bank2 di indonesia ga boleh jual beli produk derivatif jadi aman dari produk2 CDS..
--- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, "Vic" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > cds merambat ke indo? rasanya sih gak ada bank2 di indo yg jualan cds. > cds itu kayak derivative lainnya, risiko paling gede ada di seller. ini > kan bentuk asuransi. buyer cds dapat jaminan investasi di bond/loan > kembali 100% kalau issuer/borrower default. kalau everything ok, buyer > kehilangan biaya proteksi, sedangkan seller dapet premi yg di kondisi > normal di bawah 1%. kalau issuer default si seller cds harus nanggung > risiko besar karena harus nambahin dana ke buyer supaya bond/loan bisa > kebayar 100%. contohnya kasus lehman bros. waktu lehman collapse > kemudian bondnya cuma dihargai 8,625 cents per dollar. artinya seller > cds harus bayar klaim 91,375 cents per dollar ke buyer cds supaya > buyer/investor balik modal 100 cents per dollar. total nilai klaim yg > harus dibayar sekitar $365 milyar. tapi seller cds katanya udah hedging > eksposur mereka di cds. > > soal cds roi bond yg naik itu kan dampak fear di market. mungkin juga > efek dari indover atau riset jp morgan. berapa sih hutang valas govt > indo? $2-3 milyar maybe? itu kan bisa kebayar, cadangan devisa indo > > $55 milyar. cd itu mainannya spekulan. waktu jaman normal itu easy money > buat investment bank, insurance company (aig). belum tentu juga seller > cds ada kaitannya sama bondnya govt indo. > > ini ada artikel dari yahoo finance soal mortgage crisis n cds: > > > Start around 1995. Groups involved with civil rights issues and > activities for poor people began to complain that poor people and > especially non-white poor people got mortgages much less often than > white well to do people. Many economists, including me, explained that > it was not at all surprising that poorer, less credit worthy people were > often turned down for credit. That's how credit is supposed to work: you > lend to people who will pay you back. > > But the advocates for poor and black people had immense political clout. > Under President Bill Clinton, they passed legislation that called on > banks to be required to lend to non credit worthy borrowers. The laws, > including the Community Reinvestment Act, the CRA, required two large > government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to buy > those lower quality mortgages from the banks, guarantee them, and sell > them to the public. These were bundled into immense pools of subprime > mortgages as they were called, and sold all over the world. > > Soon, the private sector got into the act in a vast way. They also went > to banks and bought their subprime loans, packaged them, and sold them > as Collateralized Mortgage Obligations all over the world. > > Supposedly, the subprime collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) were > sliced up in such a way that buyers could have a very high likelihood > that they would be repaid even if many of the mortgages in the portfolio > defaulted. This assumption was based on a misunderstanding of poor > quality credit that had been popularized during the era of the junk bond > investment powerhouse, Drexel Burnham Lambert. > > As it happened, these low quality mortgage bonds were recognized as > highly likely to have real problems very soon after they started to be > issued by private banks in the billions. The people who recognized the > high likelihood of defaults were able to profit from that likelihood: > > First, they could sell the mortgage securities short, a straightforward > wager that has long been available. > > Second, they could buy credit default swaps (CDS) from financial > entities. These were essentially a side bet that anyone could make about > a certain mortgage bond (or any other kind of security). It paid off > fantastically if the bond went into default or was close to default. The > people who sold these CDS were banks and insurers, especially Merrill > Lynch and A.I.G., that believed the mortgage bonds would not default and > therefore charged very little to the other side, the counterparty, to > make the bet. > > Things went along well for everyone on the long side for several years > as the housing market boomed. Even if borrowers could not repay their > mortgages, they could refinance the mortgages for more money than was > owed on the original mortgage, pay off the first mortgage and live > happily in their new home. The mortgage in question in the bond would - > again-- be paid off and the bond would continue happily in its owners > hands. > > Then, the housing market started to stabilize and soon fall, as housing > prices do. They move in cycles, although around a rising mean, as we > economists say. > > Now, when the subprime mortgage holder could not pay off his mortgage, > he could not refinance. Instead, he had to default. When a lot of these > mortgages defaulted, the bonds into which they had been lumped declined > in value. > > So far, I, your humble servant, followed the deal just fine. It was > extremely similar