On Oct 3, 2025, at 5:28 PM, Gary Richmond
<[email protected]> wrote:
List,
Over the many years that we've been discussing Peirce's
speculative cosmology on Peirce-l, and my being especially
interested in the topic -- and so having read as much about it as
I've been able to get my hands on -- I have come to the
conclusion that there is a shift in Peirce's speculative
cosmology between the 1860's, '70's and early 80's, and his later
writings of the 1890s, especially the Cambridge Lectures of 1898,
then into the 20th century. I would further argue that he never
dropped the earlier view, but developed, 'complicated', and
reframed it, including as regards his three categories. First,
I'll lay out the contrast between his earlier and later views as
I see them, and then suggest how they might be integrated.
The early cosmology would seem to suggest an emergence from pure
1ns. In the 1860's, '70's, and especially in the 1880's (see: "A
Guess at the Riddle," “Design and Chance,” "The Law of Mind"),
Peirce described the universe as originating in a state of
absolute nothingness. However, he defined this “nothing” not as a
negation, but as a positive kind of pure potentiality associated
with 1ns: sheer, unbounded possibility without law, relation, or
determinacy.
From this initial 'chaos of feeling', the beginnings of 2ns:
(brute action/reaction, resistance, etc.) gradually emerged, and
then, over time, 3ns (regularities, habits, eventually general
laws) began to form. So, this view is one of a world arising from
formless possibility, with law and order as products of evolution
However, by the time of his 1898 Cambridge lectures, Peirce had
begun to imagine something somewhat different. There, in his
famous 'blackboard' analogy, he suggests that before any actual
universe could come into existence that there must have been a
kind of general continuity (what I've termed 'ur-continuity',
3ns) already in place, this analogous to the empty but (for the
purpose of the analogy)/continuous /expanse of a blackboard on
which marks might be made. This /proto-universe/ is not a chaos
of pure 1ns, but rather a background of continuity (3ns) and
generality (3ns) in which certain possibilities and actualities
could appear. So, instead of laws developing out of chaos, Peirce
in 1898 stressed that the general (3ns) itself is primordial.
What comes 'first' is not a 'nothing' teeming with 1ns, but
rather the indefinite continuum of 3ns, an ur-generality that
makes possible both the play of qualities and the clash of
events. (I've occasionally pointed to the "Mathematics of Logic"
paper as Peirce himself suggesting how difficult it is for some
(especially some of the best minds, he remarks) to imagine 3ns
as 1st (first); but top-down logic requires it.)
Can these two accounts be integrated? Well, I'm not sure of that,
but I do think that they need not essentially contradict each
other, that they rather represent a shift in emphasis. So:
In his earlier cosmological thinking (from the side of 1ns)
Peirce underscores that the universe had to arise from a state
/prior to determination/, from sheer spontaneity (1ns), vague
possibility (1ns). Without this, nothing new could ever come about.
In his later view (from the side of 3ns), Peirce argues that
possibility (1ns) cannot be considered except against the
backdrop of a general continuity (3ns). Pure spontaneity, pure
possibility would be nothing at all unless they subsist within a
continuum, a field in which they can appear, disappear, reappear,
connect, and stabilize. In short, the blackboard (3ns) provides
the proto-condition for the manifestation of 1ns, while the chalk
marks (the 'difference', 2ns) portend the proto-conditions for
the brute emergence that will begin the process of cosmogenesis
of a universe, viz., ours. (While I do not, some might want to
think of this "brute emergence" initiating cosmogenesis as the
Big Bang.)
What I am suggesting is that Peirce’s speculative cosmology might
be read in a kind of dialectical overlay: pure 1ns affording the
possibility of emergence in sheer spontaneity. However, this
possibility only can become a cosmos within the more primordial
field of general continuity (3ns, ur-continuity, the 'blackboard'
on which potential qualities and reactions can begin to register).
The above is but a brief outline of what I've been thinking about
for years regarding these two phases -- as I see it -- of
Peirce's cosmological thinking. It is, of course, dependent on
many sources too numerous to name, but here are a few:
Vincent Colapietro, Carl Hausman, Cheryl Misak, Richard Kenneth
Atkins, Kelly A. Parker, Jon Alan Schmidt, Lucia Santaella.
Best,
Gary R
On Fri, Oct 3, 2025 at 3:17 PM Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]> wrote:
Gary R, list
I appreciate your attempt to bring disparate views together,
but I think they must remain – disparate.
For example, I consider that JAS’s view of the universe and
mine – are polar opposites.
