Dan, Thanks for posting “Conceptions of Instinct in Language and Communication: Pragmatist vs Rationalist Approaches.” I appreciate your remarks that “instinct as abduction represents the starting point of inquiry rather than its conclusions,” as found in IBE or inference to the best explanation. And I enjoyed your discussion of your proposal of “instinct … interpreted as probabilistic cognitive bias in inference.” Decades ago I wrote my dissertation *The Play of Musement [with emphasis on Peirce’s abduction as a cognitive process] in James Joyce’s “Ulysses”.*
I look forward to reading your impressive publications. Mary Libertin Professor emerita Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania > On Apr 29, 2026, at 6:32 AM, Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> wrote: > > I don’t have any disagreement with Shapiro’s basic points. > > The Foundational Habit that I propose is just that one sign is interpreted > from another. Purely Peircean. But as I show in the paper (and more in the > book) this accounts not only for the acquisition and building of language > structure (from tree structures to constructions), it also is the basis for > LLMs, explains anomalies in philosophy e.g. Searle’s Chinese Room (I was > sharing an office with the late John Searle as he came up with this idea and > we discussed it quite a bit at the time). In my Peircean Linguistics book to > be submitted this summer, I also explain how Existential Graphs remove > problems that have bothered Chomsky for his entire career, eliminating the > need for both Compositionality (which I refer to as “Frege’s Error”). > > I have written several books on this topic, but the most relevant here is > likely this one: > https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957 > > Also this talk at Harvard, among many others available on youtube: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uUilIN-8gk > > > - Dan > > > >> On Apr 28, 2026, at 11:10 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Dan, List, >> >> I've only had a chance to read the abstract of your paper, but I hope to >> read it in its entirety in the next week or so as the thesis sounds most >> interesting and, to me at least, a bit provocative. As you probably know -- >> and as long term readers of the List may know -- I tend to agree with the >> linguist, Michael Shapiro's, that supports Peirce's, as opposed to >> Chomsky's, view of the acquisition of language. >> For Shapiro, the contrast between Chomsky and Peirce turns on fundamentally >> different conceptions of language and its acquisition. As is well known, >> Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an innate >> cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language acquisition >> consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing 'cognitive system'. >> Michael argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal syntactic structure >> abstracts language from communicative practice and, so, renders it static in >> principle, as well as largely asocial and non-semiotic (since language is >> approached as an internal code rather than a process of sign use). Shapiro, >> on the other hand, argues that “language is not an autonomous formal system >> but a mode of sign activity,” and he argues against “the hypostatization of >> grammar as an object independent of its use.” As he sees it, generative >> grammar mistakes analytic constructs for innate mental realities and, in the >> doing, obscures the fundamentally semiotic character of linguistic phenomena. >> >> Shapiro finds in Peirce a model that situates language within semiosis -- an >> ongoing, socially embedded process of sign interpretation in which what is >> innate is, as I think you suggest in your abstract, less a determinate >> structure than a capacity for abductive inference. Here language acquisition >> is developmental and open-ended: this involves the formation and revision of >> habits through interaction, fallible hypothesis formation rather than the >> unfolding of a fixed system. So Shapiro emphasizes that “grammar is not >> given in advance but emerges from the functioning of signs in communicative >> life,” thus aligning linguistic structure with evolving patterns of use. >> >> An essential difference, I think, lies in their respective notions of >> instinct: for Chomsky, as noted, it is a structured internal grammar, >> whereas for Peirce it is an evolutionary tendency toward successful >> abduction, a probabilistic 'bias', shall we say, that integrates biological >> predispositions with learning and language and cultural transmission. >> >> For Shapiro, the Peircean account is superior because it integrates biology, >> learning, culture, and communication without reducing language to a fixed >> internal mechanism. I've cc'd Michael who, I expect, will correct me if I've >> misrepresented any of his views. