On Feb 9, 2010, at 12:56 , Andreas Jellinghaus wrote: > usualy a smart card or usb crypto token has certificates on it, > and they can be read without any user verification. so monitoring > is always possible in such setups.
That's one way of approaching it, and things like public eID cards (where information is visually available from the card anyway) follow the logical path of not hiding that public information. Firefox/NSS for example assumes by default the opposite - that nothing is available from the card unless you first authenticate to it (the "friendly certs" feature, discussed several times before). Taking into account the specific usage scenario of the CryptoStick (tool for privacy-aware people) it is justified, just as well is the "PIN before anything" justified for scenarios where access to data in the card would compromise confidentiality. btw, does anyone know a native card OS that supports duress passwords? (entering a specific password would erase key material in the card) -- Martin Paljak http://martin.paljak.pri.ee +3725156495 _______________________________________________ opensc-devel mailing list opensc-devel@lists.opensc-project.org http://www.opensc-project.org/mailman/listinfo/opensc-devel
