Tapi kalau nawarin produk OFF SHORE boleh .. Kaya Citi Jual Produk Lehman :P
2008/10/27, datasahamku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > bank2 di indonesia ga boleh jual beli produk derivatif jadi aman dari > produk2 CDS.. > > --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com <obrolan-bandar%40yahoogroups.com>, > "Vic" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > cds merambat ke indo? rasanya sih gak ada bank2 di indo yg jualan cds. > > cds itu kayak derivative lainnya, risiko paling gede ada di seller. ini > > kan bentuk asuransi. buyer cds dapat jaminan investasi di bond/loan > > kembali 100% kalau issuer/borrower default. kalau everything ok, buyer > > kehilangan biaya proteksi, sedangkan seller dapet premi yg di kondisi > > normal di bawah 1%. kalau issuer default si seller cds harus nanggung > > risiko besar karena harus nambahin dana ke buyer supaya bond/loan bisa > > kebayar 100%. contohnya kasus lehman bros. waktu lehman collapse > > kemudian bondnya cuma dihargai 8,625 cents per dollar. artinya seller > > cds harus bayar klaim 91,375 cents per dollar ke buyer cds supaya > > buyer/investor balik modal 100 cents per dollar. total nilai klaim yg > > harus dibayar sekitar $365 milyar. tapi seller cds katanya udah hedging > > eksposur mereka di cds. > > > > soal cds roi bond yg naik itu kan dampak fear di market. mungkin juga > > efek dari indover atau riset jp morgan. berapa sih hutang valas govt > > indo? $2-3 milyar maybe? itu kan bisa kebayar, cadangan devisa indo > > > $55 milyar. cd itu mainannya spekulan. waktu jaman normal itu easy money > > buat investment bank, insurance company (aig). belum tentu juga seller > > cds ada kaitannya sama bondnya govt indo. > > > > ini ada artikel dari yahoo finance soal mortgage crisis n cds: > > > > > > Start around 1995. Groups involved with civil rights issues and > > activities for poor people began to complain that poor people and > > especially non-white poor people got mortgages much less often than > > white well to do people. Many economists, including me, explained that > > it was not at all surprising that poorer, less credit worthy people were > > often turned down for credit. That's how credit is supposed to work: you > > lend to people who will pay you back. > > > > But the advocates for poor and black people had immense political clout. > > Under President Bill Clinton, they passed legislation that called on > > banks to be required to lend to non credit worthy borrowers. The laws, > > including the Community Reinvestment Act, the CRA, required two large > > government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to buy > > those lower quality mortgages from the banks, guarantee them, and sell > > them to the public. These were bundled into immense pools of subprime > > mortgages as they were called, and sold all over the world. > > > > Soon, the private sector got into the act in a vast way. They also went > > to banks and bought their subprime loans, packaged them, and sold them > > as Collateralized Mortgage Obligations all over the world. > > > > Supposedly, the subprime collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) were > > sliced up in such a way that buyers could have a very high likelihood > > that they would be repaid even if many of the mortgages in the portfolio > > defaulted. This assumption was based on a misunderstanding of poor > > quality credit that had been popularized during the era of the junk bond > > investment powerhouse, Drexel Burnham Lambert. > > > > As it happened, these low quality mortgage bonds were recognized as > > highly likely to have real problems very soon after they started to be > > issued by private banks in the billions. The people who recognized the > > high likelihood of defaults were able to profit from that likelihood: > > > > First, they could sell the mortgage securities short, a straightforward > > wager that has long been available. > > > > Second, they could buy credit default swaps (CDS) from financial > > entities. These