Helmut, List, I very much appreciate the spirit of collegiality and collaboration you convey. Peirce believed it was of the greatest value for the advancement of science and, really, for the advancement of society generally. Still, although of obvious community value, that spirit has sometimes been severely lacking and, as I've observed it over the years, especially in the 'soft' sciences, the social sciences.
So, I found it interesting that you mentioned the 'linguistic wars' of the mid-20th century which were sparked by Chomsky's generative grammar and challenged by George Lakoff and others, Lakoff arguing that meaning should be primary and that syntax derives from semantic structure. The conflict -- which was e ssentially an American academic event -- got very intense and very personal such that the divisions shaped departments and fostered or hindered academic careers. Roman Jakobson did not participate in these disputes as his work predated the 'wars' and lay outside their central issues. And while Michael Shapiro also wasn't involved, he later developed a semiotic neostructuralism addressing the same underlying tensions as I noted earlier. In my mind Jakobson stands as a precursor, and Shapiro as a later attempt to move beyond the conflict between formal structure and meaning. The son of an English friend is interested in doing post-graduate work in linguistics in a program at Oxford University. Apparently the UK still retains a somewhat stronger institutional connection between linguistics, literature, and semiotics than the US, for the most part, does. Oxford, for example, has an internationally prominent linguistics faculty. However, few universities around the world have academic departments explicitly devoted to semiotics, the Department of Semiotics at the *University of** Tartu *(Estonia) being one of a very few exceptions. Others, with semiotic and Peirce studies programs which I know of simply because I know members of their faculties include *Aarhus University* (Denmark) and the *Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo* (Lucia Santaella) and the *University of São Paulo* (Vinicius Romanini). Indeed, Brazil may arguably be the country today where explicitly Peircean semiotics is flourishing. Of what might be of particular interest to you, I also understand that the *Technical University of Berlin* has a strong Research Center for Semiotics. Best, Gary R On Mon, May 4, 2026 at 11:23 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > I still haven´t understood where there is a contradiction, that would > justify calling it a competition, instead of all actors shaking hands and > saying: "We corrobate and supplement each other". For example: The fact, > that the Pirahas don´t use hierarchical phrasing at home, but a Piraha > child, raised in Rio, is well capable of it, shows, that both the innate > capability, and the cultural education are needed (for hierarchical > phrasing). "Both is needed" means, there is not a competition between these > two prerequisites. Autonomy of syntax: "Colourless green ideas sleep > furiously" is not meaningless. It´s just so, that its meaning is crazy. But > a that crazy meaning is only possible with a language´s syntax, so there is > a kind of autonomy. But "autonomy" does neither mean "not created by an > evolution", nor "not originally intended-by-evolution to form sensible > (not-crazy) phrases". I have read, that in the middle of last century there > was an outright "linguistic war", and wonder why. What ever is the core > point of contention? Are different approaches such as phenomenology vs. > realism, or let´s say, objective idealism, enemies, or just different > approaches, about whom one can be happy, if they lead to same results? > > Best, Helmut > 4. Mai 2026 um 01:33 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > > Dan, List, > > Thanks for posting the *New Yorker* article which I found quite > enlightening, suggesting to me that from a Peircean-semiotic standpoint > that your critique of the elevating of recursion (Merge) as the center of > the language capability seemed to me to converge in ways with what I > understand to be Michael’s neostructuralist position. Now you're suggesting > that it isn't, that it's 'orthogonal' to it. > > Your argument, as I thought I understood it, is that recursion is neither > demonstrably universal (given cases like Pirahã language as discussed in > the article), nor uniquely linguistic since it appears to belong to general > cognition. Further, its function in grammar may be (likely is) conditioned > by culture. Michael's neostructuralism point also doesn't deny the reality > of hierarchical structure, but he also doesn't afford it an essential > explanatory function. This is because, even where it's present, it > abstracts from what constitutes *language as sign-action*, viz., its > teleological 'movement' toward continuous interpretants, its role in > communicative practice, and its obvious historical growth. > > To me the similarity of your two positions seem*ed *to be that you both > argue against the universality and innateness that has been claimed for > recursion. You emphasize that recursion is not necessary or uniquely > linguistic, while Michael's emphasis is that language ought to be > understood as semiosis and so teleological and developmental. > > So, taken together, both of you aren't arguing that recursion is trivial; > and it obviously isn't false. However, you seemed to me to agree that while > possibly a formally useful operation, it can't function as a general theory > of language without being integrated into a broader semiotic account. > > Apparently I got this wrong. Please be so kind as to correct my > misunderstanding. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Sun, May 3, 2026 at 6:27 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > I made the point earlier that Shapiro’s arguments here, however valid, are > orthogonal to the larger issue which has to do with syntactic Merge. > > However no one on this list appears to know much about syntactic theory > more generally or Chomskyan syntax more specifically. All the info is out > there but it’s beyond my pay grade to point all this out. > > My apologies for intervening on this topic. > > DLE > > On May 3, 2026, at 18:10, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > List, > > I'd like to direct the List to two posts from 2013 that Michael Shapiro > wrote on Chomsky and which appear on his blog, *Language Lore*: > https://languagelore.net/?s=chomsky > > Both posts argue -- in somewhat different ways -- the same thesis: that > neostructuralism can replace Chomsky’s formal model with a teleological, > semiotic, and evolutionary account of language. The first post contrasts > static vs developmental views of language; the second continues that line > of thought but with an emphasis on evolution including an argument that > brain functions cannot be the ultimate explanation of language; rather, the > evolutionary and developmental history of sign-use contribute to > explaining why the brain has the structure it does. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Sun, May 3, 2026 at 5:05 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > Not the correct interpretation. And my article at that time refuted their > claim. I have written several books on this topic and debated Fitch and > Pinker publicly on these matters. Here is a New Yorker article about me and > the controversy. > > The Interpreter > https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/04/16/the-interpreter-2 > DLE > > On May 3, 2026, at 16:57, Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Unnecessary prerequisite to comparing them. > DLE > > On May 3, 2026, at 14:34, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > supplement: Sorry for this, but, before I raise anger, I feel I have to > explain, that I didn´t want to say, that anybody said it was a fallaciously > naturalized phenomenon, but that I think, that this at least should be the > accusation, to make Chomsky´s theory worth of, and vulnerable by, > refutation, or to see it put into competition with Peirce´s. > > Dan, List, > > in the Wikipedia article about generative grammar I have found: > > "In a 2002 paper, Noam Chomsky > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noam_Chomsky>, Marc Hauser > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Hauser> and W. Tecumseh Fitch > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Tecumseh_Fitch> proposed that universal > grammar consists solely of the capacity for hierarchical phrase structure. > [30] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generative_grammar#cite_note-30>". > > So, just a quite special capacity, not a fallaciously naturalized > phenomenon. > > Best, Helmut > 3. Mai 2026 um 16:31 > "Everett, Daniel" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > The point that I try to make in my work, past, present and future, wrt to > interactions between Peircean linguistics and Chomskyan linguistics is > this, which this particular message does not address. > > While it is true that there are many aspects of human language a > generative theory in the Chomskyan tradition (there are many) can miss > because of its focused attention, that type of work is not going to > persuade many of the superiority of a Peircean approach. It might in fact > be such evidence to many of us, but it is not going to change many minds. > > One must begin with an assessment of what the central empirical problems > are for a particular theory - i.e. what has it assigned itself as its own > criteria of success. > > In Chomskyan grammar, this will not entail much about markedness or Roman > Jakobson’s excellent work these days. It has to begin by taking the central > problems of Chomskyan theory raise by Merge (Chomsky’s "basic operation”) > and show how the problem disappears in a Peircean perspective, in > particular via Peirce’s Foundational Habit (my term), of Sign —> Sign. > > To get at this, we need to take on Frege’s error (compositionality) and > show how inference (e.g. via Existential Graphs), can account for the > problems. > > There are plenty of examples that I address in various papers. One of the > key ones, as a good illustrative example, is the generative problem of > “Antecedent Contained Deletion” and how this disappears in an approach > based on EGs. I have written on this, but no one perhaps more so or with > greater clarity than John Sowa. > > But it is a vast field and no one should feel obligated to argue for one > conclusion or another. > > However, if one does wish for a head-to-head comparision with Chomskyan > theory as it is currently practiced, this is crucial . One of the most > cited papers today in this regard (though he ignores Peirce) is the paper > by Steve Piantadosi (Berkely psychology), a paper that was published in my > Festschrift, but is available online here (where it has already been > downloaded 53,000 times): https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180 > > What Steve misses, imho, is the Foundational