List I agree - I think it’s sometimes useful to consider WHY one labels another person a ’nominalist’. Heck - it’s even considered almost an insult in some cases ‘ [why, you lowly nominalist, you…].
I think it has to do with the source and site and thus the very identity of knowledge. Is it within the full control of the individual Or the comunity/ Or some other agency, such as god The nominalist obviously locates the source of knowledge generation and development within the individual. Socially - this sets up a very different society - than one that rests all knowledge generation with a non-human agency [ such as god]. This was a key concept that so outraged the anti-Darwinists - to have knowledge development in the individual - not preordained by god - and - even random at that!! Ii think Peirce’s three categories - especially Thirdness, which is the mode fo being of knwoeldge/habits that are general rather than unique, that are common to a community..removes him from nominalism. But- it doesn’t move him into a priori determinism. Rather it removes him from pure idealism [ ie, such as Plato’s] by his insistence that these very same habits are self-generating, self-organize, can change, can emerge as novel, and that this takes place within the individual and Secondness. [there’s that ’symbolic indexical relation].. As for Kant- the fact that he acknowledges a non-human knowledge base [ the noumena] means that he’s not a pure or full nominalist, because he thus reduces man’s power to ‘know’. And he seems to me to be very much a ‘creature of his era - the era of the rise of the individual freedom. Edwina > On Sep 12, 2025, at 12:17 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hello, > > I'd like to challenge the assertion that Peirce considers Kant to be an > "ultra-nominalist" in metaphysics. How can one square such a claim with > Peirce's classification of metaphysical theories--based on the categories. > Here is a screenshot from an online version of the Harvard Lectures on > Pragmatism: > > <Screenshot 2025-09-11 at 3.59.16 PM.png> > > Drawing on this diagram, the most extreme type of nominalism is any > metaphysical theory that affirms the reality only of individual > existences--where those actual individuals are understood to have the > character of the second phenomenological category of brute reaction. The > examples he gives are Lutoslawski and Mickiewicz. > > Again, drawing on this table, "Kantism" (which I take to include Kant's own > theory) affirms the reality of real possibilities, real laws and actual > individuals, where the reality of each corresponds to the first, second and > third phenomenological categories. > > As such, here is one text where Peirce explicitly rejects interpretations of > Kant's metaphysics that treat the view as ultra-nominalist. On my > interpretation of texts, the vast majority of what Peirce says about Kant is > entirely consonant with his classification here. Peirce suggests there are > places in Kant's metaphysics where he is less realistic about things (e.g., > the nature of space and time) than Plato or Aristotle, but that only makes > Kant a more hesitant realist (of a particularly conceptualist stripe) about > the reality of some things than Peirce happens to be. > > Hope that helps, > > Jeff > From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on > behalf of Gary Richmond <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> > Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2025 12:51 PM > To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>>; Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> > Cc: Jack Cody <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Propositions, Truth, and Experience (was Will and > Belief) > > Jon, Jack, List, > > Jon, thanks for showing in this post as well as other posts in this thread > that, in positing unknowable 'things in themselves', Kant's ultranominalism > is seen to be in direct contrast with Peirce’s Scholastic realism which > identifies reality with what true propositions represent. As you've shown, > there's no 'mystery' in any of this, nothing is 'hidden': so it is a fact > that the green grass I'm currently looking at outside my window is > unquestionably green and you -- and anyone who knows English and has ever had > the collateral experience of seeing green grass -- indeed, as the French > phrase it, tout le monde (in whatever language they express it) knows exactly > the truth of that statement. > > In addition, Jon, it was helpful to read your succinct account of Peirce’s > view that syntax and diagrams in logic, as well as sometimes is the case in > natural language, iconically mirror logical and causal relations. > > I should note that I have thoroughly enjoyed and most definitely have learned > from your and Jack's, as well as other contributors' participation in the > discussion in this thread. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Tue, Sep 9, 2025 at 4:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Jack, List: > > Perhaps I misunderstood, but "agreed-upon meaning" struck me as a likely > indicator of nominalism--the doctrine that "grass" and "green," as words > signifying general concepts, "are mere names without any corresponding > reality." Do you agree after all that my grass being green today is "the > ontic reality," such that the proposition "my grass is green today" is true? > Do you also agree that the structure of propositions matches that of real > facts, such that even if no one had ever actually expressed this one in any > particular human language, it would still be true? A scholastic realist says > yes to both these questions, while a nominalist says no. > > Peirce was as serious a scholar of Kant's work as they come, and he > explicitly "return[ed] the verdict of nominalism," regardless of how Kant > viewed himself. "Kant was a nominalist; although his philosophy would have > been rendered compacter, more consistent, and stronger if its author had > taken up realism, as he certainly would have done if he had read Scotus" (CP > 1.19, 1903). Here is a longer excerpt from an early (and still unpublished) > manuscript draft of CP 5.464 (EP 2:400). > > CSP: I was long enough within the Kantian fold myself to comprehend clearly > in what their difficulty consists in, and how it arises, but the full > explanation would be too long for this article. It may be said to have two > sources; first, that the main propositions of Kant solve no problems, but > merely transform, or restate them, and that in a way that tends to block the > road of inquiry, the worst tendency that a philosophy can have. The reception > the Kantians gave to the non-Euclidean geometry illustrated