On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 1:38 PM, Christian Lohmaier <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Robert, *, > > On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 2:15 PM, Robert Burrell Donkin > <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 12:36 PM, Christian Lohmaier >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> [...] >>> That doesn't make sense - integrity is assured by bittorrent by >>> providing sha1sums for each chunk. And authenticity can be assured >>> just like it is with regular releases - just include a corresponding >>> signature file within the torrent. >> >> Better to download the signature over HTTPS but yes, I see no reason >> why this approach could not be made to work > > With signature I meant a real signature (gpg signature), not a md5sum > or sha1sum file. > When it is a cryptographic signature, it doesn't matter how you > download it, as it cannot be faked. > (of course the user has to get the proper key, but that's a different issue)
FWIW it's a defense in depth measure[1] >>>> I may have dreamed it or I am mixing this up with something else. >>> >>> If those were the only reasons, then they were made-up arguments. >> >> When engaging with Infrastructure, expect to be challenged and to have >> to defend any proposal. These lists are open, so expect a range of >> cluefulness from contributors. The best way to impress the core >> infrastructure team is for plenty of clueful people from a project to >> show up and defend the proposal with well research arguments. Giving >> up and going away is the surest way to lose the argument... > > With OOo the tracker network[1] was run independently anyway and not > hosted on the Oracle or OSUOSL hosted infrastructure. The main tracker > was Mike's at utwente, and that mirror also was the initial/main seed > for all the releases. There were other trackers linked together via a > tracker-hub (backup tracker as well as the hub were provided by > Harold). > > So it is not a matter of infrastructure, but a matter of policy. Where's the URL for this policy? Robert [1] Consider an attacker with some ability to fabricate convincing signatures. Downloading the signature from a trusted server means that such an attacker would need to replace an existing signature on secure hardware without detection. The small increase in traffic is a small price to pay for this additional defense in depth.
