, guarantee them, and sell them to the public. These were bundled into immense pools of subprime mortgages as they were called, and sold all over the world. Soon, the private sector got into the act in a vast way. They also went to banks and bought their subprime loans, packaged them, and sold them as Collateralized Mortgage Obligations all over the world. Supposedly, the subprime collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) were sliced up in such a way that buyers could have a very high likelihood that they would be repaid even if many of the mortgages in the portfolio defaulted. This assumption was based on a misunderstanding of poor quality credit that had been popularized during the era of the junk bond investment powerhouse, Drexel Burnham Lambert. As it happened, these low quality mortgage bonds were recognized as highly likely to have real problems very soon after they started to be issued by private banks in the billions. The people who recognized the high likelihood of defaults were able to profit from that likelihood: First, they could sell the mortgage securities short, a straightforward wager that has long been available. Second, they could buy credit default swaps (CDS) from financial entities. These were essentially a side bet that anyone could make about a certain mortgage bond (or any other kind of security). It paid off fantastically if the bond went into default or was close to default. The people who sold these CDS were banks and insurers, especially Merrill Lynch and A.I.G., that believed the mortgage bonds would not default and therefore charged very little to the other side, the counterparty, to make the bet. Things went along well for everyone on the long side for several years as the housing market boomed. Even if borrowers could not repay their mortgages, they could refinance the mortgages for more money than was owed on the original mortgage, pay off the first mortgage and live happily in their new home. The mortgage in question in the bond would - again-- be paid off and the bond would continue happily in its owners hands. Then, the housing market started to stabilize and soon fall, as housing prices do. They move in cycles, although around a rising mean, as we economists say. Now, when the subprime mortgage holder could not pay off his mortgage, he could not refinance. Instead, he had to default. When a lot of these mortgages defaulted, the bonds into which they had been lumped declined in value. So far, I, your humble servant, followed the deal just fine. It was extremely similar to the collapse of the Drexel Burnham Lambert junk bond empire. This had caused barely a ripple in the national economy when it fell apart in the early 1990's. I assumed that the same would happen with junk mortgages. There would be some failed banks and insurers, but the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Treasury could make all of those losses good. The total amount of subprime mortgage bonds was large but not compared with bank capital or the regenerative powers of the Fed. So, I assumed, and wrote, things would be fine. Where I missed the boat was not realizing how large were the CDS based on the junk mortgage bonds. They were not only large, but absolutely staggeringly large. Where the junk mortgage bonds were in the hundreds of billions, the CDS were in the tens of TRILLIONS. If the sellers of the CDS had to pay off in large part, the liability greatly exceeded the total bank capital in the United States and maybe in the world. That is, the derivatives based upon the junk mortgage bonds could be - and were - not in any way limited to the size of the mortgage bonds themselves, and this I did not know until a few months ago. It is this liability that swamped the banks, investment banks, and insurers. It is the CDS liability that broke AIG and Lehman. When I realized the extent of this problem, I wrongly thought the federal government would step in and in some way rescue everyone who had sold CDS. They did, except they `forgot' to rescue Lehman. Lehman was so large that when it failed, it was like a torpedo striking an ocean