that. The second > source of the Kantian misunderstanding,--only to be indicated here,--is > Kant's nominalism. The essence of nominalism lies in its assumption that > reality consists in a mode of being independent of thought, instead of in a > mode of being independent of any actual thoughts, or judgments, concerning > the real object. Accordingly, as soon as a nominalist is convinced that an > object or meaning is constructed of thought, he pronounces it unreal without > any further discrimination. Kant is ultranominalistic when he refers to his > nonsensical things in themselves. (R 321, 1907) > > Of course, the last sentence makes it unmistakably clear that Peirce > specifically considered Kant's notion of an incognizable thing-in-itself to > be irremediably rooted in nominalism. "Now this scholastic realism is usually > set down as a belief in metaphysical fictions. But, in fact, a realist is > simply one who knows no more recondite reality than that which is represented > in a true representation. Since, therefore, the word 'man' is true of > something, that which 'man' means is real. The nominalist must admit that man > is truly applicable to something; but he believes that there is beneath this > a thing in itself, an incognizable reality. His is the metaphysical figment" > (CP 5.312, EP 1:53, 1868). Even more strongly, "The absolutely unknowable is > a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy" (CP 6.492, > c. 1896). > > As for "the syntactical element of iconicity in propositions," it is most > obvious in Beta EG, where individuals are denoted by continuous heavy lines > and concepts are attributed to them by attaching words to those lines, so we > can literally see their logical relations. Frederik Stjernfelt observes in > Sheets, Diagrams, and Realism in Peirce (2022) that this is unquestionably > more iconic than the now-standard algebraic notation, where each variable > denoting an individual must occur repeatedly--for every quantifier and > predicate--instead of only once (pp. 138&172). Even in natural languages, > Peirce observes a tendency for the syntax to embody "the flow of causation," > giving the English sentence "Cain killed Abel" as an example (SWS 289-90, > 1910 Nov 26-27)--it is just as compact and iconic as the corresponding graph > in Beta EG, and much more so than spelling out ∃x ∃y (Cx ∧ Ay ∧ Kxy) as > "there exists an x and there exists a y such that x is Cain and y is Abel and > x stands in the relation of killing to y." > > On the other hand, Peirce recognizes elsewhere that certain arrangements of > certain words are sometimes needed to represent logical relations in natural > languages. He classifies these signs as "Copulants, which neither describe > nor denote their Objects, but merely express universally the logical sequence > of these latter upon something otherwise referred to. Such, among linguistic > signs, as 'If ____ then ____,' '____ is ____,' '____ causes ____,' '____ > would be ____,' '____ is relative to ____ for ____,' 'Whatever,' etc." (CP > 8.350, EP 2:484, 1908 Dec 25). Even here, the syntax in each case exhibits a > degree of iconicity--the antecedent precedes the consequent, the cause > precedes the effect, the present state precedes the future state, etc. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > > On Tue, Sep 9, 2025 at 7:24 AM Jack Cody <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Jon, list > > I don't think it has to do with nominalism. I mean here's a description > definition of nominalism: > > ....doctrine > <https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-e&sca_esv=b77b92e33e02ffaf&q=doctrine&si=AMgyJEtf_wwxVVftS7Kej8ZWRY4P7gIcRG6G4u_Xg6bPl-yTECp_j1PcSZ8A_HoklT5kOf-e7sx5pnGLU4SYl7N7RneLPTUGti5UYpxAP-1HHyFQ93RfNis%3D&expnd=1&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi5k4-R08uPAxX2XEEAHaPPEXwQyecJegQIFhAS> > that universals > <https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-e&sca_esv=b77b92e33e02ffaf&q=universals&si=AMgyJEt_i95eqLH3KOj-Ut-VGJJ77WvzNUmBAvuI6WxhNKmIrl95_LaTkh90xsuWN86qbxHRehXGcotf7kXJYuD2Q47X4KfHKs2n_0FRAkr_0gFs_REPyJw%3D&expnd=1&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi5k4-R08uPAxX2XEEAHaPPEXwQyecJegQIFhAT> > or general ideas are mere names without any corresponding reality. Only > particular objects exist, and properties, numbers, and sets are merely > features of the way of considering the things that exist. (Taken from Google). > > I mean, there's some sense in the above. You can go at it categorically and > affirm some of the criteria easily enough. It would have to be a far more > technical definition before I'd consent to that term and what it denotes > being the difference though I do think you are right that there is a > philosophical difference. I merely think that difference, if we made a > decision tree, (and I've sort of done this already), would be between dynamic > objects (and infinite inquiry, however one wishes to invoke it) and the > ding-an-sich. The weird part, for me, is that I don't disagree about > convergence — my own philosophical stance is that truth, as it is > regardless, is always present but cannot be measured in opinions. The truth, > as it is, (for me), is not so far from what Peirce postulates but I do not > think it an object but rather a real "thing" which if you could understand it > at all would be more an ideal (an actually extant/real ideal) than any object > — and here you can invoke the regulative hope of Peirce in perhaps an > interesting way? > > I don't have my core library to hand here but from memory Kant goes to great > lengths to demonstrate why the ding-an-sich (and the general system he > writes) is not nominalist. He knows, because of the dialogical context at the > time, that they will charge him of such. But no serious scholar, surely, can > read the Critique, et al, and return the verdict of nominalism (though you > could read much twentieth century, or nineteenth, also, and actually return > such a verdict). > > I'd have to know what is meant by it before I agreed, either way, as to > whether that's the stumbling block for I consider myself a "realist", also, > in the way I go about substantiating whatever it is I would claim. > > I'd ask that you clarify what you mean by iconic in the context of > propositions. Yes, off-the-top, I would agree, but I'm not sure it is a > genuine icon. If you could clarify the syntactical element of iconicity in > propositions, without being overly verbose (i.e., assume I am a child who > wants to know what you mean), then perhaps we could come to an agreement > there also? > > Best, > Jack > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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