[note: this post by Vincent Colapietro was sent to me but seems addressed to the List as a whole.]
Greetings. Someone has written in this exchange (Jon, I believe it was): However, it seems to me that there is an important difference between inquiry for *its own* sake and inquiry for the sake of increased *understanding*. This is of course true. But the implication appears to be that either I have ignored this distinction or cannot account for it. Peirce says in more than one place" if you, dear Reader, are inclined to suppose I have overlooked something comparatively obvious, please consider the possibility I have not. While not remotely approximate to him, I am nonetheless disposed to request a fair measure of hermeneutic charity. Inquiry for the sake of enhanced understanding must, from a Peircean perspective, carry the implication of enhanced *reflexive *inquiry (every great scientific discovery being a lesson in logic and this of course means an enhanced understanding of how to go on as inquirers from this point forward). Inquiry for the sake of inquiry encompasses both enhanced first-order understanding of how things work and a reflexive understanding of how we as historically situated agents ought, in light of first-order discoveries, read as "lessons in logic" (i.e., a normative account our comportment as experimental inquirers) ought to go on. If a fraction of the capital poured into the development of artificial intelligence were diverted to the nurturing of human ingenuity, "natural" intelligence," perhaps senseless wars and ecological devastation would not be defining features of our time. Moreover, wealth in its most fundamental sense would be more widely distributed. What is this sense? Here is one suggestive answer. All the best to each of you, V “Wealth does not appear [in antiquity] as the aim of production. … The question is [for at least the ancient Greeks and Romans] always which mode of property creates the best citizens [i.e., which mode of production, distribution, and consumption best fosters civic or political *areté*]. Wealth appears [in antiquity] only among the few commercial peoples … who live in the pores of the world, like the Jews in medieval society [here we encounter an indication of Marx’s anti-Semitism]. Now wealth is *on one side *a thing [or object], realized in things, material products, which a human being confronts as subject]; *on the other side*, as value [rather than mere thing], wealth is merely command over alien labour not with the aim of ruling, but with the aim of private consumption, etc. It appears in all forms as the shape of a thing, be it an object or be it mediated through the object, which is external and accidental to the individual. Thus, the old [or ancient view, including the Aristotelian perspective], in which the human being appears as the aim of production, regardless of his limited, national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty when contrasted to the modern [or post-medieval] world, where production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth [the limitless acquisition of material wealth] as the aim of production? [Should individuals be evaluated in terms of their contribution to the augmentation of capital or rather should any mode of production, including capitalism, be evaluated in terms of what kinds of persons and citizens it produces?] In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois [or capitalist] form [of economic life] is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces, etc. The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity’s own nature? *The absolute working out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historical development, which makes this totality of development, i.e., the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? *Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality?* Strives to remain not something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? In bourgeois [or capitalist] economics … this complete working out of human creative potentiality [altered translation] appears as a complete emptying out …” *Grundrisse *[Outlines], trans. Martin Nicolaus (NY: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 487-88 (emphasis added except with respect to *predetermined*). The *Grundrisse* is, as the translator notes in his Foreword, “a series of seven notebooks rough-drafted by Marx, chiefly for the purposes of self-clarification, during the winter 1857-58 (p. 7). Vincent Colapietro The Center for the Humanities Swan Hall, 175G 60 Upper College Road University of Rhode Island (URI) Kingston, RI 02881 Liberal Arts Research Professor Emeritus Philosophy & African American Studies Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA On Thu, Jul 16, 2026 at 11:38 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Vincent, Gary F., List, > > Jon, thank you for directing us to Vincent Colapietro's new Cognito paper, > "C. S. Peirce’s radically heuristic conception of inquiry: futural > endeavors, substantive discoveries, and sublime play" > > https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/76328/50654 > > I have begun to wonder whether the apparent difference between your > positions is less a disagreement than a matter of emphasis on different ' > moments' within the same Peircean account of inquiry. Your post stresses > that inquiry is a normative activity directed toward truth: Unless inquiry > remains answerable to the DO it may become but the manipulation of > symbols. I agree. But what I take Vincent to be emphasizing is something > somewhat different, though not necessarily incompatible. In my view, the > value of scientific discoveries is not their being 'settled' results but, > shall we say, *heuristic achievements* that become resources for further > inquiry. This is to suggest that *science is not only the accumulation of > knowledge but also the continual renewal of inquiry itself*. Is it > possible that these are in fact successive 'moments' within a single > process? If so, then inquiry remains both answerable to reality through > the DO, but that it also enlarges the methods and practices by which > future inquiry might proceed. > > Jon, you have consistently emphasized that present AI systems lack the > 'outward > clash' with reality. But I have argued that scientific inquiry does *not* > depend > *solely* on the experiences of isolated investigators. As I've emphasized > throughout the several threads of this discussion, inquiry also depends > -- and, perhaps principally depends on philosophical and other scientific > communities continually testing, criticizing and, hopefully, extending one > another's observations. I guess this represents something of an argument > *contra* the 'Great Man' theory of scientific advancement. In my view, > what individual investigators principally contribute are promising > abductions. > > Finally, I wonder whether the AI question might be framed a bit > differently than we've been doing. Rather than asking whether AI itself > 'possesses' collateral experience, maybe we should ask whether AI-generated > signs can contribute to inquiry in communities whose continuing relation to > the oD is sustained by observation, experiment, criticism, and possible > correction. If that is so, then Vincent's paper, your comments, and Gary > F.'s observations may not be positing different conceptions of inquiry as > much as suggesting a far richer understanding of *how inquiry's normative > and heuristic dimensions naturally belong together.* > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2026 at 5:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> The question in bold below is the subject of a new paper that Vincent >> Colapietro just published online >> <https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/76328/50654> >> in *Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia*, entitled "C. S. Peirce’s Radically >> Heuristic Conception of Inquiry: Futural Endeavors, Substantive >> Discoveries, and Sublime Play." As he explains in the text itself, "What I >> mean by a radically *heuristic *account of inquiry is one in which >> inquiry is undertaken *for the sake of inquiry*, and this implies that >> it is undertaken for the sake of the *growth* of inquiry and, by >> implication, the growth of understanding." Here is the full abstract. >> >> In a late manuscript (MS 283 [1906]), Peirce addressed the question, >> "What are signs for, anyhow?" and raised the possibility that they have no >> purpose other than being instruments of a *Spieltrieb *(a play-impulse). >> Peirce however rejected this view and proposed a rival one: signs >> ultimately serve habituation, the processes by which habits, especially >> ones more finely and fully attuned to the circumstances of our lives, are >> formed. But the exercise of our most reliable habits generates sequences of >> signs apparently displaying a life of their own (e.g., witness the history >> of science or indeed that of culture). That is, the operation of habits >> itself seems to be in the service of the generation of novel signs, the >> furtherance of open-ended processes, destined to transform even some of our >> most settled habits. Closely connected to this, Peirce appears to slight >> the monumental achievements of experimental inquiry, treating them as >> merely the ashes of what was once living science; in effect, he denies >> their contemporary salience to experimental inquiry. For these and other >> reasons, the author explores the extent to which inquiry for inquiry’s sake >> might be seen as an instance of pure play, having its purpose solely in its >> own perpetuation. While this radically heuristic conception of pure inquiry >> needs to be qualified, an appreciation of it might require a revision of >> how the relationship between habits and semiosis is to be understood (a >> revision in which neither is subordinated to the other). >> >> >> However, it seems to me that there is an important difference between >> inquiry for *its own* sake and inquiry for the sake of increased >> *understanding*. Peirce himself identified the growth of *concrete >> reasonableness* as the *summum bonum*, the ideal end toward which the >> entire universe is tending asymptotically (though not monotonically). >> Accordingly, I suggest that the proper end of inquiry is increased >> *knowledge*, i.e., adopting true beliefs--affirming only those >> propositions whose dynamical objects are realities, such that the >> corresponding habits of conduct would not be confounded by any possible >> future experience. "The purpose of every sign is to express 'fact,' and >> by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to >> determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the >> absolute Truth ... [which] is the ultimate interpretant of every sign" >> (NEM 4:239-40, EP 2:305, 1901). As I have said before, this is what >> makes logic as semeiotic a *normative *science--it identifies the >> principles to which any sincere inquiry *ought *to conform. "In logic, >> it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of >> reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge the >> most speedily" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). >> >> With that in mind, it seems noteworthy that the dynamical objects of all >> the signs that "AI" systems generate are *other signs*. Tracing the >> entire chain of those signs back far enough would *eventually *reach >> dynamical objects that *humans *actually experienced and then >> represented in their writings, thereby providing the texts on which the >> "AI" systems were "trained." However, as Ulysses has pointed out, the >> latter are always and only processing those symbolic signs *iconically*; >> and as a doubly degenerate sign, an icon "gives no assurance that any >> such object as it represents really exists" (NEM 4:242-3, EP 2:307, >> 1901). Consequently, as I have said before, "AI" systems cannot *verify *the >> truth of any given sentence apart from probabilistically comparing it with >> a massive collection of *other *sentences, so it is no wonder that they >> sometimes suffer from "hallucinations" that produce false or misleading >> responses to prompts. They lack the "outward clash" that causes the >> irritation of doubt when our belief-habits *are *confounded by *actual >> *experience >> with reality, thereby prompting inquiry. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Jul 13, 2026 at 10:27 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary F., List,. >>> >>> Your examples of the surgical robot and the climate-monitoring AI are >>> especially helpful in that they help make concrete what we've been >>> discussing somewhat abstractly. From a Peircean point of view, a crucial >>> consideration is *that inquiry remains answerable to reality*. Whether >>> the relevant observations come through human perception, scientific >>> instruments, robotic and other sensors, or some future combination of these >>> (and who knows what else?)* reality continues to constrain inquiry* by >>> resisting inadequate interpretants and interpretations and supporting >>> better ones. Human collateral experience no doubt remains paradigmatic, >>> but it is conceivable that future AI systems might participate more >>> directly in the larger web of observations through which communities of >>> inquiry remain connected to the world. So, perhaps we differ a bit here >>> (that is, *should* humanity, let alone life-valuing inquiry survive the >>> onslaught of planet degrading activity by the 'masters of destruction' -- >>> you know whom I mean). >>> >>> Which brings us to your related question of *alignment*. For even if >>> future AI systems were to become increasingly integrated into inquiry >>> through richer forms of interaction with reality, the normative question >>> would still remain: *To what ends is inquiry directed?* That returns us >>> to Peirce's architectonic where logic ultimately depends upon ethics and >>> ethics upon esthetics. (There's much more to be said here, but I happen to >>> be on vacation in the Finger Lakes district of New York State.) >>> >>> Suffice it to say that I too radically distrust "the small group of >>> owners and developers of AI [who] have purposes which are clearly *out* of >>> alignment with the purposes and the well-being of life on earth *including >>> the rest of humanity*." And I too am frankly horrified by AI's "energy- >>> and water-sucking data centers." As for the first, the "filthy rich" >>> owners of AI: they already own so much and control so much of what has >>> become destructive of humanity and the planet that AI would appear to be >>> just another 'add on' to their greedy lust for wealth and power *if *it were >>> not for the second, the already horrific waste of energy and water of their >>> data centers. While I personally think AI is 'here to stay', I personally >>> fear for humanity's and the planet's future. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
