| Gary, List
Yes, to Doug Engelbart in his pathbreaking 1962 report the locus of intelligence was neither the person nor the computer, but the system that incorporated both. Later Doug located intelligence in systems incorporating multiple persons; at the time of his death he was reportedly working on a book titled ‘Boosting Collective IQ’.
In 1993, while stressing the diagrammatic nature of reasoning, I was not yet sufficiently sensitive to the dialogical nature of reasoning, something Joe Ransdell pointed out in his article. I was still strictly off line in 1993; I got my first internet account in the fall of 1994, and promptly joined Peirce-L.
While I took a strong interest in AI in the nineteen eighties and nineties, I have not kept up with the latest developments and am woefully ignorant of the current state of this technology. Were I still teaching I would of course have to get up to speed, but I am happily retired.
Best, Peter Sent from my iPhone Peter, List, One of the things that stood out for me in re-reading "Thinking with Machines" is that Engelbart understood the computer as but one component within a much larger system including various other artifacts, human beings, language, methods of inquiry, training, etc.. We've been discussing in this and related thread whether one can say that 'thought', in this view, is not simply or exactly something that occurs 'inside the head' but, rather, is spread across an 'ecology of signs'. "Thought . . . is more without us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in any of us."
(CP 8.256) The Peircean argument that seemed to support this view is that thought proceeds through signs, that reasoning is diagrammatic and, further, that inquiry depends upon the observation and criticism of publicly available signs. The continuity of inquiry therefore extends beyond any individual thinker into the larger semeiotic processes through which signs continually generate further interpretants. Still, the tentative conclusion we may have arrived at in a related thread is, as Jon expressed it, that LLMs might at best be considered to be quasi-intelligent, not intelligent per se. As you argue in your paper, the philosophical significance of computational technology lies in the possibility of extending the conditions under which semiosis itself develops and that Engelbart's intelligence augmentation seems to be quite compatible with Peirce's conception of inquiry as the communal growth of meaning. Of course, when your paper appeared in 1993, the kinds of responsive (or, as some say, 'conversational') AI systems now available simply did not exist. As I've noted, today we have computational systems capable of summarizing arguments, comparing interpretations, proposing hypotheses, exposing inconsistencies, suggesting analogies, etc. An intriguing question is how these new symbolic technologies alter the ecology of inquiry itself. That is to say that in my view today's AI systems invite us to reflect on Engelbert's idea of intelligence augmentation under fundamentally new historical conditions. If that is so then the question becomes: How may advanced computational sign systems participate in the continuing semeiotic processes through which human communities generate, criticize, revise, and extend inquiries? Your paper now strikes me as most relevant to the present discussion. Rather than asking whether AI is intelligent, it asks us to consider how these new technologies might transform the ways in which intelligence itself develops within inquiry. Best, Gary R Thanks Gary,
I would also recommend Joe Ransdell’s article’The Relevance of Peircean Semiotics to Computational Intelligence Augmentation’, which discusses and expands upon my article.
Best, Peter Sent from my iPhone Peter, Jon, List,
Peter, thank you for pointing to your paper, "Thinking with Machines: Intelligence Augmentation, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Semiotic," which I remember reading many years ago when Joe Ransdell recommended that I read it and another of your papers, "Peirce, Virtuality, and Semiotic." I found both of them most relevant and valuable at that time. While many of the links on Arisbe are not working, I was able to find "Thinking with Machines" on the Wayback Machine. https://web.archive.org/web/20070522213854/http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/skagesta/thinking.htm
The third paper, "The Mind's Machines ," is unfortunately a dead link on Arisbe (I've asked Ben Udell to write a short note to the List on the problem assessing many papers on Arisbe).
I met Doug at the 2001 ICCS conference, the first of many I was to attend, once at lunch meeting which included Aldo de Moor, John Sowa, and Mary Keeler, and another time just preceding John's presenting his session paper when I was able to speak with Doug briefly one-on-one. I must admit that I was a bit intimidated at the time having just entered the world of "conceptual structures" and having heard from Aldo of Engelbart's storied career in developing the computer mouse, interactive computing, hypertext, collaborative knowledge systems, networked collaboratories, and human-computer interfaces that later became foundational technologies for modern AI development and human-AI collaboration. That, I should note, is a partial list.
