> Pivoting for a second, are you intending to support the case in which > a provider has adopted RPKI but has no intention of signing these > files?
unfortunately, this will be common for a while. methods for signing with keys from the rpki are baroque at the moment, with two documents draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc-03 proposing means. > If so, then web PKI integrity (i.e., being able to trust that the data > at the https geofeed URL is controlled by the same entity that > controls the routing data) is still required to prevent forgery. the draft does require tls for the temporary remarks: based url. it will be fixed to do so for the geofeed: url. the web pki is not associated with ip address space control/ownership. web pki is based on control of domain name space. the two are quite unrelated. randy _______________________________________________ OPSAWG mailing list OPSAWG@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsawg