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary Richmond >> >> >> On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 7:23 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Semeiosis is the foundation of all inference. I refer to this in the paper >>> linked below as “The Foundational Habit.” It is: >>> >>> Sign —> Sign >>> >>> It is a recursive procedure and on this all of science emerges. >>> >>> CONCEPTIONS OF INSTINCT IN LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION: PRAGMATIST VS. >>> RATIONALIST APPROACHES - lingbuzz/009854 >>> ling.auf.net >>> <favicon.ico> >>> <https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/009854>CONCEPTIONS OF INSTINCT IN LANGUAGE >>> AND COMMUNICATION: PRAGMATIST VS. RATIONALIST APPROACHES - lingbuzz/009854 >>> <https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/009854> >>> ling.auf.net <https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/009854> <favicon.ico> >>> <https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/009854> >>> >>> DLE >>> >>>> On Apr 28, 2026, at 19:13, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> [EXTERNAL]: This email originated from outside of Bentley University. Do >>>> not click on any links or open any attachments unless you recognize the >>>> sender and know the content is safe. Please contact Bentley Help Desk with >>>> any questions or concerns. >>>> >>>> >>>> Gary R, List >>>> >>>> Yes, you are quite correct- the function is a rule of mediation - and I >>>> said that quite clearly in my outline - when I referred to and gave >>>> examples of the HABITS or rules or laws of mediation - and mediation is of >>>> course, a ‘mode of connection - but, more, it is a mode of transformation, >>>> where it transforms, via its rules, habits, knowledge base... input data >>>> into a viable interpretation. . >>>> >>>> And yes, this semiosis triad, which I compare to the function [ and I am >>>> hardly the only person to do so!!!] does lead to , at a specific time and >>>> place, one interpretation. It has to -otherwise the world is chaos. And >>>> since this function is a triad, with each node containing vital data - >>>> it’s not a dyadic process - and you are quite incorrect to claim such - >>>> ie, the function is not the same as a a mathematical equal sign - which IS >>>> dyadic!!! >>>> >>>> . This triad/function/ is a vital action- I must interpret the input >>>> sounds or images to be: one interpretation at this specific time and >>>> space.Not multiple interpretations,but ONE. My neighbour is saying Hello >>>> - and is NOT an evil witch putting a curse on me. …I must interpret the >>>> image I see to be Rain- and not gold coins…or harmful chemicals or angels >>>> dropping from the sky or... >>>> >>>> As for the concept of continuous semeiois - that’s basic to Peirce - but >>>> my outline of ONE specific action of semiosis hardly nullifies the concept >>>> of the world as a continuous semiosic process. >>>> >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Apr 28, 2026, at 6:40 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Doug, List, >>>>> >>>>> Since she mentioned it in her response to you, I must remark that Edwina >>>>> Taborsky's interpretation of Peirce’s semiosis as a function, f(x) = y, >>>>> where x is the object, f is the sign, and y is the interpretant, is >>>>> exceedingly problematic in my view. In her model the sign 'operates' on >>>>> the object to 'produce' the interpretant. This would mean that the >>>>> interpretant is generated through a transformation comparable to a >>>>> mathematical mapping. While this model may seem appealing to those >>>>> trained in analytic philosophy or, say, Shannon's classical information >>>>> theory -- since it offers a clean input-output picture of semiosis -- >>>>> nonetheless, it replaces Peirce’s open and continuous semiotic mediation >>>>> with a closed system of transformation. >>>>> >>>>> Further, a function implies a dyadic and determinate relation: one value >>>>> of x leads to one value of y. Peirce’s semiosis, however, is at its very >>>>> heart triadic and relational. Yes, the object determines [in Peirce's >>>>> sense of 'constrains'] the sign which determines [constrains] the >>>>> interpretant, but none of these determinations is mechanical. For Peirce >>>>> the sign does not transform the object into an interpretant; rather, it >>>>> mediates between them within a process that remains open and continuous. >>>>> In reducing semiosis to transformation,Taborsky's model ignores the >>>>> potential, and the creative aspects which animate Peirce’s semeiotics, >>>>> including as regards his conception of meaning. >>>>> >>>>> In short, the formula f(x) = y collapses Peirce’s open-ended process of >>>>> mediation (3ns) into a fixed act of transformation (2ns) in that it >>>>> substitutes function for a law