to the collapse of the Drexel Burnham Lambert junk > bond empire. This had caused barely a ripple in the national economy > when it fell apart in the early 1990's. I assumed that the same would > happen with junk mortgages. There would be some failed banks and > insurers, but the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance > Corporation, and the Treasury could make all of those losses good. The > total amount of subprime mortgage bonds was large but not compared with > bank capital or the regenerative powers of the Fed. > > So, I assumed, and wrote, things would be fine. > > Where I missed the boat was not realizing how large were the CDS based > on the junk mortgage bonds. They were not only large, but absolutely > staggeringly large. Where the junk mortgage bonds were in the hundreds > of billions, the CDS were in the tens of TRILLIONS. If the sellers of > the CDS had to pay off in large part, the liability greatly exceeded the > total bank capital in the United States and maybe in the world. That is, > the derivatives based upon the junk mortgage bonds could be - and were - > not in any way limited to the size of the mortgage bonds themselves, and > this I did not know until a few months ago. > > It is this liability that swamped the banks, investment banks, and > insurers. It is the CDS liability that broke AIG and Lehman. > > When I realized the extent of this problem, I wrongly thought the > federal government would step in and in some way rescue everyone who had > sold CDS. They did, except they `forgot' to rescue Lehman. Lehman > was so large that when it failed, it was like a torpedo striking an > ocean liner below the water line. A gaping hole was left in the whole > world finance system. > > Bankers panicked. If Lehman could fail, then anyone could fail. In that > case, the banks that were still solvent figured they had better hoard > their assets and stop making loans. This led to the ongoing credit > freeze. This led to a rapidly gathering economic downturn and a drastic > fall in prices of all kinds of securities, real estate and commodities. > It also led to a severe credit squeeze on hedge funds, which saw credit > dry up and their asset prices fall suddenly, and were forced to sell > stocks and other assets on a dramatic scale, leading to still greater > falls in securities prices, and the worldwide panic that it still > unfolding. > > In turn, this led to huge infusions of liquidity into the banks of the > world, the semi-nationalization of the banks of the United States and of > many other nations to shore them up, thaw credit, and bolster world > markets and economies. These were drastic steps for drastic times, all > generated by derivatives. Warren Buffett had warned us against them, and > he was dead right, as always. > > Now, these acts should help. But it might not do the job all by itself. > Major lender solvency issues remain. If housing prices keep falling, > more mortgage bonds will default and the liability attached to the > credit default swaps based upon them will still be in the trillions or > even tens of trillions. > I might well be too alarmist here, but I think the only rational > possibility is for the federal government or the New York State > government (because most of the CDS were entered into in New York) to > simply annul the credit default swaps as void as being against public > policy. After all, there was no insurable interest in most cases, which > tends to void insurance contracts, which is what a CDS is. > > Once that happens, the banks can breathe freely again, take risks, and > the economy can revive. Or, perhaps the housing market will stabilize, > mortgage based bonds will rally, and the CDS will be out of the money > and will not be a threat to the lenders. But something has got to happen > to defuse these deadly derivatives. > In any event, we now know a lot we did not know before. Credit default > swaps are way too dangerous. Derivatives generally are dangerous. There > is much that Ben Stein does not know. I hope this explains some of how > we got to this precarious place, I apologize for not seeing it sooner. > But I am still optimistic that the government will save us from the CDS, > and we will go on to renewed prosperity. In other words, I am still > buying. > > --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, wahyu tandra <wahyutandra@> > wrote: > > > > Bagaimana kita harus menanggapi kejadian seperti ini?? > > ini mgkn berita lama, tapi tetap ada dampaknya sampai sekarang > > saya peroleh dari sini > > > > > http://cetak.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/10/10/02355618/produk.bernama.cds.