Gary R, list,

Thank you for digging up this concise account of Pattee’s “epistemic cut” 
concept. I agree that it’s not as dualistic as the word “cut” makes it sound. I 
think the closest analog to it in Peircean semeiotics is the type/token 
distinction. 

Applying that distinction across systemic scales leads us to perceive a 
hierarchy of types, in which the “higher” levels include the relatively lower 
ones. In biology, for instance, the genus typically includes many species, and 
these too include subdivisions, while the genus is also included within a 
higher “type.” The generic double-helix structure of DNA is also a type, of 
which every individual DNA molecule is a token. But at the level of the 
organism, the molecule is a token of the genotype; and the genome of the 
organism includes a token or “replica” of it in the nucleus of each cell. 

Pattee’s designation of dynamic processes as “rate-dependent” is also relative 
rather than absolute: it’s a matter of time-scale. At the developmental scale, 
the “stem cell” differentiates into various cell types as determined by the 
effects of epigenetic processes on the expression of the genome tokens. At the 
evolutionary scale, genotypes likewise produce variations, and natural 
selection determines which ones survive and replicate themselves, but this 
takes much longer — depending on the rate at which the organisms reproduce.

Gregory Bateson in Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity pointed out that thought 
has the same structure: a hierarchy of generality:

[[ In what is offered in this book, the hierarchical structure of thought, 
which Bertrand Russell called logical typing, will take the place of 
hierarchical structure of the Great Chain of Being and an attempt will be made 
to propose a sacred unity of the biosphere that will contain fewer 
epistemological errors than the versions of that sacred unity which the various 
religions of history have offered. What is important is that, right or wrong, 
the epistemology shall be explicit. Equally explicit criticism will then be 
possible.

So the immediate task of this book is to construct a picture of how the world 
is joined together in its mental aspects. How do ideas, information, steps of 
logical or pragmatic consistency, and the like fit together? How is logic, the 
classical procedure for making chains of ideas, related to an outside world of 
things and creatures, parts and wholes? ] —Bateson 1979, 21]

Bateson affirmed the continuity between mental and physical or “dynamic” 
processes. So did the ecologist Howard Odum, with his concept of the “energy 
hierarchy”: https://gnusystems.ca/TS/ssc.htm#nrgsms 

Peirce also made an interesting connection with the origins of the word “type” 
— but I’ll leave that for later in case anybody’s interested.

 

Love, gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Eternity is not another order of time, but the atmosphere of time. 
[Merleau-Ponty] {

 <https://substack.com/@gnox> substack.com/@gnox }{  
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> Turning Signs

 

From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On Behalf Of 
Gary Richmond
Sent: 9-Sep-25 00:05
To: Peirce List <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Howard Pattee's "Epistemic Cut" and Peircean semeiotics

 

Erratum: I wrote, "As I mentioned in an earlier post, to some degree Pettee's 
views seem to me to parallel Frederik Stjernfelt's in Natural Propositions: The 
Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns (2014) regarding constraints, both 
arguing that life works by constraints that connect symbolic and dynamic 
domains. However, I should note that Pattee critiques Deacon for placing 
'interpretation' "too early."  See: "Symbol Grounding Precedes Interpretation: 
Commentary to the target article by Terrence Deacon" (Biosemiotics, 2021)."

 

I stand by my first comment regarding Stjernfelt's dicisigns as perhaps 
paralleling Pattee's epistemic cut, but was thinking of Deacon at about the 
same time (I had spoken with him regarding a related issue at an ICCS 
conference about a decade ago). Having momentarily lost my intellectual 
compass, I erroneously pointed to Pattee's remarks concerning Deacon. I haven't 
yet read "Symbol Grounding Precedes Interpretation: Commentary to the target 
article by Terrence Deacon." 

 

GR

 

On Mon, Sep 8, 2025 at 7:01 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

List,

In the past few weeks there have been several references to Howard H. Pattee's 
theory of an "epistemic cut" as argued in his essay, "The Physics of Symbols: 
Bridging the Epistemic Cut" (2001).
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/12009802_The_physics_of_symbols_Bridging_the_epistemic_cut

I had heard of the epistemic cut several times over the past decade and a half, 
especially after becoming quite interested in biosemiotics and so reading some 
of the literature related to it. At that time I joined the biosemiotics list, 
then at a 2011 biosemiotics conference in New York City,  presented a paper by 
Vinicius Romanini, a good friend and colleague, who was at the last minute 
unable to attend. I was able to meet and, in some cases, have 
instructive/constructive conversations with several of the leading figures in 
the field then such as Don Favareau, Kalevi Kull, Marcello Barbieri, Eliseo 
Fernandez, Susan Petrilli, Søren Brier, John Collier, and others. I should note 
that while some had, not all of these scholars had embraced Peirce's theories. 
However, as an introduction to biosemiotics as it relates to Peircean thought, 
I highly recommend the book Romanini edited with another dear friend, Eliseo 
Fernandez, since passed.
See: Vinicius Romanani and Eliseo Fernández, Editors: Peirce and Biosemiotics: 
A Guess at the Riddle of Life 
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-7732-3

