Gary, Jon, List,
You have agreed about a lot of things, and I too think, that your positions are not contradicting each other: The prescinded sign is only a correlate is true, even tautological, as prescission is treating it by thought as a correlate, for analytical purpose. That the real sign (not the prescinded one) is inseparable from object and interpretant, is of course also true.
In the triad, the sign plays, other than e.g. the object, the central role, on one hand, because the (prescinded) dyads are S, S-O, S-I, and not e.g. S-O, O-I, I-S (I think like in the Ogden-Richards-model), and on the other hand, because the sign has real (not only prescinded) properties, that make it discernable from its environment. It is noticeable, even for people who don´t understand it as a sign, while an object might be e.g. a place in empty space, as I wrote sometime before. So, if something (the triad or the interpretant) reenters somewhere, the target of this reentry would be the sign, and not e.g. the object, I believe.
What bothers me about Spencer-Brown`s "distinction" is, that I doubt, that "distinction" is a common type. You can distinguish kinds or parts. Both is very different (see Stanley N. Salthe´s paper "Salthe 12 Axiomathes"). So you can distinguish (at least) two kinds of distinction. Wikipedia says, that Laws of Form is isomorphic with Entitative graphs. I guess then it would be isomorphic with Existential graphs too, because the rules for calculation are the same. In Existential graphs the blank page denotes "truth" (I propose "all" would do , for not merely talking about propositions, but elements in general), so a distinction there is that of a kind of truth, or something taken out from "all", a classification. In Entitative graphs the blank page denotes "false" (I propose "nothing"). So something- with or without a cut around- is an artifact, an added element, not a kind of "false", but a put-in part. And a variable without a cut around it is already a distinction, while with Spencer-Brown a distinction comes only with a "cross". So I suspect, Entitative graphs and Laws of Form are not isomorphic. Entitative and Existential graphs are, but the former are about composition, "Or", synthesis, and the latter about classification, "And", specification, analysis.
Best regards, Helmut
Gesendet: Freitag, 18. Juli 2025 um 23:49
Von: "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]>
CC: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Spencer-Brown's concept of 'reentry' in consideration of semiosis (after an idea of Helmut Ralient)
Jon, List,
JAS: I am not familiar enough with Spencer-Brown to say anything about his concept of "reentry" or its proposed application to semiosis, but I would like to offer some comments on other aspects of your post.
GR: I read Laws of Form twice in two only slightly different editions, first in my 30's, when I couldn't make heads nor tails of it, and then many years later in my late 50's, perhaps early 60's, principally because references to it, and especially to the 'reentry' concept, had appeared in the work of Niklas Luhman on social systems theory (which didn't much interest me then, but which many of my colleagues were taken with) as as well as in Varela's and Maturana's work in developing the idea of autopoiesis (which very much interested me): the biosemiotic idea that living systems create and sustain themselves by continually re-entering (and sometimes reworking) their own patterns of distinction: that they are in some sense, self-producing and self-maintaining,
GR: In footnote 22 of "Temporal Synechism" you note that Andre de Tienne asks the question "to what extent does the flow of time regulate the flow of signs, and to what extent does the flow of signs influence or determine the flow of time?"JAS: [. . .] My own starting point for answering it . . ."The close relationship between logical and temporal sequences suggests that the entire universe is a sign, specifically an argument. . . In short, the flow of time and the flow of signs are effectively one and the same--time is a true continuum because the entire universe is a true semiosic continuum. The latter is not only (like time) a topical continuum [. . .]; it is also a hyperbolic continuum, proceeding from an initial state in the infinite past toward a different final state in the infinite future, both of which are hypothetical limits that are never actually reached.
GR: Yes, your -- being Peirce's -- position is quite clear.
GR: Some argue, with considerable textual support from Peirce, that sign (representamen), object, and interpretant are but correlates within a triadic semiotic relation, others that the triadic relation itself is the Sign: that is, that one could argue that the Sign is not simply the representamen or the representamen plus its object, that the Sign is the whole triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant ensemble.JAS: As you and other List members are well aware, I am in the former camp and quite vociferously reject the latter position. As I see it, it is an even bigger terminological mistake than using "instant" colloquially instead of carefully distinguishing it from "moment," because it is even more conducive of conceptual confusion. The triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) "mediating," while "sign" designates its first corollate--that which represents the object for the interpretant, or (more generally) that which mediates between the object and the interpretant.
GR: Yes, you've repeatedly argued in this manner, and I agree with you.
