Gary R., Ulysses, List: I find your latest formulations considerably less objectionable than ascribing genuine intelligence to "AI" systems themselves. They are indeed diagrammatic tools that augment *human *intelligence, facilitating inquiry when they are intelligently used *by humans* for that purpose. Since they at least arguably qualify as quasi-minds, we *might *be able to refer to them accurately as *quasi*-intelligent; but even if so, I doubt that "AQI" would ever catch on as a replacement for "AI." :-)
Thanks, Jon On Wed, Jul 8, 2026 at 1:26 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Ulysses, List, > > Jon, I found your mention of the conference presentation on HAI especially > relevant. It immediately brought to mind Douglas Engelbart's research > program which he called *intelligence augmentation* (IA) [See his paper > (1962), "Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework," > https://www.dougengelbart.org/content/view/138] Engelbart's central idea, > as I understand it, is that the really important question is not whether > machines themselves become intelligent, but how human intelligence may be > augmented through interaction with computational systems. > > In any event, I find myself thinking less about AI considered in isolation > than about the larger semiotic processes within which both humans and > machines participate. In other words, the most interesting unit of analysis > is most definitely *not* the machine itself, but the continuing inquiry > in which machine-generated signs aid human thinking about important issues, > perhaps eventually even some of our most criticall, world-unsettling > 'wicked problems'. > > Ulysses' description of LLMs as diagrams also seems quite relevant here. A > diagram, after all, is not itself an argument or an inquiry (let alone an > inquirer). Yet diagrams have long played an indispensable role in > mathematical and scientific discovery because, as Peirce definitively showed, > especially the 'manipulation' of them permit relations to become visible > that might otherwise remain unnoticed. If AI systems are understood > somewhat analogously, then perhaps their significance lies *not* in their > possessing intelligence than in augmenting the semeiotic processes through > which inquiry develops. > > I wonder whether Engelbart's idea of IA points towards a formulation which > might reconcile our differing emphases. The machine need not be regarded > as an autonomous intelligent agent, nor merely as a passive artifact. > Rather, its significance may lie in the way that it can augment the > continuing semiosis through which communities of inquiry generate fruitful > concepts, programs, discoveries, etc. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Tue, Jul 7, 2026 at 11:48 PM Ulysses <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I am at least commenting on the semiotic and categorical capabilities of >> the AI model itself in order to understand what it is capable of >> contributing to broader inquiry and what human users need to bring to the >> AI model if they are to use them for inquiry. >> >> My position is large language models are, from a semiotic perspective, a >> diagram. Which is to say, potentially very useful for inquiry but not an >> artificial “mind” capable of symbolic thought, which is necessary, in my >> view, for intelligence. >> >> The thing I might disagree with Jon on is I am probably more likely to >> consider the training process itself as quasi intelligent, albeit with a >> lot of caveats. >> >> On Tue, 7 Jul 2026 at 11:27 pm, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary R., List: >>> >>> As you know, I understand Peirce's late topical conception of continuity >>> to be top-down, not bottom-up; the whole is ontologically primordial, not >>> an assemblage of discrete parts. From that standpoint, the notion of >>> *locating >>> *the continuity of semiosis does not really make sense--the *entire >>> universe* is a vast semiosic continuum from which individual signs, >>> individual sign-users, and larger inquiries can be prescinded as artifacts >>> of analysis. This obviously does not entail that the entire universe is >>> properly characterized as *intelligent*; on the contrary, it still >>> encompasses discrete things and their brute dyadic reactions, including the >>> sequential operations within a digital computer, as *degenerate *outcomes >>> of continuous and triadic semiosis. >>> >>> When most people refer to "artificial intelligence," it seems to me that >>> they are ascribing intelligence to an individual artificial system--exactly >>> what I find problematic--not the larger inquiry that results when humans >>> *use >>> *it for that purpose. In fact, one of the most interesting >>> presentations at a conference that I attended last month advocated greater >>> attention to human interaction with "AI" systems, which effectively turns >>> them into "HAI" systems. Research suggests that improvements in that >>> interface might make a bigger positive difference going forward than >>> further advancing the capabilities of the technology itself. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 7, 2026 at 3:11 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, List, >>>> >>>> I wonder if it is possible that we are now considering somewhat >>>> different questions. It seems to me that you are commenting more on *the >>>> semiotic character of the AI system* itself, while I increasingly find >>>> myself reflecting on *the semeiotic character of the larger inquiry *in >>>> which AI seems to me to be capable of participating. Your sticking >>>> point as I see it seems to be that the internal operations of present AI >>>> systems consist entirely of dyadic reactions and, therefore, cannot >>>> participate in the continuous triadic semiosis that Peirce identifies with >>>> intelligence. >>>> >>>> Say, for the sake of argument, that everything you say about the >>>> machine's internal operations is correct, still does it necessarily follow >>>> that the larger inquiry within which those operations become signs for >>>> further interpretation cannot, then, exhibit genuine semiosis? >>>> >>>> So, I'm beginning to think that our principal disagreement has less to >>>> do with AI, but increasingly seems concerned with *where one ought to >>>> locate the continuity of semiosis itself*. Is it primarily within the >>>> individual sign-user, or may that continuity also characterize the larger >>>> inquiry through which interpretants are generated, criticized, corrected, >>>> etc.? If the latter, then intelligence may be seen in the living semiosis >>>> through which inquiry continually develops. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R. >>>> >>>
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