Helmut, List. Helmut, I think you miss the point of my original post.
"to call unavoidable logic an incestuous lens, is a dangerous move towards a hobbean war of all against all. In such a war, who would win?" There is nothing unavoidable about that (logic) which I contend against — that which is stated in my original post in opposition to the familiar categorizations of what constitutes knowledge. Remember, I was delving into what is "belief" within that above context. Hobbes, and I have been reading plenty of Hobbes lately, is talking about a state of nature which never really existed — Marshall Sahlins is right when he calls it (Bellum contra omnes) a creation myth (origin-myth) of "capitalism". I don't think, however, it bears upon what I originally wrote. Indeed, Thomas wrote something which perhaps you may find as interesting as I do regarding the dyad with which we have to do here (namely, "belief/knowledge"). He noted that for Peirce something is not really belief, as such, if I remember his reply correctly, until one acts upon it. I find that much more interesting, say collateral experience and its embodiment, than arbitrary, albeit useful, at times, distinctions between deduction, induction, and abduction. Best, Jack ________________________________ From: Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, May 15, 2026 11:46 PM To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Michael Shapiro's 'linguistic neostructuralism' vs Noam Chomsky's 'generative grammar', was, Chomsky's vs Peirce's views of language acquisition Jack, List, to call universalism ethnocentrism, to call unavoidable logic an incestuous lens, is a dangerous move towards a hobbean war of all against all. In such a war, who would win? The WASPs, of course, as before. Just because universalistic philosophy has been successfully articulated by privileged men in the colonialist countries, does not mean, that it as a tool may only be harnessed by them. On the contrary: Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi, John Brown, Simone de Beauvoir, Bob Marley, (who have come into my mind just now), were not identityists, but universalists. I think, that identity politics , a kind of absolute relativism (note the paradoxon) is false and dangerous, just as the (Peircean? Peirce-overinterpreting?) focus on "habit" is. I add to my list Spartacus, quite some time before colonialist-countries-enlightenment, so not influenced by its "habit", so, maybe the wish for freedom is not habitual, but somewhat universal? Best, Helmut 12. Mai 2026 um 14:48 "Jack Cody" <[email protected]> wrote: Jerry, list, I would just note that knowledge, as such, is not merely deductive, nor abductive, nor any of these philosophical terminologies which are, at best, categorical lenses through which one would then, apparently self-reflexively, understand knowledge qua "knowledge" (understand the term through an acquired series of concepts which present themselves as natural but are also somewhat received). There is also the notion, true enough, that knowledge, quite apart from being distinct from belief, is a form of belief — to know, any-thing, such that the shop I shall visit later will be there when I travel, is habitual-praxis (Peirce has his own views on this....) which is embodied as habitus (Mauss/Bourdieu). There is a belief-structure to the confidence which corresponds to the knowledge-structur(ing) of all things one confidently, with belief, claims to know. Of course I do not quibble with the gist of your post in terms of analytical distinction regarding the belief, for example, that a magic thing might cause some second or third magical thing to happen in such a way that this kind of belief cannot be proven or rationally given but its faithful would have to adhere to it on the basis that it is the "religion" (in rough terms, whatever function it served, among other criteria) of the society. I merely point out that your very formal definitions are themselves not, at all, (and this is hardly your fault for I blame the philosophical canon for its incestuous nature — I mean its inverted ethnocentrism of a sort which sees only categories of reason(ing) which it has held for centuries or more to be what the terms signify and then we quibble about the ordering of said terms) — not, at all, entirely correct or true and do, ironically, call for a belief (what else shall you call it? a conviction? makes no difference if it is evidence-based...) on the part of those who propose it. Best, Jack PS: I nod to Peirce who did some work on the notion of embodied habit (habitus in Mauss, though Peirce never used this term to my knowledge nor was likely aware of how much more broadly it could be extended, though happy for others to argue and prove me wrong on that). ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, May 9, 2026 10:11 PM To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Gary Richmond <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Michael Shapiro's 'linguistic neostructuralism' vs Noam Chomsky's 'generative grammar', was, Chomsky's vs Peirce's views of language acquisition List: On May 8, 2026, at 7:14 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: "Belief" is a term for not a logical concept, but for a hardened state of mind. Knowledge is due to deduction. To estimate a probability is due to induction, and to take something for possible is due to abduction. But to believe in something doesn´t have a logical background, only its fixation can be analysed to four kinds. "I know, that not" is a knowledge, "I don´t know, that" too. "It is possible, that not" is a possibility, "It is not possible, that" is not a possibility anymore. "It is probable, that not" and "It is not probable, that" are both probabilities. "I believe, that not" is a belief, but "I don´t believe, that" is not a belief anymore. So, belief logically works like possibility, and knowledge like probability. What forms of logicality are being addressed in these sentences? Let’s discuss. In CSP's syntactical table (matrix of classes of terms), Qualisign Sinsign, Legisign, aligns signs with precisely chosen “word forming elements” that charge the reader with associating the meanings of signs with multiple possible forms of ordinations of meanings. In the second row of this syntax-generating table (matrix), Icon, Index, Symbol, CSP aligns a set of cognitive terms that associate multiple concomitant terms that potentially align the signs with forms of logicality. In the third row of the table, CSP aligns three terms Rhema, Dicisign, Argument thereby generating an alignment of a 3x3 matrix of syntactical words which he uses to associate cognitively the logicality of sentences, that is, an argument (a determinative proposition that is valid) It is critical to note that the de novo genesis of a proposition from specific predecessor terms is the task aligned with the term _argument_ . The first column of the matrix structural order aligns the meanings of qualisigns, icon, and rhema as necessary illative terms that point to a specific identity. The second column of the matrix structural order aligns the meanings of terms sinsign, index (numbers, ordering?) and dicisign (ordination?) into a specific form of transitivity that are necessary to form an argument that potentially specifies the legisign. This line of reasoning is grounded on the presumption of a consistent linguistic (syntactical, indexical, grammatical) interpretation of scientific evidence without any direct reference to mathematical operations or mathematical structures such as “linear algebra” or “isomorphisms”. It appears CSP is using the term “legisign” as an alternative to stating that a meaningful name of identity is assigned to the sinsign. Open question: The question is what motivates the change in order of the second row from “icon, index, symbol” to “index, icon, symbol”? What would be the cause such that the logicality of all specific patterns of syntactical and grammatical inference among terms of the argument be changed? Would it be revised because of an insufficient grammatical structure to support a meaningful (valid) assertion under any situation or semiotic circumstance? Cheers Jerry
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