of habit. Whereas a function ends with an >>>>> output, Peirce’s semiosis generates new interpretants as new signs >>>>> indefinitely, each interpretant, in turn, becoming a sign. This process >>>>> has no definite closure. Some have called this 'infinite semiosis': the >>>>> process where the interpretant of a sign becomes a new sign for the same >>>>> object, and so initiates an endless chain of meaning. It implies that >>>>> meaning-making is never static or fully realized, but is always open to >>>>> further interpretation and unfolding. >>>>> >>>>> And there is one additional danger: that of over-formalizing Peirce’s >>>>> ideas. While it is true that Peirce himself sometimes used mathematical >>>>> analogies (although, and for prime example, he strongly argued against >>>>> using his system of Existential Graphs as a calculus), his semeiotic is >>>>> anything but computational. By turning semiosis into a neat function, one >>>>> is treating signs as static conversions rather than as evolving acts of >>>>> interpretation rooted in culture, experience, and inquiry (there are >>>>> biological analogies of these). In addition, it's important to note that >>>>> Peirce’s semeiotic is deeply entangled with his phenomenology and >>>>> metaphysics (see, for example,“An Outline Classification of the Sciences” >>>>> in the 1903 Syllabus) and is, in my view, not fully detachable from them. >>>>> >>>>> There is, perhaps, a limited sense in which Taborsky’s metaphor might be >>>>> helpful. But if so, she would have to treat the 'function' not as a >>>>> deterministic formula but as a rule of mediation; that is to say as a >>>>> pattern of relational continuity rather than causal mapping. As such it >>>>> might serve as a shorthand for the way the sign organizes its reference. >>>>> But then Taborsky would have to acknowledge that f here is not an >>>>> operator but a habit: a mode of connection among object, sign, and >>>>> interpretant within a continuum of semiosis, something I think that she >>>>> is unlikely to do. >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps the greatest flaw in Taborsky’s model as I see it is that it >>>>> doesn’t capture the continuity -- the evolutionary continuity -- the >>>>> vitality in Peirce’s thought. His semeiotic came out of his own evolving >>>>> ideas about synechism and habit-formation, stressing the continuity and >>>>> growth of interpretation. A fixed function like f(x)=y freezes what >>>>> Peirce understood as a living, evolutionary process. For these reasons, >>>>> in my view such essentially dyadic models as Taborsky's misunderstand and >>>>> misinterpret Peirce’s semiosis. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Gary Richmond >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 2:00 PM doug mackenzie <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>> Hi all, >>>>>> >>>>>> I've just joined this mailing list because I am finally taking the >>>>>> opportunity to dig into Peirce's writings. I am a sessional instructor >>>>>> at UBC and I will be teaching COGS 303 (Research Methods in Cognitive >>>>>> Systems) this September for the second time. I taught the course last >>>>>> September and hewed closely to the syllabus as it was designed by Dr. >>>>>> Ron Rensink (details here >>>>>> <https://www.cs.ubc.ca/~rensink/publications/download/preparingUgrads-rr.pdf>). >>>>>> >>>>>> I've been sold on the Team-Based Learning approach and I'm in the >>>>>> process of designing the modules which will compose the course. I'm now >>>>>> reading The Fixation of Belief and How to Make Our Ideas Clear, and >>>>>> Peirce's ideas about the scientific method and doubt seem really to fit >>>>>> with the course's focus on self-awareness of cognitive biases. >>>>>> >>>>>> I was wondering if anyone has made use of Peirce's writings or ideas in >>>>>> courses on research methods or the philosophy of science. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> >>>>>> Doug Mackenzie >>>>>> Vancouver, BC >>>>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . >>>>>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . >>>>>> But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, >>>>>> then go to >>>>>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>>>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>>>>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . >>>>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . >>>>> But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, >>>>> then go to >>>>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>>>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>>> >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]> . >>>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, >>>> if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then >>>> go to >>>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
