Jon, Vincent, Gary F, List, Your Subject in introducing this thread, *The End(s) of Inquiry*, has rather haunted me these past few weeks since “end” may name (a) the * particular* aims of specific inquiries, (b) the *ultimate ideal* toward which inquiry tends, or even, (c)* inquiry ending* as we know it. Of course, I agree that inquiry cannot be justified merely by its continuation, that on Peircean principles that it need be directed toward a most admirable ideal, the* summum bonum* of science being *the reasonable in itself*. You seem to equate that ideal with truth, knowledge, and the growth of concrete reasonableness. No argument there -- although I might broaden 'knowledge' to include the growth of interpersonal understanding through the development of those habits essential to collaborative inquiry.
This is how I might distinguish the *ends of inquiry* from the *end of inquiry*. *Particular inquiries* seek adequate explanations of facts, valid judgments of arguments, etc. The more *general end of inquiry,* again from a Peircean perspective, is the asymptotic growth of understanding towards Truth. Truth is *not 'constructed' by us,* as some influential French scholars of the mid-20th century would have it, but is something to which *we are answerable as a community,* a point which was recently emphasized by Gary F and Vincent. On the way, each particular inquiry would seem likely to benefit greatly by researchers practicing personal humility and discipline, fidelity to the inquiry (and to other inquirers who may be involved in the inquiry), and to the hope that *this* inquiry could contribute to the growth of knowledge. As for AI, I agree that responsive systems do not -- and in my view, will never -- undergo the 'irritation of doubt' as we human inquirers do. Indeed, they possess *no* autonomous concern for truth, or for rational conduct, or for moral responsibility. Nevertheless, as I've been arguing, *not every sign contributing to inquiry must independently confront its dynamical object*, that inquiry has always depended on books, diagrams, instruments as well as on arguments connecting investigations with realities that individual researchers might not have directly experienced. Your emphasis on the 'outward clash' is exactly right: The decisive question is *whether the larger inquiry remains answerable to Reality, typically experiential reality*. Nonetheless, it seems to me that AI-generated signs *can* function as potentially valuable interpretants after they've been tested, corrected, rejected, etc. Although their Jon, Vincent, Gary F, List, Your Subject in introducing this thread, *The End(s) of Inquiry*, has rather haunted me these past few weeks since “end” may name (a) the * particular* aims of specific inquiries, (b) the *ultimate ideal* toward which inquiry tends, or even, (c)* inquiry ending* as we know it. Of course, I agree ythat inquiry cannot be justified merely by its continuation, that on Peircean principles that it needs to be directed toward a most admirable ideal, the* summum bonum* of science being *the reasonable in itself*. You seem to equate that ideal with truth, knowledge, and the growth of concrete reasonableness. No argument there -- although I might broaden 'knowledge' to include the growth of interpersonal understanding through the development of those habits essential to collaborative inquiry. This how I might distinguish the *ends of inquiry* from the *end of inquiry* . *Particular inquiries* seek adequate explanations of facts, valid judgments of arguments, etc. The more *general end of inquiry,* again from a Peircean perspective, is the asympotic growth of understanding towards Truth. Truth is *not 'constructed' by us,* as some influential French scholars of the mid-20th century would have it, but is something to which *we are answerable as a community,* a point which was recently emphasized by Gary F and Vincent. On the way, each particular inquiry would seem likely to benefit greatly by researchers practicing personal humility and discipline, fidelity to the inquiry (and to other inquirers who may be involved in the inquiry), and to the hope that *this* inquiry might contribute to the growth of knowledge. As for AI, I agree that responsive systems do not -- and my view, will never -- undergo the 'irritation of doubt' as we human inquirers do. Indeed, they possess *no* autonomous concern for truth, rational conduct, or moral responsibility. Nevertheless, as I've been arguing, *not every sign contributing to inquiry must independently confront its dynamical object*, that inquiry has always depended on books, diagrams, instruments as well as on arguments connecting investigations with realities that individual researchers might not have directly experienced. Your emphasis on the 'outward clash' is exactly right: The decisive question is *whether the larger inquiry remains answerable to Reality, typically