were essentially a side bet that anyone could make about > > a certain mortgage bond (or any other kind of security). It paid off > > fantastically if the bond went into default or was close to default. The > > people who sold these CDS were banks and insurers, especially Merrill > > Lynch and A.I.G., that believed the mortgage bonds would not default and > > therefore charged very little to the other side, the counterparty, to > > make the bet. > > > > Things went along well for everyone on the long side for several years > > as the housing market boomed. Even if borrowers could not repay their > > mortgages, they could refinance the mortgages for more money than was > > owed on the original mortgage, pay off the first mortgage and live > > happily in their new home. The mortgage in question in the bond would - > > again-- be paid off and the bond would continue happily in its owners > > hands. > > > > Then, the housing market started to stabilize and soon fall, as housing > > prices do. They move in cycles, although around a rising mean, as we > > economists say. > > > > Now, when the subprime mortgage holder could not pay off his mortgage, > > he could not refinance. Instead, he had to default. When a lot of these > > mortgages defaulted, the bonds into which they had been lumped declined > > in value. > > > > So far, I, your humble servant, followed the deal just fine. It was > > extremely similar to the collapse of the Drexel Burnham Lambert junk > > bond empire. This had caused barely a ripple in the national economy > > when it fell apart in the early 1990's. I assumed that the same would > > happen with junk mortgages. There would be some failed banks and > > insurers, but the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance > > Corporation, and the Treasury could make all of those losses good. The > > total amount of subprime mortgage bonds was large but not compared with > > bank capital or the regenerative powers of the Fed. > > > > So, I assumed, and wrote, things would be fine. > > > > Where I missed the boat was not realizing how large were the CDS based > > on the junk mortgage bonds. They were not only large, but absolutely > > staggeringly large. Where the junk mortgage bonds were in the hundreds > > of billions, the CDS were in the tens of TRILLIONS. If the sellers of > > the CDS had to pay off in large part, the liability greatly exceeded the > > total bank capital in the United States and maybe in the world. That is, > > the derivatives based upon the junk mortgage bonds could be - and were - > > not in any way limited to the size of the mortgage bonds themselves, and > > this I did not know until a few months ago. > > > > It is this liability that swamped the banks, investment banks, and > > insurers. It is the CDS liability that broke AIG and Lehman. > > > > When I realized the extent of this problem, I wrongly thought the > > federal government would step in and in some way rescue everyone who had > > sold CDS. They did, except they `forgot' to rescue Lehman. Lehman > > was so large that when it failed, it was like a torpedo striking an > > ocean liner below the water line. A gaping hole was left in the whole > > world finance system. > > > > Bankers panicked. If Lehman could fail, then anyone could fail. In that > > case, the banks that were still solvent figured they had better hoard > > their assets and stop making loans. This led to the ongoing credit > > freeze. This led to a rapidly gathering economic downturn and a drastic > > fall in prices of all kinds of securities, real estate and commodities. > > It also led to a severe credit squeeze on hedge funds, which saw credit > > dry up and their asset prices fall suddenly, and were forced to sell > > stocks and other assets on a dramatic scale, leading to still greater > > falls in securities prices, and the worldwide panic that it still > > unfolding. > > > > In turn, this led to huge infusions of liquidity into the banks of the > > world, the semi-nationalization of the banks of the United