Thanks Alan...

> On 13 Jul 2018, at 14:30, Alan DeKok <al...@deployingradius.com> wrote:
> 
>> On Jul 13, 2018, at 1:00 AM, Douglas Gash (dcmgash) <dcmg...@cisco.com> 
>> wrote:
>> 9.5 Deployment Best Practices
>> 
>> With respect to the observations about the security issues described above, 
>> a network administrator MUST NOT rely on the obfuscation of the TACACS+ 
>> protocol and TACACS+ MUST be deployed over networks which ensure privacy and 
>> integrity of the communication. TACACS+ MUST be used within a secure 
>> deployment.  Failure to do so may impact overall network security.
> 
>  "may"?  It's much stronger than that.  Secrets will leak, people will be 
> able to spoof credentials, etc.  It *will* impact network security.  Severely.
> 

Agreed, will update.


>> The following recommendations are not part of the definition of the 
>> protocol. Rather, they impose restrictions on how the protocol is applied. 
>> Specific requirements of the TACACS+ server and TACACS+ client 
>> implementations are mandated to make it easier for the administrators who 
>> deploy TACACS+ to adopt the restrictions.
> 
>  That last sentence is unclear to me.  And mandates don't make it easier, 
> they make it harder.  But the mandates are necessary for security.
> 
The intent is this: the implementors of the Servers and Clients receive the new 
mandatory MUST items in order to make it easier for the admins deploying 
TACACS+ to do the stipulated SHOULD items in the field. I think we can 
establish that shared responsibility for the recommended security practices. 
That is the intent of the sentence, I will clarify it... though would welcome 
thoughts on that intent.




>> Some of the specific requirements mandated for TACACS+ servers and TACACS+ 
>> clients may not be present in currently deployed implementations. This is 
>> accepted as situational fact, and these implementations may still be 
>> regarded as correctly implementing the TACACS+ protocol as long as they 
>> conform to the details in other sections of this document.
> 
>  The spec doesn't need to say "yes, all existing implementations are OK".
> 
>  This list has had long discussions on that topic, which I suspect was due to 
> general unfamiliarity with the IETF process.  I don't think it's necessary to 
> put that statement in the document.  
> 
>  There have been many, many, historical protocols documented in the IETF.  
> None that I recall have a statement explicitly blessing existing 
> implementations.
> 
>  The document *should* say that it documents TACACS+ as per existing 
> implementation and practice.  BUT for security reasons, certain parts of the 
> protocol and/or deployment practices are deprecated for security reasons.
> 
>> New implementations, and upgrades of current implementations, SHOULD 
>> implement the recommendations.
> 
>  And that SHOULD means "you don't really need to adopt the recommendations".
> 
>  The spec needs to say "you MUST implement and deploy it in a secure manner".
> 
That is reasonable and rereading last weeks comments aligns better, I will 
update to that effect.



>  Alan DeKok.
> 

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