Habit, which explains the > foundation of LLMs and AI more generally. > > - Dan > > On May 3, 2026, at 12:39 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Dan, Helmut, List, > > This has been a very fruitful thread for my thinking about language, > something I haven't given sufficient attention to these past few decades as > I concentrated on Peircean semeiotics, tricategoriality, pragmaticism, etc. > As earlier noted, knowing Michael Shapiro personally, having read many of > his published works, following his blog, *Language Lore * > https://languagelore.net/about-language-lore-2/, and having regular > conversations with him at a small Peirce-centered philosophy club which > meets monthly in NYC (Michael lives in Vermont) has at least kept > linguistics on my radar. Since the discussion so far has centered on the > person and thought of Noam Chomsky, I would like to note that Shapiro was > trained under Roman Jakobson at Harvard and is intellectually aligned with > structuralist and semiotic traditions rather than Chomsky's generative > program. > > As I understand it, for Shapiro Jakobson's work represents the point at > which structuralism begins to 'overcome' itself. Jakobson's linguistics > already seems to anticipate a semiotic conception of language, yet he > doesn't fully get past formalism. So, in my view, Shapiro's > neostructuralism may best be understood as a Peircean completion of > Jakobson’s program, not a complete departure from it, but explicitly > articulating it in terms of semiosis and, so, teleology. > > It now seems to me that from a Peircean-semiotic standpoint, Michael > Shapiro’s critique of Chomsky principally concerns what Shapiro takes to be > *primary* in language. As previously noted, Chomsky’s theory treats > language as an internal, formal system -- an abstract grammar governed > by general rules such that questions of purpose, interpretation, and > communication are, shall we say, 'bracketed'. > Shapiro’s neostructuralism reverses that tendency and serves > as Shapiro's semiotic alternative. In his > work structuralism is revised such that 3ns, as mediation, habit, growth of > meaning, etc. is no longer excluded; rather, it actually *constitutes* > linguistic > structure. > Language in this view is not a 'given' system but, rather, an evolving > semiotic process and is intelligible only in terms of its development, and > especially its teleological tendency toward meaning. Contrariwise, > purposiveness, interpretant effects, and the continuity of semiosis are > excluded > from Chomsky's program. For Shapiro semiosis, sign-action, is precisely > where linguistic explanation needs to begin, thus his objection that > generative grammar is methodologically reductive because it detaches > grammar from semiosis, treats structure as fixed rather than developmental, > and so gives only an abstract understanding of the phenomenon of language. > > In sum: From the standpoint of neostructuralism, it is not that Chomsky's > work is without value -- and it most certainly has been influential! -- but > lacking a semiotic revision it cannot serve as a general theory of > language. I strongly agree with Shapiro. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > On Sat, May 2, 2026 at 5:55 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > No Noam would never say that. Never. General intelligence in his theory > has zero to do with L1 acquisition. > > My office was next to Chomsky’s for a year. > > In 2023 MIT Brain and Cognitive Sciences held a conference in my honor. > But that dept and MIT linguistics have very different views of language. > > The talks at that conference are on youtube. The volume is also available. > Dan > > <maxresdefault.jpg> > > Tedlab > youtu.be > <https://youtu.be/06zefFkhuKI> > > On May 2, 2026, at 17:12, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dan, List, > > That´s great, that you know him! I would find it very interesting, whether > he either would say: > > -- "Ok, the language acquisition device may not differ from general > intelligence, and the universal grammar may not differ from general logic, > I just have called these things the way I did, because I am concerned with > linguistics, not with more general sciences such as biology, psychology or > logic" > > Or: > > -- "I think, that the language acquisition device and the universal > grammar are special innate abilities, that only genetically appear within > creatures who use language, esp. humans, but not in other creatures, who > are quite intelligent, esp. octopusses, who don´t communicate with > language, but by changing the colours, texture, and form of their skin" > > Or: Something else. > > I would find the answer interesting, because I don´t have a preference for > either answer, can´t have as a layman, and Chomsky is an expert, one of a > few. My last post, in this regard, was not a judgement, not even a > justified suspicion, only a layman´s utterance-in-progress, the kind of > question, experts are often bothered with. > > Best, Helmut > 30. April 2026 um 15:07 > "Everett, Daniel" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > > I knew Chomsky well for more than 40 years. He has given interviews about > me and I him (especially in the New Yorker and NY Times - cover story. And > a cover story in the Chronicle. > > The article i linked to earlier as well as the almost finished book > Peircean lingiistics discusses and compares Chomsky and Peirce in great > detail. > > Peirce’s theory wins hands down. > > > > Dan > > On Apr 30, 2026, at 