I consider JAS’s outline with its top down framework to be a
deterministic, a priori centralized process, ignoring
Peirce’s outline of
-The formation of the universe from NOTHING [ 1.412,, 6.217,
EP2:322] which means – there is no determinism, no specific
focus – only a ‘desire’ to be instantiated. – which
instantiations are always in a triadic set [EP2;394]
-
-The reality of Firstness as a basic
categorical/organizational mode, which means that freedom and
chance are a basic component of the universe. See the element
of absolute chance in nature’ 7.514
-
-- the reality of Thirdness, which means that
self-organization of the ‘instantiations [in Secondness] of
the universe operates by means of communal habits which
enable both complex networks of relations and continuity of
type - which in turn prevents entropic dissipation
-
-- the reality that Thirdness as the laws of organization
evolves and changes, A habit might have evolved by chance [
7: 521] ‘the first germ of law was an entity, which itself
arose by chance, that is as a First”…but, this habit would
then become a continuity of organization for[ 7.515 ], “a
law can evolve or develop itself…with a ‘generalizing
tendency”. See also7.512 ‘the laws of nature are the results
of an evolutionary process’..which is ‘still in progress’ 7.514.
-
- As he writes” the laws of the universe have been formed
under a universal tendency of all things toward
generalization and habit-taking [7.515]. This means – that
these laws are formed within and BY the universe itself as a
semiosic process- and- that this is a dynamic of changing
process, for, in both cerebral theory and molecular ‘”the
non-conservative elements are the predominant ones”.- which
makes sense, since the instantiations [ entities organized in
Secondness] have finite life spans
-
-Given this brief outline – my view of the Peircean semiosis
is that there is no ‘semiotic whole’ and certainly, no
‘constituent parts’. Instead, the universe is a CAS, a
complex adaptive system of energy forming itself into
matter,, as triadic instantiations or Signs, within all
three categorical modes [1ns, 2ns, 3ns]which are networked
with each other ….
Edwina
On Oct 1, 2025, at 8:59 PM, Gary Richmond
<[email protected]> wrote:
List,
This thread seems to me to have the potential of /possibly/
bridging /some/ of the conceptual gaps between seemingly
/very different views/ regarding basic understandings of
Peirce's semeiotic. So, thanks for introducing it, Gary F.
and for providing links to the very relevant passages in
your Turning Signs from which we read, for example:
GF: rather than think of meanings as built up from their
component parts, we might better think of them as
processes analyzed into those parts for semiotic
purposes. Semiosis, even at the most primitive level, is
always a process which must continue for some time in
some direction (toward the making of some pragmatic
difference such as a habit-change). Irreducible
Thirdness is essential to it. With this in mind, Peirce
gives a holistic top-down account of the relations
between arguments, propositions and ‘names’ (i.e.
‘terms’), upending ‘the traditional view that a
Proposition is built up of Names, and an Argument of
Propositions.’
"… an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than
a motion is built up of positions." CSP
Gary’s initial framing of the discussion as Peirce’s
semeiotic holism might prove to be an important touchstone
here reminding us that perceived objects can themselves be
understood as 'artifacts of analysis' in much the same way
that individual signs are abstractions from the general
semeiotic flow. Gary's reference to current neurobiological
research provides posteriori support for Peirce’s insight
that at least the perceptual continuum precedes our analytic
parsing of it.
GF: Unhealthy as it may be for a special interest or
subsystem to dominate a system, there is a kind of
temporary dominance which may be necessary for a complex
system to act as a unit. For instance,
In human as well as nonhuman species, functions seem
to be apportioned asymmetrically to the cerebral
hemispheres, for reasons which probably have to do
with the need for one final controller rather than
two, when it comes to choosing an action or a
thought. If both sides had equal say on making a
movement, you might end up with a conflict – your
right hand might interfere with the left, and you
would have a lesser chance of producing coordinated
patterns of motion involving more than one limb. —
Damasio (1994)
. . . . . . . .
. . . it's the left hemisphere's function to ‘break up
the holistic fabric of reality’. In this way
neuropsychology confirms Peirce's phenomenology which
puts the wholeness of feelings First and analysis into
parts Second. From this follows Peirce's holistic
approach to ‘Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics.’
Jon takes this holism asontologically fundamental: the
universe is not assembled from elementary sign-units but is
'perfused with signs' within a vast continuum from which
particulars are prescinded. This aligns with Peirce’s /late
cosmological vision/ of the cosmos as 'one immense sign'. In
this view, both perceptionand reasoning begin as undivided
wholes, and terms and propositions are artifacts of analysis.
Edwina pushes back against the idea of ontological priority
for the whole stressing Peirce’s /realism/, that is, that
there are real things whose characters are independent of
our opinions, of our analyses. For her, semiosis is a matter
of triadic processes constantly forming and dissolving real
entities that exist for varying durations within a CAS. In
her view (if I'm not mistaken), individuality is emergent,
operating through networks of triadic relations.