States and of > > many other nations to shore them up, thaw credit, and bolster world > > markets and economies. These were drastic steps for drastic times, all > > generated by derivatives. Warren Buffett had warned us against them, and > > he was dead right, as always. > > > > Now, these acts should help. But it might not do the job all by itself. > > Major lender solvency issues remain. If housing prices keep falling, > > more mortgage bonds will default and the liability attached to the > > credit default swaps based upon them will still be in the trillions or > > even tens of trillions. > > I might well be too alarmist here, but I think the only rational > > possibility is for the federal government or the New York State > > government (because most of the CDS were entered into in New York) to > > simply annul the credit default swaps as void as being against public > > policy. After all, there was no insurable interest in most cases, which > > tends to void insurance contracts, which is what a CDS is. > > > > Once that happens, the banks can breathe freely again, take risks, and > > the economy can revive. Or, perhaps the housing market will stabilize, > > mortgage based bonds will rally, and the CDS will be out of the money > > and will not be a threat to the lenders. But something has got to happen > > to defuse these deadly derivatives. > > In any event, we now know a lot we did not know before. Credit default > > swaps are way too dangerous. Derivatives generally are dangerous. There > > is much that Ben Stein does not know. I hope this explains some of how > > we got to this precarious place, I apologize for not seeing it sooner. > > But I am still optimistic that the government will save us from the CDS, > > and we will go on to renewed prosperity. In other words, I am still > > buying. > > > > --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com <obrolan-bandar%40yahoogroups.com>, > wahyu tandra <wahyutandra@> > > wrote: > > > > > > Bagaimana kita harus menanggapi kejadian seperti ini?? > > > ini mgkn berita lama, tapi tetap ada dampaknya sampai sekarang > > > saya peroleh dari sini > > > > > > > > > http://cetak.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/10/10/02355618/produk.bernama.cds.\ > <http://cetak.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/10/10/02355618/produk.bernama.cds.>> > picu.kepanikan > > > > > > dan katanya sudah merembet d negara kita juga.. > > > per tgl 10/10/08 CDS indonesia jadi 725bps > > > artinya untuk proteksi $10jt SUN > > > dari gagal bayar selama 5 tahun biayanya $725rb/thn > > > > > > saya kurang mengerti, tapi rasanya adalah kesalahan pembuatan sistem > > ekonomi yang menguntungkan para spekulan dan merugikan para investor.. > > > > > > > > > Krisis Keuangan > > > Produk Bernama CDS Picu Kepanikan > > > > > > Jumat, 10 Oktober 2008 | 02:35 WIB > > > > > > Washington, Kamis - Produk investasi bernama credit default swaps > > (CDS) menjadi pemicu krisis berkelanjutan sejak kebangkrutan Lehman > > Brothers pada 15 September lalu. Nilai CDS sudah mencapai lebih dari 60 > > triliun dollar AS sekarang. > > > "Kini penting bagi Kongres AS untuk bertindak," kata Ketua > > Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal AS (Securities and Exchange Commission/SEC) > > Christopher Cox, Rabu (8/10) di Washington. Cox mengatakan, pengaturan > > transaksi CDS saatnya dilakukan. > > > Warren Buffet, investor kaya di AS, menyebut CDS sebagai "senjata > > pemusnah massal sektor keuangan" dan sumbu bom waktu. > > > CDS adalah surat berharga yang memberikan jaminan bayar kepada seorang > > pemegang obligasi. > > > Gary Dorsch dari Global Money Trends Newsletter di situs The Market > > Oracle (Inggris), edisi 8 Oktober, mencontohkan betapa berbahayanya CDS > > itu. Ia mencontohkan, ada seorang investor yang memberi obligasi yang > > diterbitkan Lehman Brothers. > > > Investor tersebut kemudian menyerahkan dana ke Lehman Brothers, yang > > kemudian menanamkan kembali dana itu ke perusahaan yang butuh dana. > > Lehman Brothers dapat komisi. Si investor mendapatkan bunga dari dana > > yang dia pinjamkan. > > > Walau Lehman Brothers punya reputasi (sebelum kebangkrutan), investor > > tersebut kemungkinan tak bisa dibayari Lehman Brothers saat terjadi > > jatuh tempo pembayaran obligasi. > > > Untuk merangsang si investor membeli obligasi Lehman, Amerincan > > International Group (AIG) menerbitkan CDS untuk menopang kredibilitas > > Lehman. Kenyataannya, hal inilah yang terjadi. AIG akan membayari si > > investor jika Lehman gagal membayar. Namun, CDS dibayari AIG hanya jika > > Lehman gagal bayar. > > > Makin liar > > > Nilai pasar CDS berkembang dua kali lipat dalam tiga tahun terakhir. > > Saat muncul pada tahun 1995, nilai CDS baru 144 miliar dollar AS. Bom > > waktu mulai ditanamkan ketika perdagangan CDS berkembang makin liar. > > > Pada tahun 2000 Kongres AS menghapus perundang-undangan yang mengatur > > CDS. Pada tahun itu, Christopher Cox (Ketua SEC) adalah anggota Kongres > > AS. > > > Banyak ekonom yang mengatakan, bom waktu krisis keuangan dimulai saat > > penghapusan peraturan soal CDS. Salah satu ekonom yang mengatakan itu > > adalah Kent Engelke, ekonom dari Capitol Securities Management, > > Richmond, Virginia, AS. > > > Sheila C Bair, Ketua Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (penjaminan > > simpanan nasabah bank di AS), mengatakan, CDS kini menjadi sebuah > > pelajaran yang sangat berharga dari krisis 2008. > > > Sejak tahun 2005, potensi kebangkrutan korporasi AS makin besar. Saat > > itu kredit macet di sektor perumahan AS mulai bermunculan. Sejak keadaan > > ini dicium pasar, produk-produk CDS makin marak diperdagangkan. Investor > > yang bisa membeli CDS tidak lagi terbatas pada investor yang membeli > > obligasi asli (misalnya terbitan Lehman). > > > Transaksi jual-beli CDS juga dilakukan di bawah meja. CDS menjadi > > produk idaman spekulan. Misi CDS berubah dari pengamanan obligasi gagal > > bayar menjadi sebuah instrumen peraup untung di tengah gelombang > > kebangkrutan korporasi. Siapa pun pemegang CDS pasti untung asalkan > > terjadi kebangkrutan korporasi penerbit surat utang. > > > Kantor berita Associated Press menuliskan, para hedge fund (manajer > > investasi) sangat menyukai CDS. Derivatif dari CDS juga bermunculan, > > termasuk CDS yen versus dollar AS. Juga ada CDS untuk komoditas minyak, > > pangan, dan lainnya. > > > Dalam perkembangan terakhir, yen didorong naik untuk dijatuhkan. Ini > > membuat pemegang CDS yen/dollar AS untung. > > > Sejak kebangkrutan Lehman Brothers, transaksi CDS semakin marak. > > Pemegang CDS mengintai potensi besar keuntungan dari rentetan > > kebangkrutan korporasi yang sudah terjadi. > > > Michael Greenberger, mantan Direktur Commodity Futures Trading > > Commission (AS), kini profesor hukum di University of Maryland, > > mengatakan, "Maraknya CDS menciptakan suasana pasar kacau. > > Masalahnya, para spekulan bertaruh akan terjadi kejatuhan indeks, > > kurs." > > > Hal inilah yang membuat penyuntikan dana, penurunan suku bunga oleh > > Bank Sentral gagal menenangkan pasar. > > > Kejatuhan itu justru membuat pemegang CDS makin beruntung karena > > rentetan kegagalan pembayaran korporasi. Anjloknya harga saham membuat > > perusahaan tak bisa mengharapkan bursa sebagai sumber mendapatkan modal > > untuk membayar utang. > > > Pemegang CDS juga diuntungkan dengan mengeringnya pinjaman antarbank. > > Pinjaman antarbank merupakan sumber tercepat meraih dana untuk melunasi > > utang jatuh tempo. > > > Persoalan makin besar karena CDS tidak tertera dalam neraca keuangan > > perusahaan. Juga tidak jelas siapa penerbit CDS dan pembelinya. "CDS > > telah berkembang menjadi ajang manipulasi," kata Cox. > > > Para pemegang CDS terus menciptakan suasana yang menjatuhkan indeks, > > yang mempercepat rentetan kebangkrutan perbankan. Menurut Dorsch, inilah > > yang menjadi alasan utama di balik kejatuhan beruntun indeks saham AS > > dan global karena peredaran CDS telah meluas ke berbagai negara. > > (REUTERS/AP/AFP/MON) > > > > > > > > > > >
