Jon, list I don't think it has to do with nominalism. I mean here's a description definition of nominalism:
....doctrine<https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-e&sca_esv=b77b92e33e02ffaf&q=doctrine&si=AMgyJEtf_wwxVVftS7Kej8ZWRY4P7gIcRG6G4u_Xg6bPl-yTECp_j1PcSZ8A_HoklT5kOf-e7sx5pnGLU4SYl7N7RneLPTUGti5UYpxAP-1HHyFQ93RfNis%3D&expnd=1&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi5k4-R08uPAxX2XEEAHaPPEXwQyecJegQIFhAS> that universals<https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-e&sca_esv=b77b92e33e02ffaf&q=universals&si=AMgyJEt_i95eqLH3KOj-Ut-VGJJ77WvzNUmBAvuI6WxhNKmIrl95_LaTkh90xsuWN86qbxHRehXGcotf7kXJYuD2Q47X4KfHKs2n_0FRAkr_0gFs_REPyJw%3D&expnd=1&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi5k4-R08uPAxX2XEEAHaPPEXwQyecJegQIFhAT> or general ideas are mere names without any corresponding reality. Only particular objects exist, and properties, numbers, and sets are merely features of the way of considering the things that exist. (Taken from Google). I mean, there's some sense in the above. You can go at it categorically and affirm some of the criteria easily enough. It would have to be a far more technical definition before I'd consent to that term and what it denotes being the difference though I do think you are right that there is a philosophical difference. I merely think that difference, if we made a decision tree, (and I've sort of done this already), would be between dynamic objects (and infinite inquiry, however one wishes to invoke it) and the ding-an-sich. The weird part, for me, is that I don't disagree about convergence — my own philosophical stance is that truth, as it is regardless, is always present but cannot be measured in opinions. The truth, as it is, (for me), is not so far from what Peirce postulates but I do not think it an object but rather a real "thing" which if you could understand it at all would be more an ideal (an actually extant/real ideal) than any object — and here you can invoke the regulative hope of Peirce in perhaps an interesting way? I don't have my core library to hand here but from memory Kant goes to great lengths to demonstrate why the ding-an-sich (and the general system he writes) is not nominalist. He knows, because of the dialogical context at the time, that they will charge him of such. But no serious scholar, surely, can read the Critique, et al, and return the verdict of nominalism (though you could read much twentieth century, or nineteenth, also, and actually return such a verdict). I'd have to know what is meant by it before I agreed, either way, as to whether that's the stumbling block for I consider myself a "realist", also, in the way I go about substantiating whatever it is I would claim. I'd ask that you clarify what you mean by iconic in the context of propositions. Yes, off-the-top, I would agree, but I'm not sure it is a genuine icon. If you could clarify the syntactical element of iconicity in propositions, without being overly verbose (i.e., assume I am a child who wants to know what you mean), then perhaps we could come to an agreement there also? Best, Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, September 8, 2025 11:08 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Propositions, Truth, and Experience (was Will and Belief) Jack, List: I am glad that we agree about every proposition being both indexical and symbolic--I would add iconic, but you have not said whether you agree with that--as well as LLMs not properly being characterized as having "intelligence." Your link to a paper about the latter from a Peircean standpoint did not work for me until I used the Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org/web/20250125053357/https://signosfilosoficos.izt.uam.mx/index.php/SF/article/download/853/683/), and it turns out that the full text is in Spanish. However, I came across another relevant piece that is brief, online, and in English--"LLMs through Saussurean and Peircean Lenses" (https://medium.com/higher-neurons/llms-through-saussurean-and-peircean-lenses-e64d340d1d10). In summary, "Saussure illuminates the systematic interplay among linguistic signs, thereby explaining how a disembodied intelligence could deftly manipulate symbols in the absence of an external world. Peirce, by contrast, provides the philosophical scaffolding for understanding how embodied agents--like human beings--anchor those symbolic manipulations in tangible perception and experience." On the other hand, we still seem to disagree about the relationship between a true proposition and reality. I continue to suspect that this is a mere symptom of a more fundamental difference at a deeper level, namely, nominalism vs. scholastic realism. JRKC: Your proposition doesn't meet the criteria I stipulated for a "true proposition" wherein the subject proposed/represented would be precisely, within the propositional structure, what said subject, if extant, in any respect, is beyond that structure. Again, you did not stipulate any such