GR: In this view [that the triadic relation itself is the Sign], these three elements together form an inseparable unity such that if any part were missing, the sign would be incomplete
JAS: [. . . Rather] we should say. . . that every sign by definition has an object and (at least potentially) an interpretant, such that if either of these were missing, then there would be no sign at all.
GR: Agreed. And although we've discussed it before, the idea that while most signs do tend to have an interpretent, some have one "at least potentially," is a topic which might be unpacked further, especially for those forum members who missed those discussion, since you continue "such that if either of these were missing, then there would be no sign at all." It seems to me that all signs have an immediate interpretant (the capacity to mean something), a sign may have a dynamical interpretent (if, say, someone actually finds and reads the message in a bottle), and that the final interpretant is it's meaning "in the long run" by an unlimited community over unlimited time (so only asymptotically approachable). Another way to say this is that a sign must have the capacity to generate an interpretant to be a sign at all.
JAS: "[S]emiosis is no more built up of discrete signs--nor even discrete triadic relations--than time is built up of discrete instants, space is built up of discrete points, and motion is built up of discrete positions.
GR: Agreed.
GR: In this view, it is only as an analytical contrivance in speculative grammar that the distinction of object - sign - interpretant as correlates holds.JAS: With this, I happily agree. As you rightly noted, "the interpretant is itself most typically a new (or modified) sign," and Peirce also maintains that the object must likewise be of the nature of a sign. "Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought" (CP 1.538, 1903)
GR: Thank you for the excellent group of quotations with which you concluded your message and which would seem to settle the matter. I have always found the last quote you offered, well, profound:
"The very entelechy of being lies in being representable. ... This appears mystical and mysterious simply because we insist on remaining blind to what is plain, that there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol" (EP 2:324, NEM 4:262, 1901).
And, as we've all learned, "Symbols grow." CP 2.302
Best,
Gary R
On Thu, Jul 17, 2025 at 6:13 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Gary R., List:I am not familiar enough with Spencer-Brown to say anything about his concept of "reentry" or its proposed application to semiosis, but I would like to offer some comments on other aspects of your post.GR: In footnote 22 of "Temporal Synechism" you note that Andre de Tienne asks the question "to what extent does the flow of time regulate the flow of signs, and to what extent does the flow of signs influence or determine the flow of time?"As I also say in that footnote, De Tienne does not just pose this question, he explores it in detail in a 2015 paper (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279513621_The_Flow_of_Time_and_the_Flow_of_Signs_A_Basis_for_Peirce's_Cosmosemiotics). My own starting point for answering it is at the top of the next page (260)--"The close relationship between logical and temporal sequences suggests that the entire universe is a sign, specifically an argument: 'a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities' (CP 5.119,EP 2:193, 1903)." In short, the flow of time and the flow of signs are effectively one and the same--time is a true continuum because the entire universe is a true semiosic continuum. The latter is not only (like time) a topical continuum, such that the whole is ontologically prior to the parts, which are indefinite until deliberately marked off for a purpose; it is also a hyperbolic continuum, proceeding from an initial state in the infinite past toward a different final state in the infinite future, both of which are hypothetical limits that are never actually reached.GR: Some argue, with considerable textual support from Peirce, that sign (representamen), object, and interpretant are but correlates within a triadic semiotic relation, others that the triadic relation itself is the Sign: that is, that one could argue that the Sign is not simply the representamen or the representamen plus its object, that the Sign is the whole triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant ensemble.As you and other List members are well aware, I am in the former camp and quite vociferously reject the latter position. As I see it, it is an even bigger terminological mistake than using "instant" colloquially instead of carefully distinguishing it from "moment," because it is even more conducive of conceptual confusion. The triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) "mediating," while "sign" designates its first corollate--that which represents the object for the interpretant, or (more generally) that which mediates between the object and the interpretant.GR: In this view, these three elements together form an inseparable unity such that if any part were missing, the sign would be incompleteIf this is the primary concern motivating the widespread misuse of "sign" as referring to the triadic relation instead of its first correlate, then there is a simple and much better alternative. Instead of saying (incorrectly) that the absence of an object or interpretant renders the sign "incomplete," we should say (correctly) that every sign by definition has an object and (at least potentially) an interpretant, such that if either of these were missing, then there would be no sign at all. More specifically, I would say that every sign has a dynamical object, an immediate object, an immediate interpretant, and a final interpretant; the only correlate that (at least theoretically) could ever be missing is a dynamical interpretant, i.e., an actual effect of the sign (token). This is because the immediate object and immediate interpretant are internal to the sign (type) itself, while the dynamical object and final