Gary F., Gary R., List: I am not directly familiar with Pattee's work, but I likewise wondered whether his concept of "epistemic cut" is related to Peirce's type/token distinction. I am also definitely interested in the "connection with the *origins *of the word 'type'" that the latter made, and I will further point out that he ultimately replaced "replica" with "instance" as his preferred term for a token that embodies a type. He explains why in a text about Existential Graphs.
CSP: An individual existing embodiment of such a type is called a *graph-instance*, or a[n] *instance *of a graph. I formerly called it a *replica*, forgetting that Mr. Kempe, in his Memoir on Mathematical Forms, §170, had already preempted this word as a technical term relating to graphs, and that in a highly appropriate sense, while my sense was not at all appropriate. I therefore am glad to abandon this term. (LF 2/1:171, 1904) The CP editors included a similar remark as a footnote to 4.395, which Peirce had written in the margin of the corresponding manuscript; they dated it c. 1910, but Pietarinen suggests that late 1903 is more likely (LF 2/1:171n24). In any case, since I maintain that *every *token is an instance of a type, and also that there can be different types of the same sign, my own terminology for speculative grammar distinguishes between "tokens of types" and "instances of signs." For example, "man" and "man" are different tokens of the same type, while "man" (in English) and "homme" (in French) are different tokens of different types, as well as different instances of the same sign. As for the relation between a type and its tokens, according to Peirce, "In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies" (CP 4.537, 1906). He later adds that a type is "a general, which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform" (CP 8.313, 1905 Jan 22); and that we must distinguish types "from *Instances *of them, which are Icons of them" (NEM 3:887, 1908 Dec 5). In short, a type *governs *its tokens, which *embody *and *iconically represent* the type. I am not directly familiar with Bateson's work, either, but I posted comments and questions about some of his statements that are quoted in *Turning Signs* a few weeks ago ( https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00094.html). My own longstanding hypothesis about the hierarchy (or constitution) of being in accordance with Peirce's cosmological blackboard diagram is that it is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). My recently developed semiosic ontology adds that the one root of all being is the being of a sign, such that every individual existing thing is a token of a type, an instance of a sign, an actual exemplar of a real general; and every dyadic reaction between such discrete things is a degenerate manifestation of continuous and triadic semiosis. This account *does *stress "the continuity of semiosis across scales" by holding that every part of the entire universe as one immense sign has parts of the same kind, i.e., they are all likewise signs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Sep 11, 2025 at 2:09 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F, List, > > Thanks for your interesting response to my post on the epistemic cut. I'm > currently on a two week family vacation in Colorado, so I haven't too > much free time to reflect and reply on yours or any posts to the List. But > as everyone else in my family is presently taking a nap, I thought I'd > attempt a quick reply to your thoughtful post, a response which most > likely will need some revision as it's very much 'off the cuff'. > > My first thought is that Peirce does not treat types as static 'containers” > of tokens; instead, types are habits or laws that only exist insofar as > they can be instantiated and interpreted which, in my view, means that > the relation is not merely hierarchical (as in genus/species or DNA > double-helix/molecules), but dynamic and inferential. In my view, there > is an essential continuity of types and tokens through habits of > interpretation which undercuts the very sharpness of any 'cut' between > symbolic and physical processes. In a word, Peirce treats type/token not > as a structural hierarchy but as involved in a triadic, dynamic, and > continuous process of semiosis. > > Terrence Deacon, in *Incomplete Nature*, argues that Peirce’s framework > resists strict dualisms by embedding signs within processes of growth and > habit-taking. So, from this perspective, Pattee’s distinction between > rate-dependent dynamics and rate-independent symbols may be useful as a > heuristic, but I am beginning to think that it is less faithful to Peirce > than an account that stresses t*he continuity of semiosis across scales*. In > Deacon's view, what matters most is the way interpretive processes knit > together matter, life, and thought through evolving habits. > > I would like to hear more about Bateson's proposal for replacing the > 'Great Chain of Being' idea with a hierarchy of logical types, seemingly a > project showing how ideas, information, and pragmatic and logical processes > connect with the external world. I recall your having written about this in > *Turning > Signs*, but if you could point to some passages for quick reference, that > would be helpful. > > GF: Peirce also made an interesting connection with the *origins* of the > word “type” — but I’ll leave that for later in case anybody’s interested. > > I'd definitely be interested! > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Thu, Sep 11, 2025 at 9:38 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R, list, >> >> Thank you for digging up this concise account of Pattee’s “epistemic cut” >> concept. I agree that it’s not as dualistic as the word “cut” makes it >> sound. I think the closest analog to it in Peircean semeiotics is the >> type/token distinction. >> >> Applying that distinction across systemic scales leads us to perceive a >> *hierarchy* of types, in which the “higher” levels *include* the >> relatively lower ones. In biology, for instance, the *genus* typically >> includes many *species*, and these too include subdivisions, while the >> genus is also included within a higher “type.” The generic double-helix >> structure of DNA is also a type, of which every individual DNA molecule is >> a token. But at the level of the organism, the molecule is a token of the >> genotype; and the genome of the organism includes a token or “replica” of >> it in the nucleus of each cell. >> >> Pattee’s designation of dynamic processes as “rate-dependent” is also >> relative rather than absolute: it’s a matter of time-scale. At the >> developmental scale, the “stem cell” differentiates into various cell types >> as determined by the effects of epigenetic processes on the expression of >> the genome tokens. At the evolutionary scale, genotypes likewise produce >> variations, and natural selection determines which ones survive and >> replicate themselves, but this takes much longer — depending on the rate at >> which the organisms reproduce. >> >> Gregory Bateson in *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity* pointed out that >> *thought* has the same structure: a hierarchy of generality: >> >> [[ In what is offered in this book, the hierarchical structure of >> thought, which Bertrand Russell called logical typing, will take the place >> of hierarchical structure of the Great Chain of Being and an attempt will >> be made to propose a sacred unity of the biosphere that will contain fewer >> epistemological errors than the versions of that sacred unity which the >> various religions of history have offered. What is important is that, right >> or wrong, the epistemology shall be *explicit*. Equally explicit >> criticism will then be possible. >> >> So the immediate task of this book is to construct a picture of how the >> world is joined together in its mental aspects. How do ideas, information, >> steps of logical or pragmatic consistency, and the like fit together? How >> is logic, the classical procedure for making chains of ideas, related to an >> outside world of things and creatures, parts and wholes? ] —Bateson 1979, >> 21] >> >> Bateson affirmed the continuity between mental and physical or “dynamic” >> processes. So did the ecologist Howard Odum, with his concept of the >> “energy hierarchy”: https://gnusystems.ca/TS/ssc.htm#nrgsms >> >> Peirce also made an interesting connection with the *origins* of the >> word “type” — but I’ll leave that for later in case anybody’s interested. >> >> >> >> Love, gary f. >> >> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >> >> } Eternity is not another order of time, but the atmosphere of time. >> [Merleau-Ponty] { >> >> substack.com/@gnox }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> >> >
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