On 12/06/2010 09:38 AM, Alex Pankratov wrote: >> -----Original Message----- >> From: p2p-hackers-boun...@lists.zooko.com >> [mailto:p2p-hackers-boun...@lists.zooko.com] On Behalf Of David >> Barrett >> Sent: December 5, 2010 9:51 PM >> To: p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com >> Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] .p2p domain > > ... > >> 4) When renewing the record, refuse any unsigned change, or change >> whose signature fails. > > ... > > And what about abandoned/expired domains that are re-assigned to new owners? > It is not realistic to expect all existing owners to gracefully relinquish > the ownership of expiring domains.
I tried to address this with (3): "3) On the client (or recursive DNS server) side, cache a domain's public key (if available) until its registration expires. (The "TTL" for the key is independent from the TTL of the record itself.)" The key associated with the domain would only be valid for the purchased duration of the domain. When it comes time to renew, any DNS caches of that key would be cleared. In other words, if they don't renew, then the new owner's key goes into effect. Similarly, if someone seizes the domain, the old caches would live on until the domain itself expires (eg, potentially after a matter of years). > > On a more general note - if a "secure" DNS infrastructure ever sees a proper > adoption, I bet that there will be some form of PKI present in it. Simple > key-based trust is not going to fly with interested intermediates, e.g. > shady agencies that already own or have an access to SSL CA keys and are > capable of on-the-fly certificate forgery, and through this the MnM attacks, > if needed. > > What you describe is a geek's solution that doesn't account for political > realities :) I'm with you, but it is simply not going to happen. I agree: none of this addresses the real problem of "how to have a global name->value mapping that is somehow accurate and yet has no central authority". The plan I outline doesn't attempt the impossible (prevent ICANN from ever revoking a domain), but instead just try to ensure it upholds its pledge to the domain owner (reliably publishing a given DNS name for a period of time). But any real system needs some ability for *somebody* to revoke/change the mapping (eg, if a trademark violation in the jurisdiction of the TLD owner), so any real system is no better than the current one in terms of defense against government seizure. -david _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