Edwina’s view would seem to resonate with Peirce’s
early/middle realism and the concreteness of triadic
relations, while Jon’s view resonates more with Peirce’s
late philosophy (including a cosmology of continuity,
universe as sign, synechism, agapism, etc.) where the holism
of semiosis is central. Still, Edwina is correct, I think,
in arguing that Peirce never abandoned his 'critical'
realism about real things and his insistence on /the
irreducibility of triadic relations in the generation of
these things/. In a word, Jon’s reading stresses Peirce’s
synechistic holism, Edwina’s his insistence on
realtriadic relations.
Do GaryF's comments perhaps help bridge these positions? To
me they suggest that Peirce’s holistic semeiotic can be
grounded in both phenomenological analysis and empirical
science, that Peirce’s insights can be seen to gel with
contemporary scientific perspectives. Still:
GF: . . . neuropsychology confirms Peirce's
phenomenology which puts the wholeness of feelings First
and analysis into parts Second. From this follows
Peirce's holistic approach to ‘Logic, or the essence of
Semeiotics.’
Best,
Gary R
On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 5:10 PM Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]> wrote:
List
I disagree with the outline
the semeiotic whole is ontologically prior to its
constituent parts (top-down); not the other way around,
as if the former were/assembled/from the latter as its
basic units in the reductionist sense (bottom-up). The
entire universe is not/composed/of individual signs as
its building blocks, it is instead /perfused/with signs
(CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--a vast symbol
that/involves/indices and icons (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-4,
1903).
The above, in my view, is moving into romantic
mysticism. In my understanding of Peirce’s semiosis, the
universe, as a semiotic whole is not ontologically prior
to its constituents, but is instead, totally composed in
the ‘here and now’ of its constituent parts – which are
triadic sets-functioning as semiosic processes.There is
neither an ontological prior nor post reality; ie, no
top down nor bottom up. .
Instead, as Peirce wrote, “There are Real things, whose
characters are entirely independent of our opinions
about them’..5.384. We must acknowledge this. This does
not mean that individual entities exist ‘per se’ in the
atomic materialist sense – which has long been debunked.
Instead, it acknowledges that this semiosic universe
operates as energy/matter constantly forming
existentially distinct units. Each entity- which
actually has a morphology of a triadic- hexadic set of
relations- may last as such for a nanosecond to a
hundred, thousands of years ; eg, an atom, a tree, a
mountain… When we examine individuality further in its
indexicality, we see how the individual unit operates
only within a network of relations with other
‘individual entities’ – which relationships can be
outlined in any of the ten basic classes of triads, or
the more complex 28 hexadic relationships.
What does this mean? To me it means that the universe is
a CAS, a complex adaptive system, a self-organized
phaneron of energy-as-matter [aka signs], constantly
developing new individual entities, operating within
habits -of-morphological organization, which habits
themselves evolve and adapt. The purpose? I’m afraid I
go no further than ‘to prevent entropic dissipation of
energy. ..and this is not an ’ontologically prior agenda’.
Edwina
On Oct 1, 2025, at 1:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<[email protected]> wrote:
Gary F., List:
I appreciate the subject line, emphasizing that the
semeiotic whole is ontologically prior to its
constituent parts (top-down); not the other way around,
as if the former were /assembled /from the latter as
its basic units in the reductionist sense (bottom-up).
The entire universe is not /composed /of individual
signs as its building blocks, it is instead /perfused
/with signs (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--a vast symbol
that /involves /indices and icons (CP 5.119, EP
2:193-4, 1903).
I have indeed regularly quoted that 1906 passage in R
295 (finally published at LF 3/1:234-5) to support my
conception of the universe as one immense sign, a
semiosic continuum, an ongoing inferential process--an
argument from which we prescind facts as represented by
propositions using names, those "smaller" signs thus
being artifacts of analysis along with their associated
objects and interpretants (see also CP 2.27, 1902). I
also maintain that perception is likewise an undivided
whole from which we prescind predicates, hypostasize
some of them into subjects, and attribute others to
those subjects in propositions, namely, perceptual
judgments-- "the first premisses of all our reasonings"
(CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903). I provide a few quotations
from Peirce to support that understanding in section
3.5 of my "Semiosic Synechism" paper
(https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHSSA-42.pdf).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran
Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> /
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 11:38 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
If I may, I’d like to move on to some /a
posteriori/ reasoning (i.e. evidence from the
“positive sciences” of phenomenology,
neuropsychology and biology) that seems to support
aspects of Peirce’s category-based semeiotics.
Helmut, some time ago you expressed some skepticism
about my remark in a post that perceived objects
are “artifacts of analysis” just as signs are. I
didn’t have the time to clarify what I meant back
then, but perhaps I can make up for that now, by
offering this link:
https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#csptd .
I’m sure that 1906 passage has been cited here
before (probably by JAS), but not the
neurobiological work that supports it, which begins
here: https://gnusystems.ca/TS/sdg.htm#x13 . That
passage from /Turning Signs/ also links to the one
above.
Love, gary f
Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
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