liner below the water line. A gaping hole was left in the whole world finance system. Bankers panicked. If Lehman could fail, then anyone could fail. In that case, the banks that were still solvent figured they had better hoard their assets and stop making loans. This led to the ongoing credit freeze. This led to a rapidly gathering economic downturn and a drastic fall in prices of all kinds of securities, real estate and commodities. It also led to a severe credit squeeze on hedge funds, which saw credit dry up and their asset prices fall suddenly, and were forced to sell stocks and other assets on a dramatic scale, leading to still greater falls in securities prices, and the worldwide panic that it still unfolding. In turn, this led to huge infusions of liquidity into the banks of the world, the semi-nationalization of the banks of the United States and of many other nations to shore them up, thaw credit, and bolster world markets and economies. These were drastic steps for drastic times, all generated by derivatives. Warren Buffett had warned us against them, and he was dead right, as always. Now, these acts should help. But it might not do the job all by itself. Major lender solvency issues remain. If housing prices keep falling, more mortgage bonds will default and the liability attached to the credit default swaps based upon them will still be in the trillions or even tens of trillions. I might well be too alarmist here, but I think the only rational possibility is for the federal government or the New York State government (because most of the CDS were entered into in New York) to simply annul the credit default swaps as void as being against public policy. After all, there was no insurable interest in most cases, which tends to void insurance contracts, which is what a CDS is. Once that happens, the banks can breathe freely again, take risks, and the economy can revive. Or, perhaps the housing market will stabilize, mortgage based bonds will rally, and the CDS will be out of the money and will not be a threat to the lenders. But something has got to happen to defuse these deadly derivatives. In any event, we now know a lot we did not know before. Credit default swaps are way too dangerous. Derivatives generally are dangerous. There is much that Ben Stein does not know. I hope this explains some of how we got to this precarious place, I apologize for not seeing it sooner. But I am still optimistic that the government will save us from the CDS, and we will go on to renewed prosperity. In other words, I am still buying. --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, wahyu tandra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Bagaimana kita harus menanggapi kejadian seperti ini?? > ini mgkn berita lama, tapi tetap ada dampaknya sampai sekarang > saya peroleh dari sini > > http://cetak.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/10/10/02355618/produk.bernama.cds.\ picu.kepanikan > > dan katanya sudah merembet d negara kita juga.. > per tgl 10/10/08 CDS indonesia jadi 725bps > artinya untuk proteksi $10jt SUN > dari gagal bayar selama 5 tahun biayanya $725rb/thn > > saya kurang mengerti, tapi rasanya adalah kesalahan pembuatan sistem ekonomi yang menguntungkan para spekulan dan merugikan para investor.. > > > Krisis Keuangan > Produk Bernama CDS Picu Kepanikan > > Jumat, 10 Oktober 2008 | 02:35 WIB > > Washington, Kamis - Produk investasi bernama credit default swaps (CDS) menjadi pemicu krisis berkelanjutan sejak kebangkrutan Lehman Brothers pada 15 September lalu. Nilai CDS sudah mencapai lebih dari 60 triliun dollar AS sekarang. > "Kini penting bagi Kongres AS untuk bertindak," kata Ketua Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal AS (Securities and Exchange Commission/SEC) Christopher Cox, Rabu (8/10) di Washington. Cox mengatakan, pengaturan transaksi CDS saatnya dilakukan. > Warren Buffet, investor kaya di AS, menyebut CDS sebagai "senjata pemusnah massal sektor keuangan" dan sumbu bom waktu. > CDS adalah surat berharga yang memberikan jaminan bayar kepada seorang pemegang obligasi. > Gary Dorsch dari Global Money Trends