List, This thread seems to me to have the potential of *possibly* bridging *some* of the conceptual gaps between seemingly *very different views* regarding basic understandings of Peirce's semeiotic. So, thanks for introducing it, Gary F. and for providing links to the very relevant passages in your Turning Signs from which we read, for example:
GF: rather than think of meanings as built up from their component parts, we might better think of them as processes analyzed into those parts for semiotic purposes. Semiosis, even at the most primitive level, is always a process which must continue for some time in some direction (toward the making of some pragmatic difference such as a habit-change). Irreducible Thirdness is essential to it. With this in mind, Peirce gives a holistic top-down account of the relations between arguments, propositions and ‘names’ (i.e. ‘terms’), upending ‘the traditional view that a Proposition is built up of Names, and an Argument of Propositions.’ "… an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built up of positions." CSP Gary’s initial framing of the discussion as Peirce’s semeiotic holism might prove to be an important touchstone here reminding us that perceived objects can themselves be understood as 'artifacts of analysis' in much the same way that individual signs are abstractions from the general semeiotic flow. Gary's reference to current neurobiological research provides posteriori support for Peirce’s insight that at least the perceptual continuum precedes our analytic parsing of it. GF: Unhealthy as it may be for a special interest or subsystem to dominate a system, there is a kind of temporary dominance which may be necessary for a complex system to act as a unit. For instance, In human as well as nonhuman species, functions seem to be apportioned asymmetrically to the cerebral hemispheres, for reasons which probably have to do with the need for one final controller rather than two, when it comes to choosing an action or a thought. If both sides had equal say on making a movement, you might end up with a conflict – your right hand might interfere with the left, and you would have a lesser chance of producing coordinated patterns of motion involving more than one limb. — Damasio (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . it's the left hemisphere's function to ‘break up the holistic fabric of reality’. In this way neuropsychology confirms Peirce's phenomenology which puts the wholeness of feelings First and analysis into parts Second. >From this follows Peirce's holistic approach to ‘Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics.’ Jon takes this holism as ontologically fundamental: the universe is not assembled from elementary sign-units but is 'perfused with signs' within a vast continuum from which particulars are prescinded. This aligns with Peirce’s *late cosmological vision* of the cosmos as 'one immense sign'. In this view, both perception and reasoning begin as undivided wholes, and terms and propositions are artifacts of analysis. Edwina pushes back against the idea of ontological priority for the whole stressing Peirce’s *realism*, that is, that there are real things whose characters are independent of our opinions, of our analyses. For her, semiosis is a matter of triadic processes constantly forming and dissolving real entities that exist for varying durations within a CAS. In her view (if I'm not mistaken), individuality is emergent, operating through networks of triadic relations. Edwina’s view would seem to resonate with Peirce’s early/middle realism and the concreteness of triadic relations, while Jon’s view resonates more with Peirce’s late philosophy (including a cosmology of continuity, universe as sign, synechism, agapism, etc.) where the holism of semiosis is central. Still, Edwina is correct, I think, in arguing that Peirce never abandoned his 'critical' realism about real things and his insistence on *the irreducibility of triadic relations in the generation of these things*. In a word, Jon’s reading stresses Peirce’s synechistic holism, Edwina’s his insistence on real triadic relations. Do Gary F's comments perhaps help bridge these positions? To me they suggest that Peirce’s holistic semeiotic can be grounded in both phenomenological analysis and empirical science, that Peirce’s insights can be seen to gel with contemporary scientific perspectives. Still: GF: . . . neuropsychology confirms Peirce's phenomenology which puts the wholeness of feelings First and analysis into parts Second. From this follows Peirce's holistic approach to ‘Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics.’ Best, Gary R On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 5:10 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > List > > I disagree with the outline > > the semeiotic whole is ontologically prior to its constituent parts > (top-down); not the other way around, as if the former were *assembled *from > the latter as its basic units in the reductionist sense (bottom-up). The > entire universe is not *composed *of individual signs as its building > blocks, it is instead *perfused *with signs (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, > 1906)--a vast symbol that *involves *indices and icons (CP 5.119, EP > 2:193-4, 1903). > > The above, in my view, is moving into romantic mysticism. In my > understanding of Peirce’s semiosis, the universe, as a semiotic whole is > not ontologically prior to its constituents, but is instead, totally > composed in the ‘here and now’ of its constituent parts – which are triadic > sets- functioning as semiosic processes. There is neither an > ontological prior nor post reality; ie, no top down nor bottom up. . > > Instead, as Peirce wrote, “There are Real things, whose characters are > entirely independent of our opinions about them’..5.384. We must > acknowledge this. This does not mean that individual entities exist ‘per > se’ in the atomic materialist sense – which has long been debunked. > Instead, it acknowledges that this semiosic universe operates as > energy/matter constantly forming existentially distinct units. Each entity- > which actually has a morphology of a triadic- hexadic set of > relations- may last as such for a nanosecond to a hundred, thousands of > years ; eg, an atom, a tree, a mountain… When we examine individuality > further in its indexicality, we see how the individual unit operates only > within a network of relations with other ‘individual entities’ – which > relationships can be outlined in any of the ten basic classes of triads, or > the more complex 28 hexadic relationships. > > What does this mean? To me it means that the universe is a CAS, a complex > adaptive system, a self-organized phaneron of energy-as-matter [aka signs], > constantly developing new individual entities, operating within habits > -of-morphological organization, which habits themselves evolve and adapt. > The purpose? I’m afraid I go no further than ‘to prevent entropic > dissipation of energy. ..and this is not an ’ontologically prior agenda’. > > > Edwina > > > > On Oct 1, 2025, at 1:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary F., List: > > I appreciate the subject line, emphasizing that the semeiotic whole is > ontologically prior to its constituent parts (top-down); not the other way > around, as if the former were *assembled *from the latter as its basic > units in the reductionist sense (bottom-up). The entire universe is not > *composed > *of individual signs as its building blocks, it is instead *perfused *with > signs (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--a vast symbol that *involves *indices > and icons (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-4, 1903). > > I have indeed regularly quoted that 1906 passage in R 295 (finally > published at LF 3/1:234-5) to support my conception of the universe as one > immense sign, a semiosic continuum, an ongoing inferential process--an > argument from which we prescind facts as represented by propositions using > names, those "smaller" signs thus being artifacts of analysis along with > their associated objects and interpretants (see also CP 2.27, 1902). I also > maintain that perception is likewise an undivided whole from which we > prescind predicates, hypostasize some of them into subjects, and attribute > others to those subjects in propositions, namely, perceptual > judgments-- "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP > 2:191, 1903). I provide a few quotations from Peirce to support that > understanding in section 3.5 of my "Semiosic Synechism" paper ( > https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHSSA-42.pdf). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 11:38 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> If I may, I’d like to move on to some *a posteriori* reasoning (i.e. >> evidence from the “positive sciences” of phenomenology, neuropsychology and >> biology) that seems to support aspects of Peirce’s category-based >> semeiotics. >> >> Helmut, some time ago you expressed some skepticism about my remark in a >> post that perceived objects are “artifacts of analysis” just as signs are. >> I didn’t have the time to clarify what I meant back then, but perhaps I can >> make up for that now, by offering this link: >> https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#csptd . >> >> I’m sure that 1906 passage has been cited here before (probably by JAS), >> but not the neurobiological work that supports it, which begins here: >> https://gnusystems.ca/TS/sdg.htm#x13 . That passage from *Turning Signs* >> also links to the one above. >> >> Love, gary f >> >> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . 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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