interpretant are the other two (external) correlates of the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating.GR: In Peirce’s semeiotic, the interpretant is itself most typically a new (or modified) sign, so the triad continually regenerates itself in endless semiosis. Seen this way, the Sign is not three static parts, but an active, self-referential loop.In my view, this description has it backwards (bottom-up)--again, I maintain that the continuous whole is ontologically prior to its parts (top-down), which are indefinite until deliberately marked off for a purpose. The first step is prescinding an individual sign of interest from the real and continuous process of semiosis, followed by identifying the other correlates of its triadic relation. These are "static parts" of semiosis only in the same hypothetical (but useful) sense that instants are "static parts" of time, points are "static parts" of space, and positions are "static parts" of motion--not real parts, but entia rationis. Put another way, semiosis is no more built up of discrete signs--nor even discrete triadic relations--than time is built up of discrete instants, space is built up of discrete points, and motion is built up of discrete positions.GR: Thus, from the standpoint of 'reentry', the sign is the living triadic distinction continually folding back on itself--not a static correlate, but a process.This is another unfortunate conflation of two distinct concepts--as Ben U. already pointed out, "semiosis" is the term for the real and continuous process, while "sign" is the term for the first correlate prescinded from it as an individual artifact of analysis.GR: In this view, it is only as an analytical contrivance in speculative grammar that the distinction of object - sign - interpretant as correlates holds.With this, I happily agree. As you rightly noted, "the interpretant is itself most typically a new (or modified) sign," and Peirce also maintains that the object must likewise be of the nature a sign. "Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought" (CP 1.538, 1903). "Whatever is capable of being represented is itself of a representative nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). "Thus, it is said to be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented by the sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, should itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not independent of all representation" (EP 2:328, 1904). In short, although "really being and being represented are very different" (EP 2:303, NEM 4:239, 1901), really being and being representable--and thus being of the nature of a sign--are the same. "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable. ... This appears mystical and mysterious simply because we insist on remaining blind to what is plain, that there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol" (EP 2:324, NEM 4:262, 1901).Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Wed, Jul 16, 2025 at 5:39 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote:Jon, List,In footnote 22 of "Temporal Synechism" you note that Andre de Tienne asks the question "to what extent does the flow of time regulate the flow of signs, and to what extent does the flow of signs influence or determine the flow of time?" This post is meant to begin a discussion of that question.Several days ago I had an off List exchange with Helmut Ralien which included some comments of mine on an earlier Peirce-L post of his in which he introduced the Spencer-Brown concept of 'reentry' into a discussion of whether the sign (hereafter I'll use lowercase 'sign' to mean 'representamen') was a mere correlate within the object - sign - interpretant triad, or whether the triad itself in toto constituted the Sign (uppercase 'Sign' standing for that idea in this post).I thought his introduction of Spencer-Brown's notion into the discussion was brilliant, but I had some trouble following it. So, I made a few suggestions as to how it might otherwise be approached. Here, with some modifications related to the content of the recent thread on Time, is my suggestion of an approach to the Spencer-Brown 'reentry' idea.Some argue, with considerable textual support from Peirce, that sign (representamen), object, and interpretant are but correlates within a triadic semiotic relation, others that the triadic relation itself is the Sign: that is, that one could argue that the Sign is not simply the representamen or the representamen plus its object, that the Sign is the whole triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant ensemble. In this view, these three elements together form an inseparable unity such that if any part were missing, the sign would be incomplete -- just as, if it were possible (which it obviously is not), if any of the three 'parts' of a temporal "durée" were to be missing, there would be no Time.Spencer-Brown’s concept of 'reentry' might help clarify the matter by showing how a distinction can fold back into itself. In Laws of Form, 'reentry' means that a distinction reenters the space it marks, creating self-reference and recursion. In Peirce’s semeiotic, the interpretant is itself most typically a new (or modified) sign, so the triad continually regenerates itself in endless semiosis.
Seen this way, the Sign is not three static parts, but an active, self-referential loop. Reentry suggests that what makes a Sign is not the mere coexistence of sign, object, and interpretant, but the dynamic process of the triadic relation reentering itself through the production of further interpretants. Thus, from the standpoint of 'reentry', the sign is the living triadic distinction continually folding back on itself -- not a static correlate, but a process.
In this view, it is only as an analytical contrivance in speculative grammar that the distinction of object - sign - interpretant as correlates holds. Rather, as it is in the analysis of Time, the central 'part' of the object - representamen - interpretant triad is 'more present'. That is all.
Best,
Gary R
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