-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi Tony,
On 16/05/12 03:04, Tony Arcieri wrote: > I think tying them to public keys provides the properties you want > from a "proof of work" system while still making the keys > (particularly if they're ECDSA keys) easy to generate. I wasn't suggesting proof-of-work, I was arguing that it wouldn't work. (I thought Russ Weeks was proposing it, but maybe not. Sorry Russ if I misunderstood you.) But I don't think easily generated key pairs would solve the problem either. The attacker doesn't need to get a specific node ID - she only needs to get a set of IDs that are closer to the target than any innocent nodes' IDs. If key pairs are cheap to generate then she can simply generate key pairs until she finds a set of suitable IDs. If key pairs (or node IDs in general) are expensive to generate then she can do the same, using resources that are only a fraction of the innocent nodes' resources, because she spends all her CPU time on the problem and they don't. (I think this argument against proof-of-work was first made by Richard Clayton.) Raphael has pointed to a better answer, though, which is to detect the anomalous clump of node IDs around the target. Cheers, Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPs3K/AAoJEBEET9GfxSfMXc8H/1shNiRTZzHpY9b5ND/4jGPY 0/X29s+C28BVsP+FqHWDU52OKf4fIJSK1WZuKcv17HvRDQkr2/PoRRltP3Qp+Agp wOcQDxKqH+Ysxx2SvG75ix+vLRT/sJ5/Mue2OqsQmuIXdRfpVYRpjwlp668MGhwC dLJavEQw3Gf1mUmO8rbc2h2mBNoFYxapkyAHnIic0GMCkAtyucAI9yhcSDRV7piH SmWwHO7FuXPZMaGUk7S0mT09Y1J571jE016V15fFcSeIBF5FCA1Cjw3kOhVVI8Ev 50x1bRq0myrkNO4fPeyo1N5C0QVW6RX8XOpjOh89iB1C6I4Dfj21963Gowqv0QA= =+UNx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