I'd like to quote a section of your conclusion of "Thinking with Machines" to suggest the themes of your paper:
In the above we have examined and documented a coherent set of ideas common to Engelbart's augmentationism, Popper's evolutionary epistemology, and Peirce's pragmatistic semiotic. Let us summarize these ideas in eight theses, not all of them explicitly shared by all three thinkers:
- Human evolution proceeds exosomatically, through the evolution of external artifacts.
- Human knowledge does not reside in the head, but in a subclass of our evolved artifacts: Engelbart's "external symbols", Popper's "World 3", Peirce's "signs".
- The Whorfian hypothesis: Our fundamental world view is shaped by one of our evolved exosomatic organs, namely our language.
- The Neo-Whorfian hypothesis: Our thinking is also shaped in a variety of ways by other exosomatic organs, specifically the tools by which we manipulate external symbols.(84)
- Abstract, critical thought is made possible only by the existence of written language. This thesis is also embraced by Buehler and Havelock.
- The possible degrees of abstraction (as well as the possible kinds of intellectual projects) available to us depend on the logical or effective features of the symbols by which we represent abstractions -- Arabic numerals, parentheses, and the like -- i.e. not what the symbols look like, but what they can and cannot do.
- The possible degrees of abstraction available to us depend on the physical features of the tools with which we produce and manipulate symbols -- pencils, computers, and the like.
- The digital computer is most fruitfully regarded as a means for augmenting human intelligent activity by automating and accelerating the production and manipulation of symbols, rather than as an independent source of intelligent behavior.
I would encourage all those interested in the topic to read "Thinking with Machines." Thanks again, Peter, for directing us to it.
Best,
Gary
Gary, list,
It may be of interest that I argued for the relevance of Peirce’s semiotic to Engelbart’s intelligence augmentation in my 1993 paper ‘Thinking with Machines’, available on the Peirce Telecommunity website. Doug read the paper, we had a couple of conversations about it, and I think I can claim the credit for Doug’s taking an interest in Peirce in his later years.
Best, Peter Sent from my iPhone Jon, Ulysses, Jeff, List,
I agree that "AQI" (or even "AQ-I") is quite unlikely to catch on any day soon.
Recently I've been reflecting on Doug Engelbart's project, Intelligence Augmentation (IA), which my friend and colleague, Aldo de Moor, has done much 'hands-on' work through his work on CommunitySense ( https://www.communitysense.nl). Aldo describes his project as "Building on and generalizing from Engelbart’s views," and summarizes Engelbart's vision in "Making Doug’s Dream Come True:
Collaboratories in Context" ( https://communitysense.nl/papers/iccs02b.pdf)
In [Engelbart's] view, the only feasible approach [to developing 'collaboratories' functioning as mediators of distributed groups working with systems of information tools] is a long term, pragmatically guided whole-system evolution. It is crucial not just to create good socio-technical
systems, consisting of co-evolving Human and Tool Systems. Also, one should continuously improve
this design process, in other words “improve the improvement capability of the organization”.
Recently I've been working on the possibility of building on and developing Engelbart's and de Moor's work on collaboratories in consideration of AI, an idea that I've been referring to as IAAI (Intelligence Augmentation meets Artificial Intelligence). That acronym may not take hold either, but I think it captures the gist of the idea of a contemporary approach to how we humans might approach grappling with such extraordinary LLM developments.
Best,
Gary R
xx Gary R., Ulysses, List:
I find your latest formulations considerably less objectionable than ascribing genuine intelligence to "AI" systems themselves. They are indeed diagrammatic tools that augment human intelligence, facilitating inquiry when they are intelligently used by humans for that purpose. Since they at least arguably qualify as quasi-minds, we might be able to refer to them accurately as quasi-intelligent; but even if so, I doubt that "AQI" would ever catch on as a replacement for "AI." :-)
Thanks,
Jon
Jon, Ulysses, List, Jon, I found your mention of the conference presentation on HAI especially relevant. It immediately brought to mind Douglas Engelbart's research program which he called intelligence augmentation (IA) [See his paper (1962), "Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework," https://www.dougengelbart.org/content/view/138] Engelbart's central idea, as I understand it, is that the really important question is not whether machines themselves become intelligent, but how human intelligence may be augmented through interaction with computational systems.