experiential reality*. Nonetheless, I have argued that AI-generated signs *can* function as potentially valuable interpretants after they've been tested, corrected, rejected, etc. Although their participation in inquiry is clearly derivative and dependent, I have argued that it doesn't necessarily follow that their participation in producing interesting and potentially interesting interpretants is necessarily unreal. The deepest danger of AI seems to be for some that if machine generated analysis and discourse were to completely replace observation, collateral experience, some more-than-human humanistic criticism,etc., then, yes, AI could well contribute to the end of inquiry as we know it. However that scenario seems *most* unlikely to me. If, on the other hand, responsive AI were capable of participating in inquiring by, for example, revealing inconsistencies or reorganizing material for testing, etc., I believe that it has the potential to benefit inquiry. More specifically, I have argued that *AI can participate in the semiosis involved in inquiry* -- albeit in a derivative, dependent, and incomplete way. In this matter I have adopted Doug Engelbart's conception of 'Intelligence Augmentation' (AI) as the optimal way to look at these new, powerful technologies. Perhaps this goes hand in hand with my opposition to any Great Man Theory of Scientific Advancement. (However, this is not at all to suggest that there aren't now and haven't always been brilliantly creative men and women in all the arts and sciences, people whose contribution have been inestimable in moving us towards that *summum bonum*.) I suppose that in a word I would conclude -- and, I believe, on Peircean principles -- that it is not only men and women who are capable of participating in the semiosis of inqury. AI is a candidate for that participation. Quoting Peirce, Jon wrote: "In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge the most speedily." I think that it is possible that AI can meaningfully help "develop knowledge the most speedily." Meanwhile, let's hope that it, and we, can contribute to resolving AI's high electricity, water, and space demands issues as well as those related to inequalities of access. I'm beginning to think that the problem with AI may prove to be much less with the technology and much more with the individuals and corporations that are developing and controlling it. Best, Gary R On Wed, Jul 15, 2026 at 5:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > The question in bold below is the subject of a new paper that Vincent > Colapietro just published online > <https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/76328/50654> > in *Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia*, entitled "C. S. Peirce’s Radically > Heuristic Conception of Inquiry: Futural Endeavors, Substantive > Discoveries, and Sublime Play." As he explains in the text itself, "What I > mean by a radically *heuristic *account of inquiry is one in which > inquiry is undertaken *for the sake of inquiry*, and this implies that it > is undertaken for the sake of the *growth* of inquiry and, by > implication, the growth of understanding." Here is the full abstract. > > In a late manuscript (MS 283 [1906]), Peirce addressed the question, "What > are signs for, anyhow?" and raised the possibility that they have no > purpose other than being instruments of a *Spieltrieb *(a play-impulse). > Peirce however rejected this view and proposed a rival one: signs > ultimately serve habituation, the processes by which habits, especially > ones more finely and fully attuned to the circumstances of our lives, are > formed. But the exercise of our most reliable habits generates sequences of > signs apparently displaying a life of their own (e.g., witness the history > of science or indeed that of culture). That is, the operation of habits > itself seems to be in the service of the generation of novel signs, the > furtherance of open-ended processes, destined to transform even some of our > most settled habits. Closely connected to this, Peirce appears to slight > the monumental achievements of experimental inquiry, treating them as > merely the ashes of what was once living science; in effect, he denies > their contemporary salience to experimental inquiry. For these and other > reasons, the author explores the extent to which inquiry for inquiry’s sake > might be seen as an instance of pure play, having its purpose solely in its > own perpetuation. While this radically heuristic conception of pure inquiry > needs to be qualified, an appreciation of it might require a revision of > how the relationship between habits and semiosis is to be understood (a > revision in which neither is subordinated to the other). > > > However, it seems to me that there is an important difference between > inquiry for *its own* sake and inquiry for the sake of increased > *understanding*. Peirce himself