List, A procedural matter was brought up which I'd like to clarify,
When a forum member changes the subject line of a thread, the point of the change is to reflect what that person is *now *discussing in *that *post, not what *was* recently discussed in the thread before the subject line was changed. *Obviously, if anyone has more to say about the previous topic, then they can still reply to a post in that previous thread*. A participant in a threaded discussion may feel free to change the subject line of that thread if that discussion has brought them to the consideration of a topic brought up in the course of that discussion which they would like to further discuss as such. *Obviously, an unrelated topic would warrant the introduction of an entirely new thread.* While I recently gave what has in many forums and has always in Peirce-L been considered to be the proper, as respectful way to change a subject line, I'll give it again: *New Subject Line, was Old Subject Line* Variants of this formula are, of course, acceptable, and one has seen in this forum such minor variants as: *New Subject Line, WAS Old Subject Line* *New Subject Line, (was, Old Subject Line)* Best, Gary Richmond (writing as Peirce-L moderator and co-manager of it and Arisbe with Ben Udell) On Sat, Sep 13, 2025 at 6:41 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > List - > > I’m not sure if the thread title above represents the recent discussion > correctly, That is it wasn’t a discussion about nominalism vs scholastic > realism. Indeed, as both Gary R and I pointed out - neither term was > even defined! A rather vital ‘black hole!’ > > To my recollection, it began within the discussion of 5.525; and the > categorical process of symbolic indexical[ 3-2] in semiosic interactions... > with JAS calling Kant a nominalist [ as a blanket term rather than > contextual]….and so - it went. > > Not a very fruitful discussion - which would have far better looked at the > difference between the external and Dynamic Objects and also - the role of > and nature of Thirdness in the universe [ not merely in human cognition]. > > Edwina > > On Sep 12, 2025, at 9:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary R., Jack, List: > > For the record, although the quotations attributed below to Peirce's 1903 > Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism are accurate summaries, he did not actually > state either of them. He does say, "I am myself a scholastic realist of a > somewhat extreme stripe" (CP 5.470), but not until 1907, in one of several > manuscript drafts for an introductory article about pragmatism that was not > published during his lifetime (R 318). > > I cannot speak for anyone else, but I am not using "nominalist" as an > epithet--I am simply positing it as a common philosophical root that might > explain various disagreements that have emerged in recent threads. > Accordingly, I agree with Gary R. that it is a matter of careful > definitions. For one thing, it is very important to recognize that in this > context, we are not talking about *realism *as the doctrine that reality > is independent of human thought, perception, or experience, which is > opposed to *idealism* as the doctrine that reality is mentally > constructed. Instead, we are talking about *scholastic *realism as the > doctrine that "*laws *and general *types *... are real," which is opposed > to *nominalism* as the doctrine that these are "figments of the mind." > > Conveniently, it turns out that Peirce prepared the entry for "nominalism" > in *The Century Dictionary* (1889-91). He distinguishes several > varieties, associating them with (a) the Stoics, (b) Roscellin, (c) Peter > Abelard, (d) William of Occam, (e) Thomas Hobbes, (f) modern science, and > (g) "Kant, who maintained that all unity in thought depends upon the nature > of the human mind, not belonging to the thing in itself." It is evidently > in *this* specific sense that Peirce views Kant as holding that "general > *types *are figments of the mind," thus qualifying him--and anyone who > agrees with him on this point--as a nominalist *in that respect*. Again, > Peirce suggests elsewhere that purging the incognizable thing-in-itself > from Kant's philosophy would effectively make him a pragmatist and > scholastic realist after all. > > There has been some debate about whether Peirce was a nominalist > *initially *(e.g., Max Fisch) or a scholastic realist from the very > beginning (e.g., Rosa Mayorga), but it is indisputable that his realism > only became stronger with time. As early as 1892, he describes his younger > self as "too nominalistic" (CP 6.270, EP 1:350); and by 1905, he admits > that he "went too far in the direction of nominalism" in "How to Make Our > Ideas Clear" (1878) asserting that his mature position "amounts to extreme > scholastic realism" (CP 8.208). My understanding is that Rorty went in the > other direction--scholastic realist at first, but increasingly nominalist > over the years. > > In any case, I asked Google, "What scholars claim that Peirce was a > nominalist?" It replied, "No major scholars claim that Charles Sanders > Peirce was a nominalist. Peirce was a staunch opponent of nominalism and > viewed it as a detrimental philosophy with negative consequences for > science, ethics, and civilization." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Sep 12, 2025 at 6:51 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary, List, >> >> Firstly, I'm not agreed nor saying that Peirce is/was a nominalist. I >> think it "empty verbiage". However, there are some who both read/teach >> Peirce at the highest level who do think such things. I cannot give those >> names here. For others are on the record you can do a quick search and >> qualified opinions, nominalism with an asterisk, follows from the likes of >> Rorty and so forth. Those who I know personally, of course, are as literate >> and published in Peircean studies as any on this list but I cannot use >> their names here and won't as it's a personal thing. >> >> Again, it was more to Edwina's point. And I think your reaction, (that >> is, it's almost a sin to say it (against Peirce), verifies Edwina's general >> commentary that the term is used more insultingly than it is to elucidate. >> I think that commentary correct. If one here says "such and such was a >> nominalist" it's only, as far as I can tell, insofar as the other person >> isn't and the right opinion/in salience, is with the non-nominalist. I >> think that is apt. Neither Kant nor Peirce were nominalist, but you can >> find as many as you like who can give you those opinions if you're willing >> to do cursory searches (from the best known names, too, I might add). Here, >> on-list, it's more of what went above — "y is nominalist and you cite y, >> whereas n/Peirce is not, and the right opinion, or n, (naturally enough on >> a list devoted to one philosopher), is not y". I see no value to it and >> think Jeffrey and Edwina have put it to bed. >> >> Best, >> Jack >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Friday, September 12, 2025 10:04 PM >> *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> >> *Cc:* Jack Cody <[email protected]>; Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> [email protected]> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Propositions, Truth, and Experience (was Will >> and Belief) >> >> Jon, Jeff, Jack, List, >> >> Jon: [Pierce] spells out "the question of nominalism and realism" a few >> paragraphs earlier as "whether *laws *and general *types* are figments >> of the mind or are real" (CP 1.16), so he evidently perceives all these >> thinkers as proponents of the first option in one way or another. >> >> It seems to me that a lot depends on one's definitions of nominalism and >> realism. >> >> Peirce's scholastic realism, associated with Duns Scotus, held that >> universals are real in some way, though *not* as Platonic Ideas existing >> apart from things. Rather, they exist *in re*: that is, they are general >> kinds (like redness or triangularity) so that they are not just names or >> mental constructs but are genuinely real. For him, to deny the reality of >> generals is to make the world unintelligible. Indeed, science presupposes >> that there are real patterns and laws, not just brute individual facts and >> his 'extreme Scholastic Realism' claims that generals are real in the >> strongest sense: continuity, possibility, and “would-bes” are all real >> features of the world this, again, versus the nominalist's position that >> that only individual things are real and that words like ‘humanity’ or >> ‘law of gravity’ are just convenient labels. >> >> Here are a couple of quotations I was able to quickly grab which >> succinctly give Peirce's meaning of 'extreme Scholastic realism." >> >> "I am a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe. I hold that >> generals are real, that laws are real, that possibilities are real, without >> depending upon their being realized.” 1903, Harvard Lectures on >> Pragmatism >> >> “When I say that I am a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe, >> I mean, for example, that I hold that a law, although it does not exist as >> an individual thing, is as real as if it did.” 1903, Harvard Lectures >> on Pragmatism >> >> So, laws don’t *exist* like physical objects, but they are just as *real* >> because they govern how things behave and even possibly will behave and >> denying this -- as most if not all forms of nominalism do -- actually >> undermines >> science, because science assumes laws are real and discoverable. >> >> Jack: "I'll let it be known though that many philosophers I have spoken >> with consider Peirce a nominalist." I would like you to point to one or >> two quotations from philosophers of any note who have called Peirce a >> nominalist. I can't think of even one myself. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE > FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your > default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