In any event, I find myself thinking less about AI considered in isolation than about the larger semiotic processes within which both humans and machines participate. In other words, the most interesting unit of analysis is most definitely not the machine itself, but the continuing inquiry in which machine-generated signs aid human thinking about important issues, perhaps eventually even some of our most criticall, world-unsettling 'wicked problems'.
Ulysses' description of LLMs as diagrams also seems quite relevant here. A diagram, after all, is not itself an argument or an inquiry (let alone an inquirer). Yet diagrams have long played an indispensable role in mathematical and scientific discovery because, as Peirce definitively showed, especially the 'manipulation' of them permit relations to become visible that might otherwise remain unnoticed. If AI systems are understood somewhat analogously, then perhaps their significance lies not in their possessing intelligence than in augmenting the semeiotic processes through which inquiry develops.
I wonder whether Engelbart's idea of IA points towards a formulation which might reconcile our differing emphases. The machine need not be regarded as an autonomous intelligent agent, nor merely as a passive artifact. Rather, its significance may lie in the way that it can augment the continuing semiosis through which communities of inquiry generate fruitful concepts, programs, discoveries, etc.
Best,
Gary R
I am at least commenting on the semiotic and categorical capabilities of the AI model itself in order to understand what it is capable of contributing to broader inquiry and what human users need to bring to the AI model if they are to use them for inquiry.
My position is large language models are, from a semiotic perspective, a diagram. Which is to say, potentially very useful for inquiry but not an artificial “mind” capable of symbolic thought, which is necessary, in my view, for intelligence.
The thing I might disagree with Jon on is I am probably more likely to consider the training process itself as quasi intelligent, albeit with a lot of caveats. Gary R., List:
As you know, I understand Peirce's late topical conception of continuity to be top-down, not bottom-up; the whole is ontologically primordial, not an assemblage of discrete parts. From that standpoint, the notion of locating the continuity of semiosis does not really make sense--the entire universe is a vast semiosic continuum from which individual signs, individual sign-users, and larger inquiries can be prescinded as artifacts of analysis. This obviously does not entail that the entire universe is properly characterized as intelligent; on the contrary, it still encompasses discrete things and their brute dyadic reactions, including the sequential operations within a digital computer, as degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.
When most people refer to "artificial intelligence," it seems to me that they are ascribing intelligence to an individual artificial system--exactly what I find problematic--not the larger inquiry that results when humans use it for that purpose. In fact, one of the most interesting presentations at a conference that I attended last month advocated greater attention to human interaction with "AI" systems, which effectively turns them into "HAI" systems. Research suggests that improvements in that interface might make a bigger positive difference going forward than further advancing the capabilities of the technology itself.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian Jon, List, I wonder if it is possible that we are now considering somewhat different questions. It seems to me that you are commenting more on the semiotic character of the AI system itself, while I increasingly find myself reflecting on the semeiotic character of the larger inquiry in which AI seems to me to be capable of participating. Your sticking point as I see it seems to be that the internal operations of present AI systems consist entirely of dyadic reactions and, therefore, cannot participate in the continuous triadic semiosis that Peirce identifies with intelligence. Say, for the sake of argument, that everything you say about the machine's internal operations is correct, still does it necessarily follow that the larger inquiry within which those operations become signs for further interpretation cannot, then, exhibit genuine semiosis? So, I'm beginning to think that our principal disagreement has less to do with AI, but increasingly seems concerned with where one ought to locate the continuity of semiosis itself. Is it primarily within the individual sign-user, or may that continuity also characterize the larger inquiry through which interpretants are generated, criticized, corrected, etc.? If the latter, then intelligence may be seen in the living semiosis through which inquiry continually develops. Best, Gary R.
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