Gary R, list, I don’t think anybody doubts that there is a hierarchy of types, i.e. of general concepts. (Stan Salthe used to call it the “specification” or “subsumption” hierarchy, as opposed to the hierarchy of scale.) If we take tokens to be singular, individual, existing things, then they have no place in that hierarchy, even at the bottom. All nouns are general, except proper names; genotypes and phenotypes are both types. But if we think in terms of systems and processes, as I tend to do, then we see existing “individuals” as artifacts of analysis, just as signs are artifacts of the analysis of semiosis.
You and I, for instance, are not individuals in the strict logical sense of that word. We are systems and processes that are embedded in higher-scale processes and include internal systems. We exist at a temporal and spatial scale, and on the human scale, we are tokens of our species — which is itself a temporary product of the process of evolution. Both Peirce and Bateson recognized this as a mental process which is also a physical process powered by energy as determined by “laws.” Life and semiosis are likewise processes that take time and take place across many scales involving both top-down and bottom-up interactions. We can’t understand any level of them with a timeless logic. I hope that helps … Now to the “interesting connection” Peirce made with the origins of the word “type.” I thought of changing the subject line to “Sex and Semiosis,” but decided to leave it as is rather than start a new thread. The relevant passage in Turning Signs is here: https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29 Within that passage is a link to a longer blog post about the history of the word “type” (unusual for me because it contains visuals): https://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/09/earthtypes/ I may have shared either or both of these with the list years ago, but anyway here they are again. Love, gary f. Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg From: Gary Richmond <[email protected]> Sent: 11-Sep-25 15:09 To: [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Howard Pattee's "Epistemic Cut" and Peircean semeiotics Gary F, List, Thanks for your interesting response to my post on the epistemic cut. I'm currently on a two week family vacation in Colorado, so I haven't too much free time to reflect and reply on yours or any posts to the List. But as everyone else in my family is presently taking a nap, I thought I'd attempt a quick reply to your thoughtful post, a response which most likely will need some revision as it's very much 'off the cuff'. My first thought is that Peirce does not treat types as static 'containers” of tokens; instead, types are habits or laws that only exist insofar as they can be instantiated and interpreted which, in my view, means that the relation is not merely hierarchical (as in genus/species or DNA double-helix/molecules), but dynamic and inferential. In my view, there is an essential continuity of types and tokens through habits of interpretation which undercuts the very sharpness of any 'cut' between symbolic and physical processes. In a word, Peirce treats type/token not as a structural hierarchy but as involved in a triadic, dynamic, and continuous process of semiosis. Terrence Deacon, in Incomplete Nature, argues that Peirce’s framework resists strict dualisms by embedding signs within processes of growth and habit-taking. So, from this perspective, Pattee’s distinction between rate-dependent dynamics and rate-independent symbols may be useful as a heuristic, but I am beginning to think that it is less faithful to Peirce than an account that stresses the continuity of semiosis across scales. In Deacon's view, what matters most is the way interpretive processes knit together matter, life, and thought through evolving habits. I would like to hear more about Bateson's proposal for replacing the 'Great Chain of Being' idea with a hierarchy of logical types, seemingly a project showing how ideas, information, and pragmatic and logical processes connect with the external world. I recall your having written about this in Turning Signs, but if you could point to some passages for quick reference, that would be helpful. GF: Peirce also made an interesting connection with the origins of the word “type” — but I’ll leave that for later in case anybody’s interested. I'd definitely be interested! Best, Gary R
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