criteria when you first presented your "test"; you simply said, "I would ask only that you present one example of a true proposition which represents things as they really are." Even so, my examples do meet your newly prescribed criteria because they represent real facts. "What we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself" (EP 2:304, 1901). In other words, the structure of a proposition matches the structure of reality, which helps explain why the latter is intelligible in the first place. "The third element of the phenomenon is that we perceive it to be intelligible, that is, to be subject to law, or capable of being represented by a general sign or Symbol" (CP 8.268, 1903). "The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality" (CP 6.341, 1907). JRKC: I.e., it is not a test that can be passed--it refers to the ontic reality rather than the agreed-upon meaning such as "grass is green"--yes, I can understand you, and it will not "confound experience", but such is not the truth of "grass" or "green". Meaning is "agreed-upon" only in the sense that any particular human language is largely a matter of conventions. "My grass is green today" in English, "Mein Gras ist grün heute" in German, and "Mi césped está verde hoy" in Spanish all express the very same proposition. "Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same representamen" (EP 2:203, 1903). Each is a token of a different type, but an instance of the same sign--a proposition that is true independent of any individual human formulation of it, and even if no one ever said it or thought it at all, because it is determined by the "ontic reality" that my grass is green today. Moreover, the proposition's ultimate meaning in accordance with pragmaticism is that anyone who believes it has corresponding habits of conduct, which would never be confounded by any possible future experience; hence, an infinite community after infinite investigation, and thus infinite experience, would affirm it. If that is not truth, then what is? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Mon, Sep 8, 2025 at 5:05 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, Gary, List, Jon, there's a good bit there. Yes, predication is indexical-symbolic (has to be). Consider that example of a true proposition which you gave to me — "you really did ask for that" (a proposition which is almost entirely indexical: that is, you indexed my previous statement, as per recursion/embedding, as if to point to it (through obvious use of deictic signifiers qua predication). Your proposition doesn't meet the criteria I stipulated for a "true proposition" wherein the subject proposed/represented would be precisely, within the propositional structure, what said subject, if extant, in any respect, is beyond that structure. I.e., it is not a test that can be passed —it refers to the ontic reality rather than the agreed-upon meaning such as "grass is green" —yes, I can understand you, and it will not "confound experience", but such is not the truth of "grass" or "green". The threshold for the "test" is set by an interpretation, valid, my analysis shows, of Peirce's own conclusion in 5.525. At any rate, your position was later clarified as facts of the propositional kind, though you note the same or similar nuance, though differently, as being the only kind of truth there is (or at least the only kind within that category). We don't agree there but that clearly demarcates why you think you've passed and why I disagree. We are arguing at two different categorical levels — which is fine. Anyway, leaving the above aside, for I am working on it within a new (more nuanced) proof-structure (with more Peircean references), I'd like to share the below abstract with respect to LLM/AI: Abstract: Charles S. Peirce was interested on logical machines developed in the late 19th century and discussed whether they could develop the authentic semiotic processes indispensable for deductive reasoning. Is it possible for machines to have a genuine capacity to carry out inferences? In this paper, Peirce's arguments are analyzed, who argued that deduction, in general, cannot be reduced to mechanical factors. To this end, reference will be made to the idea of theorematic reasoning, which is fundamental for mathematical proofs and goes beyond mechanical procedures. The idea of semiosis in Peirce will also be explored, which seems to extend to the organic realm, but not to the artificial inorganic world of machines. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn about Artificial Intelligence from Peirce’s semiotic perspective. https://www.academia.edu/oa/4403458984 Artificial Intelligence Through Peirce's Lens In short, I agree. That which is functional artifice, algorithmic/transform, is not intelligence. Nor do I think it ever will be. Not merely for the reasons you cite but for kinds of reasons and the Peircean lens offers but a few. Best, Jack
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