08:56, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Gary, List, > > thank you! In this form, I understand the criticism. I guess, maybe a > scientist should compare his work with other scientific approaches to a > higher extent than Chomsky did or does. I also wonder, whether the innate > language acquisition device is something different from general > intelligence, and whether the universal grammar is different from logic > (incl. triadic) in general, or these are unnecessary specifications. > > Best, Helmut > 30. April 2026 um 01:17 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Helmut, List, > > I haven't a linguist's knowledge of Chomsky's theory. While over the years > I've read a significant amount of material related to it, and especially in > recent years that which appears in the work of that quintessentially > Peircean linguist, Michael Shapiro, my comments are strictly those of a > layman. > > So, necessarily, are my questions. So, for example, you suggest that > "without the innate 'language acquisition device', a human would not be > able to acquire language." Now since most researchers think Homo sapiens > existed for tens of thousands, possibly over 100,000 years before spoken > language emerged, did Chomsky's 'Universal Grammar, his innate cognitive > architecture, simply lay dormant for that period of time? Or did it somehow > evolve in the homo sapien brain over that vast period? Perhaps this > question has been addressed in the literature, but I'm not aware of it. > > You wrote: " But [Universal Grammar] wouldn´t say, that a child would > not need communicative practice too, to learn a language. It neither would > say, that language is not a mode of sign activity, nor, that the structure > of the "language acquisition device" is not evolutionally adopted from, and > adapted to, the rules of semiotics, the logical base of communication." > > I think you may have a point here as my understanding is that Chomsky’s > theory does not logically *exclude *communication or semiotic > considerations. However, his theory does not at all rely on them > nor positively develop them. They remain peripheral rather than > foundational, which is a point that critics like Shapiro make. > > To expand on this a bit, I suppose that in principle one could reinterpret > Chomsky’s framework in semiotic terms. However, this would be an external > reconstruction rather than something he himself developed. It is certainly > possible to argue that the language faculty evolved under certain > *communicative > pressures* and that its structures reflect *semiotic constraints*. > However, Chomsky does not derive UG from semiotic principles, nor does he > treat grammar as emerging from a general theory of signs. And although he > acknowledges communicative explanations, he challenges them in favor of > internal constraints. > > So, in a word, language as sign activity is not denied by Chomsky but, to > the extent that it appears at all, it is subordinated to formal internal > constraints such that semiotics and a broader logic of communication is > mainly absent from his framework. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 5:42 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary, List, > > Does he really "reduce" language acquisition to a fixed internal > mechanism, or just the ability of language acquisition? Because, if it is > the ability, it is not a reduction of the thing language itself. It just > would say, that, without the innate "language acquisiton device", a human > would not be able to acquire language. But it wouldn´t say, that a child > would not need communicative practice too, to learn a language. It neither > would say, that language is not a mode of sign activity, nor, that the > structure of the "language acquisition device" is not evolutionally adopted > from, and adapted to, the rules of semiotics, the logical base of > communication. > > Best, Helmut > 29. April 2026 um 17:56 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Helmut, List, > > You wrote: " One then only might say that [Chomsky] limits his inquiry to > linguistics . . ." > > While not a linguist, I've taken a keen interest in the field, especially > after coming to know Michael Shapiro and his work a couple of decades ago. > However, at this point I can't add more than what I've already written: > > > Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an innate > cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language acquisition > consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing 'cognitive system'. > Michael [Shapiro] argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal syntactic > structure *abstracts language from communicative practice* and, so, > renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and non-semiotic > (since language is approached as an internal code rather than a process of > sign use). > > > The point is *exactly* linguistic: In my view, *Chomsky reduces language > acquisition to a fixed internal mechanism and, further, abstracts language > from communicative practice. *Following Shapiro, I tried to make the > point that, very different from this, Peirce sees language not as a formal > system but as a *mode of sign activity* and all that follows from that in > his semeiotics. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 6:20 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary, List, > > I have often wondered, whether Chomsky only "abstracts" or "renders" his > universal grammar as something innate to all humans, or claims it for basic > in the sense of axiomatic. Because, if he doesn´t do that latter thing, I > think he cannot be blamed of denying social, communicative, semiotic, and > logical deeper sources of universal grammar. One then only might say, that > he limits his inquiry to linguistics, which is his main interest and > research field. > > Best, Helmut > > 29. April 2026 um 05:10 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Dan, List, > > I've only had a chance to read the abstract of your paper, but I hope to > read it in its entirety in the next week or so as the thesis sounds most > interesting and, to me at least, a bit provocative. As you probably know -- > and as long term readers of the List may know -- I tend to agree with the > linguist, Michael Shapiro's, that supports Peirce's, as opposed to > Chomsky's, view of the acquisition of language. > > For Shapiro, the contrast between Chomsky and Peirce turns on > fundamentally different conceptions of language and its acquisition. As is > well known, Chomsky’s rationalist model treats language as grounded in an > innate cognitive architecture -- Universal Grammar -- so that language > acquisition consists largely in the 'triggering' of a pre-existing > 'cognitive system'. Michael argues that Chomsky's emphasis on formal > syntactic structure *abstracts language from communicative practice* and, > so, renders it static in principle, as well as largely asocial and > non-semiotic (since language is approached as an internal code rather than > a process of sign use). Shapiro, on the other hand, argues that “language > is not an autonomous formal system but a mode of sign activity,” and he > argues against “the hypostatization of grammar as an object independent of > its use.” As he sees it, generative grammar mistakes analytic constructs > for innate mental realities and, in the doing, obscures the fundamentally > semiotic character of linguistic phenomena. > > Shapiro finds in Peirce a model that situates language within semiosis -- > an ongoing, *socially embedded process of sign interpretation* in which > what is innate is, as I think you suggest in your abstract, less a > determinate structure than *a capacity for abductive inference*. Here > language acquisition is developmental and open-ended: this involves the > formation and revision of habits through interaction, *fallible > hypothesis formation* rather than the unfolding of a fixed system. So > Shapiro emphasizes that “grammar is *not* given in advance but emerges > from the functioning of signs in communicative life,” thus aligning > linguistic structure with evolving patterns of use. > > An essential difference, I think, lies in their respective notions of > instinct: for Chomsky, as noted, it is a structured internal grammar, > whereas for Peirce it is an evolutionary tendency toward successful > abduction, a probabilistic 'bias', shall we say, that integrates biological > predispositions with learning and language and cultural transmission. > > For Shapiro, the Peircean account is superior because it integrates > biology, learning, culture, and communication without reducing language to > a fixed internal mechanism. I've cc'd Michael who, I expect, will correct > me if I've misrepresented any of his views. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 7:23 PM Everett, Daniel <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > Semeiosis is the foundation of all inference. I refer to this in the paper > linked below as “The Foundational Habit.” It is: > > Sign —> Sign > > It is a recursive procedure and on this all of science emerges. > > CONCEPTIONS OF INSTINCT IN LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION: PRAGMATIST VS. > RATIONALIST APPROACHES - lingbuzz/009854 > ling.auf.net > [image: favicon.ico] <https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/009854> > > DLE > > On Apr 28, 2026, at 19:13, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > *[EXTERNAL]:* This email originated from outside of Bentley University. > Do not click on any links or open any attachments unless you recognize the > sender and know the content is safe. Please contact Bentley Help Desk with > any questions or concerns. > > Gary R, List > > Yes, you are quite correct- the function is a* rule* of mediation - and I > said that quite clearly in my outline - when I referred to and gave > examples of the HABITS or rules or laws of mediation - and mediation is of > course, a ‘mode of connection - but, more, it is a mode of transformation, > where it transforms, via its rules, habits, knowledge base... input data > into a viable interpretation. . > > And yes, this semiosis triad, which I compare to the function [ and I am > hardly the only person to do so!!!] does lead to , at a specific time and > place, *one interpretation*. It has to -otherwise the world is chaos. And > since this function is a triad, with each node containing vital data - > it’s not a dyadic process - and you are quite incorrect to claim such - ie, > the function is not the same as a a mathematical equal sign - which IS > dyadic!!! > > . This triad/function/ is a vital action- I must interpret the input > sounds or images to be: one interpretation at this specific time and > space.Not multiple interpretations,but ONE. My neighbour is saying Hello - > and is NOT an evil witch putting a curse on me. …I must interpret the image > I see to be Rain- and not gold coins…or harmful chemicals or angels > dropping from the sky or... > > As for the concept of continuous semeiois - that’s basic to Peirce - but > my outline of ONE specific action of semiosis hardly nullifies the concept > of the world as a continuous semiosic process. > > > Edwina > > > > > > On Apr 28, 2026, at 6:40 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Doug, List, > > Since she mentioned it in her response to you, I must remark that Edwina > Taborsky's interpretation of Peirce’s semiosis as a function, *f(x) = y*, > where x is the object, f is the sign, and y is the interpretant, is > exceedingly problematic in my view. In her model the sign 'operates' on the > object to 'produce' the interpretant. This would mean that the interpretant > is generated through a* transformation *comparable to a mathematical > mapping*.