Newsletter di situs The Market Oracle (Inggris), edisi 8 Oktober, mencontohkan betapa berbahayanya CDS itu. Ia mencontohkan, ada seorang investor yang memberi obligasi yang diterbitkan Lehman Brothers. > Investor tersebut kemudian menyerahkan dana ke Lehman Brothers, yang kemudian menanamkan kembali dana itu ke perusahaan yang butuh dana. Lehman Brothers dapat komisi. Si investor mendapatkan bunga dari dana yang dia pinjamkan. > Walau Lehman Brothers punya reputasi (sebelum kebangkrutan), investor tersebut kemungkinan tak bisa dibayari Lehman Brothers saat terjadi jatuh tempo pembayaran obligasi. > Untuk merangsang si investor membeli obligasi Lehman, Amerincan International Group (AIG) menerbitkan CDS untuk menopang kredibilitas Lehman. Kenyataannya, hal inilah yang terjadi. AIG akan membayari si investor jika Lehman gagal membayar. Namun, CDS dibayari AIG hanya jika Lehman gagal bayar. > Makin liar > Nilai pasar CDS berkembang dua kali lipat dalam tiga tahun terakhir. Saat muncul pada tahun 1995, nilai CDS baru 144 miliar dollar AS. Bom waktu mulai ditanamkan ketika perdagangan CDS berkembang makin liar. > Pada tahun 2000 Kongres AS menghapus perundang-undangan yang mengatur CDS. Pada tahun itu, Christopher Cox (Ketua SEC) adalah anggota Kongres AS. > Banyak ekonom yang mengatakan, bom waktu krisis keuangan dimulai saat penghapusan peraturan soal CDS. Salah satu ekonom yang mengatakan itu adalah Kent Engelke, ekonom dari Capitol Securities Management, Richmond, Virginia, AS. > Sheila C Bair, Ketua Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (penjaminan simpanan nasabah bank di AS), mengatakan, CDS kini menjadi sebuah pelajaran yang sangat berharga dari krisis 2008. > Sejak tahun 2005, potensi kebangkrutan korporasi AS makin besar. Saat itu kredit macet di sektor perumahan AS mulai bermunculan. Sejak keadaan ini dicium pasar, produk-produk CDS makin marak diperdagangkan. Investor yang bisa membeli CDS tidak lagi terbatas pada investor yang membeli obligasi asli (misalnya terbitan Lehman). > Transaksi jual-beli CDS juga dilakukan di bawah meja. CDS menjadi produk idaman spekulan. Misi CDS berubah dari pengamanan obligasi gagal bayar menjadi sebuah instrumen peraup untung di tengah gelombang kebangkrutan korporasi. Siapa pun pemegang CDS pasti untung asalkan terjadi kebangkrutan korporasi penerbit surat utang. > Kantor berita Associated Press menuliskan, para hedge fund (manajer investasi) sangat menyukai CDS. Derivatif dari CDS juga bermunculan, termasuk CDS yen versus dollar AS. Juga ada CDS untuk komoditas minyak, pangan, dan lainnya. > Dalam perkembangan terakhir, yen didorong naik untuk dijatuhkan. Ini membuat pemegang CDS yen/dollar AS untung. > Sejak kebangkrutan Lehman Brothers, transaksi CDS semakin marak. Pemegang CDS mengintai potensi besar keuntungan dari rentetan kebangkrutan korporasi yang sudah terjadi. > Michael Greenberger, mantan Direktur Commodity Futures Trading Commission (AS), kini profesor hukum di University of Maryland, mengatakan, "Maraknya CDS menciptakan suasana pasar kacau. Masalahnya, para spekulan bertaruh akan terjadi kejatuhan indeks, kurs." > Hal inilah yang membuat penyuntikan dana, penurunan suku bunga oleh Bank Sentral gagal menenangkan pasar. > Kejatuhan itu justru membuat pemegang CDS makin beruntung karena rentetan kegagalan pembayaran korporasi. Anjloknya harga saham membuat perusahaan tak bisa mengharapkan bursa sebagai sumber mendapatkan modal untuk membayar utang. > Pemegang CDS juga diuntungkan dengan mengeringnya pinjaman antarbank. Pinjaman antarbank merupakan sumber tercepat meraih dana untuk melunasi utang jatuh tempo. > Persoalan makin besar karena CDS tidak tertera dalam neraca keuangan perusahaan. Juga tidak jelas siapa penerbit CDS dan pembelinya. "CDS telah berkembang menjadi ajang manipulasi," kata Cox. > Para pemegang CDS terus menciptakan suasana yang menjatuhkan indeks, yang mempercepat rentetan kebangkrutan perbankan. Menurut Dorsch, inilah yang menjadi alasan utama di balik kejatuhan beruntun indeks saham AS dan global karena peredaran CDS telah meluas ke berbagai negara. (REUTERS/AP/AFP/MON) > >