However, I had never really explored the notion of an epistemic gap, and so 
recently decided that, since it had been mentioned on the List, I might now 
take a look into it. Strangely, as I began my research, and although Pattee's 
essay is cited not infrequently in the biosemiotic literature, I couldn't find 
any reviews of it online, so I began by reading this page where one can read 
the Abstract of the essay and several Section snippets:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0303264701001046
I haven't yet completed reading the entire paper, but I think I've grasped 
enough of a sense of it to make a few comments which might be helpful to those 
who are interested in the concept.

The epistemic cut, as I understand it, is a distinction Pattee makes in 
consideration of living organisms, between symbols (which he calls 
'rate-independent', e.g. genetic codes) and dynamics ('rate-dependent', 
virtually all physical processes). In Pattee’s framework, rate-independent 
processes are symbolic, like DNA sequences, their meaning not depending on how 
fast or slow they are 'read' or 'copied'. Rate-dependent processes, on the 
other hand, are physical dynamics, like chemical reactions, whose outcomes 
depend on timing, rates of change, energy flows, etc. The epistemic cut 
separates the aforementioned domains, Pattee arguing that these must interact 
for living systems to exist at all.

The paradigmatic example, indeed the first appearance of the epistemic split 
according to Pattee, appears as the genotype/phenotype split, where DNA 
sequences (symbols) direct the construction of proteins (matter). In Pattee's 
view, evolution itself depends on bridging this gap through control and coding. 
Pattee asks, how do living systems express novelty, memory, and freedom? His 
answer is that all life requires stored genetic memory and constraints that 
allow alternative pathways within physical laws.

I would note that the epistemic cut, although not an ontological division in 
reality, is, according to Pattee, necessary for scientific knowledge. He argues 
that to speak of “symbols” in referring to “objects” demands a functional 
separation, and this separation is irreducible because physical laws alone 
cannot account for the higher-level processes such as coding and control. 

As I understand him, Pattee holds that all symbols are grounded in physical 
bases/substrates, and that biology shows this most clearly. He argues that 
bridging the epistemic cut in life depends on specific material conditions such 
as genetic coding and what he calls evolutionary 'search' processes involving 
physical constraints. The point for 'life' is that what distinguishes the 
living from the lifeless is that life entails symbol/matter complementarity, 
requiring both physical law and symbolic constraints. Pettee maintains that to 
understand life fully, science must integrate physics, semiotics, and biology, 
and to recognize the indispensable role of the epistemic cut.

Now as to how this might relate to Peirce's semeiotic: First, it seems to me 
clear enough that Pattee’s epistemic cut does not represent Cartesian dualism. 
Indeed, it could be argued (although I don't know that it has been) that it is 
much closer to Peirce’s trichotomic than to dualism. As noted above, Pattee 
explicitly says that the cut is not a division in reality but an “epistemic 
necessity: Symbols in living beings (DNA, codes, etc.) are physical structures 
--  what he calls 'heteropolymers', which embody the bridge across the 
epistemic cut. This is to say that their ordered sequences serve as symbols, 
while their material structures and reactions perform physical functions -- so 
they are clearly not immaterial “ideas.”

As I mentioned in an earlier post, to some degree Pettee's views seem to me to 
parallel Frederik Stjernfelt's in Natural Propositions: The Actuality of 
Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns (2014) regarding constraints, both arguing that 
life works by constraints that connect symbolic and dynamic domains. However, I 
should note that Pattee critiques Deacon for placing 'interpretation' "too 
early."  See: "Symbol Grounding Precedes Interpretation: Commentary to the 
target article by Terrence Deacon" (Biosemiotics, 2021).

Further connecting these ideas to Peircean semeiotics, it appears to me that 
Pattee’s framework implicitly involves three irreducible elements: Symbols 
(rate-independent structures), dynamics (rate-dependent processes), and 
constraints (mediating laws and habits). I would suggest that his position is 
closer to Peirce’s realism and semeiotics than to any form of dualism because 
it treats symbols as physical signs embedded in dynamics such that their 
meaning and function arise only through relational processes. Further, Pattee’s 
epistemic cut is, as I see it, not only not at all dualistic but closer to a 
Peircean view in which Pattee's "symbols, dynamics, and constraints" can be 
viewed as corresponding to Peirce’s sign, object, and interpretant. This would 
further suggest that the epistemic cut might also be seen as grounded in 
Peirce's three categories.

Best,

Gary R

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