identified the growth of *concrete > reasonableness* as the *summum bonum*, the ideal end toward which the > entire universe is tending asymptotically (though not monotonically). > Accordingly, I suggest that the proper end of inquiry is increased > *knowledge*, i.e., adopting true beliefs--affirming only those > propositions whose dynamical objects are realities, such that the > corresponding habits of conduct would not be confounded by any possible > future experience. "The purpose of every sign is to express 'fact,' and > by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to > determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the > absolute Truth ... [which] is the ultimate interpretant of every sign" > (NEM 4:239-40, EP 2:305, 1901). As I have said before, this is what makes > logic as semeiotic a *normative *science--it identifies the principles to > which any sincere inquiry *ought *to conform. "In logic, it will be > observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning > will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge the most > speedily" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). > > With that in mind, it seems noteworthy that the dynamical objects of all > the signs that "AI" systems generate are *other signs*. Tracing the > entire chain of those signs back far enough would *eventually *reach > dynamical objects that *humans *actually experienced and then represented > in their writings, thereby providing the texts on which the "AI" systems > were "trained." However, as Ulysses has pointed out, the latter are always > and only processing those symbolic signs *iconically*; and as a doubly > degenerate sign, an icon "gives no assurance that any such object as it > represents really exists" (NEM 4:242-3, EP 2:307, 1901). Consequently, as > I have said before, "AI" systems cannot *verify *the truth of any given > sentence apart from probabilistically comparing it with a massive > collection of *other *sentences, so it is no wonder that they sometimes > suffer from "hallucinations" that produce false or misleading responses to > prompts. They lack the "outward clash" that causes the irritation of doubt > when our belief-habits *are *confounded by *actual *experience with > reality, thereby prompting inquiry. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jul 13, 2026 at 10:27 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary F., List,. >> >> Your examples of the surgical robot and the climate-monitoring AI are >> especially helpful in that they help make concrete what we've been >> discussing somewhat abstractly. From a Peircean point of view, a crucial >> consideration is *that inquiry remains answerable to reality*. Whether >> the relevant observations come through human perception, scientific >> instruments, robotic and other sensors, or some future combination of these >> (and who knows what else?)* reality continues to constrain inquiry* by >> resisting inadequate interpretants and interpretations and supporting >> better ones. Human collateral experience no doubt remains paradigmatic, >> but it is conceivable that future AI systems might participate more >> directly in the larger web of observations through which communities of >> inquiry remain connected to the world. So, perhaps we differ a bit here >> (that is, *should* humanity, let alone life-valuing inquiry survive the >> onslaught of planet degrading activity by the 'masters of destruction' -- >> you know whom I mean). >> >> Which brings us to your related question of *alignment*. For even if >> future AI systems were to become increasingly integrated into inquiry >> through richer forms of interaction with reality, the normative question >> would still remain: *To what ends is inquiry directed?* That returns us >> to Peirce's architectonic where logic ultimately depends upon ethics and >> ethics upon esthetics. (There's much more to be said here, but I happen to >> be on vacation in the Finger Lakes district of New York State.) >> >> Suffice it to say that I too radically distrust "the small group of >> owners and developers of AI [who] have purposes which are clearly *out* of >> alignment with the purposes and the well-being of life on earth *including >> the rest of humanity*." And I too am frankly horrified by AI's "energy- >> and water-sucking data centers." As for the first, the "filthy rich" >> owners of AI: they already own so much and control so much of what has >> become destructive of humanity and the planet that AI would appear to be >> just another 'add on' to their greedy lust for wealth and power *if *it were >> not for the second, the already horrific waste of energy and water of their >> data centers. While I personally think AI is 'here to stay', I personally >> fear for humanity's and the planet's future. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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