* While this model may seem appealing to those trained in > analytic philosophy or, say, Shannon's classical information theory -- > since it offers a clean *input-output *picture of semiosis -- > nonetheless, it replaces Peirce’s open and continuous semiotic mediation > with a closed system of transformation. > > Further, a function implies a dyadic and determinate relation: one value > of x leads to one value of y. Peirce’s semiosis, however, is at its very > heart triadic and relational. Yes, the object determines [in Peirce's sense > of 'constrains'] the sign which determines [constrains] the interpretant, > but *none of these determinations is mechanical*. For Peirce the sign > does not *transform *the object into an interpretant; rather, it *mediates > * between them within a process that remains open and continuous. In > reducing semiosis to transformation,Taborsky's model ignores the potential, > and the creative aspects which animate Peirce’s semeiotics, including as > regards his conception of meaning. > > In short, the formula f(x) = y collapses Peirce’s open-ended process of > mediation (3ns) into a fixed act of transformation (2ns) in that* it > substitutes function for a law of habit*. Whereas a function ends with an > output, Peirce’s semiosis generates new interpretants as new > signs indefinitely, each interpretant, in turn, becoming a sign. This > process has no definite closure. Some have called this 'infinite > semiosis': the process where the interpretant of a sign becomes a new sign > for the same object, and so initiates an endless chain of meaning. It > implies that meaning-making is never static or fully realized, but is > always open to further interpretation and unfolding. > > And there is one additional danger: that of over-formalizing Peirce’s > ideas. While it is true that Peirce himself sometimes used mathematical > analogies (although, and for prime example, he strongly argued against > using his system of Existential Graphs as a calculus), his semeiotic is > anything but computational. By turning semiosis into a neat function, one > is treating signs as static conversions rather than as *evolving acts of > interpretation* rooted in culture, experience, and inquiry (there are > biological analogies of these). In addition, it's important to note > that Peirce’s semeiotic is deeply entangled with his phenomenology and > metaphysics (see, for example,“An Outline Classification of the Sciences” > in the 1903 *Syllabus*) and is, in my view, not fully detachable from > them. > > There is, perhaps, a limited sense in which Taborsky’s metaphor might be > helpful. But if so, she would have to treat the 'function' *not as a > deterministic formula but as a rule of mediation*; that is to say as a > pattern of relational continuity rather than causal mapping. As such it > might serve as a shorthand for the way the sign organizes its reference. > But then Taborsky would have to acknowledge that* f* here is *not an > operator but a habit*: a mode of connection among object, sign, and > interpretant within a continuum of semiosis, something I think that she is > unlikely to do. > > Perhaps the greatest flaw in Taborsky’s model as I see it is that it > doesn’t capture the continuity -- the evolutionary continuity -- the > *vitality* in Peirce’s thought. His semeiotic came out of his own > evolving ideas about synechism and habit-formation, stressing the > continuity and growth of interpretation. A fixed function like *f(x)=y* > freezes what Peirce understood as a living, evolutionary process. For these > reasons, in my view such essentially dyadic models as Taborsky's > misunderstand and misinterpret Peirce’s semiosis. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2026 at 2:00 PM doug mackenzie <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hi all, > > I've just joined this mailing list because I am finally taking the > opportunity to dig into Peirce's writings. I am a sessional instructor at > UBC and I will be teaching COGS 303 (Research Methods in Cognitive Systems) > this September for the second time. I taught the course last September and > hewed closely to the syllabus as it was designed by Dr. Ron Rensink > (details here > <https://www.cs.ubc.ca/~rensink/publications/download/preparingUgrads-rr.pdf> > ). > > I've been sold on the Team-Based Learning approach and I'm in the process > of designing the modules which will compose the course. I'm now reading The > Fixation of Belief and How to Make Our Ideas Clear, and Peirce's ideas > about the scientific method and doubt seem really to fit with the course's > focus on self-awareness of cognitive biases. > > I was wondering if anyone has made use of Peirce's writings or ideas in > courses on research methods or the philosophy of science. > > Best, > > Doug Mackenzie > Vancouver, BC > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