\ > picu.kepanikan > > > > dan katanya sudah merembet d negara kita juga.. > > per tgl 10/10/08 CDS indonesia jadi 725bps > > artinya untuk proteksi $10jt SUN > > dari gagal bayar selama 5 tahun biayanya $725rb/thn > > > > saya kurang mengerti, tapi rasanya adalah kesalahan pembuatan sistem > ekonomi yang menguntungkan para spekulan dan merugikan para investor.. > > > > > > Krisis Keuangan > > Produk Bernama CDS Picu Kepanikan > > > > Jumat, 10 Oktober 2008 | 02:35 WIB > > > > Washington, Kamis - Produk investasi bernama credit default swaps > (CDS) menjadi pemicu krisis berkelanjutan sejak kebangkrutan Lehman > Brothers pada 15 September lalu. Nilai CDS sudah mencapai lebih dari 60 > triliun dollar AS sekarang. > > "Kini penting bagi Kongres AS untuk bertindak," kata Ketua > Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal AS (Securities and Exchange Commission/SEC) > Christopher Cox, Rabu (8/10) di Washington. Cox mengatakan, pengaturan > transaksi CDS saatnya dilakukan. > > Warren Buffet, investor kaya di AS, menyebut CDS sebagai "senjata > pemusnah massal sektor keuangan" dan sumbu bom waktu. > > CDS adalah surat berharga yang memberikan jaminan bayar kepada seorang > pemegang obligasi. > > Gary Dorsch dari Global Money Trends Newsletter di situs The Market > Oracle (Inggris), edisi 8 Oktober, mencontohkan betapa berbahayanya CDS > itu. Ia mencontohkan, ada seorang investor yang memberi obligasi yang > diterbitkan Lehman Brothers. > > Investor tersebut kemudian menyerahkan dana ke Lehman Brothers, yang > kemudian menanamkan kembali dana itu ke perusahaan yang butuh dana. > Lehman Brothers dapat komisi. Si investor mendapatkan bunga dari dana > yang dia pinjamkan. > > Walau Lehman Brothers punya reputasi (sebelum kebangkrutan), investor > tersebut kemungkinan tak bisa dibayari Lehman Brothers saat terjadi > jatuh tempo pembayaran obligasi. > > Untuk merangsang si investor membeli obligasi Lehman, Amerincan > International Group (AIG) menerbitkan CDS untuk menopang kredibilitas > Lehman. Kenyataannya, hal inilah yang terjadi. AIG akan membayari si > investor jika Lehman gagal membayar. Namun, CDS dibayari AIG hanya jika > Lehman gagal bayar. > > Makin liar > > Nilai pasar CDS berkembang dua kali lipat dalam tiga tahun terakhir. > Saat muncul pada tahun 1995, nilai CDS baru 144 miliar dollar AS. Bom > waktu mulai ditanamkan ketika perdagangan CDS berkembang makin liar. > > Pada tahun 2000 Kongres AS menghapus perundang-undangan yang mengatur > CDS. Pada tahun itu, Christopher Cox (Ketua SEC) adalah anggota Kongres > AS. > > Banyak ekonom yang mengatakan, bom waktu krisis keuangan dimulai saat > penghapusan peraturan soal CDS. Salah satu ekonom yang mengatakan itu > adalah Kent Engelke, ekonom dari Capitol Securities Management, > Richmond, Virginia, AS. > > Sheila C Bair, Ketua Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (penjaminan > simpanan nasabah bank di AS), mengatakan, CDS kini menjadi sebuah > pelajaran yang sangat berharga dari krisis 2008. > > Sejak tahun 2005, potensi kebangkrutan korporasi AS makin besar. Saat > itu kredit macet di sektor perumahan AS mulai bermunculan. Sejak keadaan > ini dicium pasar, produk-produk CDS makin marak diperdagangkan. Investor > yang bisa membeli CDS tidak lagi terbatas pada investor yang membeli > obligasi asli (misalnya terbitan Lehman). > > Transaksi jual-beli CDS juga dilakukan di bawah meja. CDS menjadi > produk idaman spekulan. Misi CDS berubah dari pengamanan obligasi gagal > bayar menjadi sebuah instrumen peraup untung di tengah gelombang > kebangkrutan korporasi. Siapa pun pemegang CDS pasti untung asalkan > terjadi kebangkrutan korporasi penerbit surat utang. > > Kantor berita Associated Press menuliskan, para hedge fund (manajer > investasi) sangat menyukai CDS. Derivatif dari CDS juga bermunculan, > termasuk CDS yen versus dollar AS. Juga ada CDS untuk komoditas minyak, > pangan, dan lainnya. > > Dalam perkembangan terakhir, yen didorong naik untuk dijatuhkan. Ini > membuat pemegang CDS yen/dollar AS untung. > > Sejak kebangkrutan Lehman Brothers, transaksi CDS semakin marak. > Pemegang CDS mengintai potensi besar keuntungan dari rentetan > kebangkrutan korporasi yang sudah terjadi. > > Michael Greenberger, mantan Direktur Commodity Futures Trading > Commission (AS), kini profesor hukum di University of Maryland, > mengatakan, "Maraknya CDS menciptakan suasana pasar kacau. > Masalahnya, para spekulan bertaruh akan terjadi kejatuhan indeks, > kurs." > > Hal inilah yang membuat penyuntikan dana, penurunan suku bunga oleh > Bank Sentral gagal menenangkan pasar. > > Kejatuhan itu justru membuat pemegang CDS makin beruntung karena > rentetan kegagalan pembayaran korporasi. Anjloknya harga saham membuat > perusahaan tak bisa mengharapkan bursa sebagai sumber mendapatkan modal > untuk membayar utang. > > Pemegang CDS juga diuntungkan dengan mengeringnya pinjaman antarbank. > Pinjaman antarbank merupakan sumber tercepat meraih dana untuk melunasi > utang jatuh tempo. > > Persoalan makin besar karena CDS tidak tertera dalam neraca keuangan > perusahaan. Juga tidak jelas siapa penerbit CDS dan pembelinya. "CDS > telah berkembang menjadi ajang manipulasi," kata Cox. > > Para pemegang CDS terus menciptakan suasana yang menjatuhkan indeks, > yang mempercepat rentetan kebangkrutan perbankan. Menurut Dorsch, inilah > yang menjadi alasan utama di balik kejatuhan beruntun indeks saham AS > dan global karena peredaran CDS telah meluas ke berbagai negara. > (REUTERS/AP/AFP/MON) > > > > >
