Gary, thank you for bring the list’s attention to our project. We are currently working on integrating the microfilm edition with the Houghton scans and developing an interface for editing and organising the manuscript transcriptions (Gemini assisted). Automatic concordance matching between pages is in a sort of early stage and we hope that it may facilitate dealing with multiple drafts and especially also with inserted pages in assembling readable versions of the individual ms.
My role in the project is more that of a domain expert, as the data science people call it. I’ve been following your conversation on AI and semiotics for a while and I have been discussing the “Not minds but signs” paper with Davide (it was written before the project started). I feel that your arguments here were already further along than Davide’s early reflections which may strike large LANGUAGE model people as more fascinating than those who have been habituated to assume a semiotic state of mind for a long time now. I think the confrontation of minds and signs is difficult to maintain from a Peircean pov. You could argue that a semiotic extension of the concept of mind is an advancement from minds as merely linguistic, but I find it hard to see how the entire range of aspects of embodiment, action and community that go beyond a merely grammatical conception of semiotics, i.e. how genuine human efforts end up becoming concepts, and concepts are being understood as storage of human efforts, would fit into redescribing LLMs as sign users in the fullest sense. However, addressing these questions is part of the research trajectory of our project and I am excited to see what comes of diving into this. Best Sebastian > Am 08.08.2026 um 02:04 schrieb Gary Richmond <[email protected]>: > > List, > > Jon Alan Schmidt directed me to a very interesting and, I believe, important > paper by Davide Picca which he came upon when List member, Sebastian Fei, > sent him an email "providing a link to his current research project--"Peirce > Interprets Peirce" (https://peirce-team.github.io/website/). One of the > papers already produced by its principal investigator, Davide Picca, is > entitled 'Not Minds, but Signs: Reframing LLMs through Semiotics' > (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.17080)." > > Jon also provided the Abstract of the paper which I've slightly shortened. > > This paper challenges the prevailing tendency to frame Large Language Models > (LLMs) as cognitive systems, arguing instead for a semiotic perspective that > situates these models within the broader dynamics of sign manipulation and > meaning-making. Rather than assuming that LLMs understand language or > simulate human thought, we propose that their primary function is to > recombine, recontextualize, and circulate linguistic forms based on > probabilistic associations. By shifting from a cognitivist to a semiotic > framework, we avoid anthropomorphism and gain a more precise understanding of > how LLMs participate in cultural processes, not by thinking, but by > generating texts that invite interpretation. Through theoretical analysis and > practical examples, the paper demonstrates how LLMs function as semiotic > agents whose outputs can be treated as interpretive acts, open to contextual > negotiation and critical reflection. We explore applications in literature, > philosophy, education, and cultural production, emphasizing how LLMs can > serve as tools for creativity, dialogue, and critical inquiry. The semiotic > paradigm foregrounds the situated, contingent, and socially embedded nature > of meaning, offering a more rigorous and ethically aware framework for > studying and using LLMs. Ultimately, this approach reframes LLMs as > technological participants in an ongoing ecology of signs. They do not > possess minds, but they alter how we read, write, and make meaning, > compelling us to reconsider the foundations of language, interpretation, and > the role of artificial systems in the production of knowledge. > > Jon commented on the abstract that "This sounds very much like the position > that you have been advocating recently." I agree, with one small quibble. > > Although Picca draws extensively upon Peirce, his use of Peircean semiotics > is largely text-centered. While he treats LLM outputs primarily as signs that > elicit interpretants in human readers, he doesn't discuss as such Peirce's > broader conception of semiosis as an ongoing communal process of inquiry in > which interpretants generate further interpretants, and that habits of > inquiry evolve within communities of investigators, something which, > following Douglas Engelbart's Intelligence Augmentation (IA), I tend to > emphasize. But this is a mere quibble. > > This paper largely complements the line of inquiry I'd been pursuing. While > Picca argues, and I agree, that LLMs should be understood as participants in > an 'ecology of signs' rather than as artificial minds, I've focused on > semiosis not being that of isolated agents (human or machine), but in the > continuing semiotic activity of communities of inquiry (large or small). On > that view, LLMs may participate derivatively in intelligence augmentation > precisely because AIs can generate signs that can become subject to communal > criticism, correction, and possible development. Picca's semiotic framework > points in this direction although it does not explicitly make that, to my > mind, essential Peircean move. > > Nonetheless, for those interested in the topic, I highly recommend Pica's > paper. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Fri, Jul 24, 2026 at 9:17 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Jon, Vincent, Gary F, List, >> >> Your Subject in introducing this thread, The End(s) of Inquiry, has rather >> haunted me these past few weeks since “end” may name (a) the particular aims >> of specific inquiries, (b) the ultimate ideal toward which inquiry tends, or >> even, (c) inquiry ending as we know it. Of course, I agree that inquiry >> cannot be justified merely by its continuation, that on Peircean principles >> that it need be directed toward a most admirable ideal, the summum bonum of >> science being the reasonable in itself. You seem to equate that ideal with >> truth, knowledge, and the growth of concrete reasonableness. No argument >> there -- although I might broaden 'knowledge' to include the growth of >> interpersonal understanding through the development of those habits >> essential to collaborative inquiry. >> >> This is how I might distinguish the ends of inquiry from the end of inquiry. >> Particular inquiries seek adequate explanations of facts, valid judgments of >> arguments, etc. The more general end of inquiry, again from a Peircean >> perspective, is the asymptotic growth of understanding towards Truth. >> Truth is not 'constructed' by us, as some influential French scholars of the >> mid-20th century would have it, but is something to which we are answerable >> as a community, a point which was recently emphasized by Gary F and Vincent. >> On the way, each particular inquiry would seem likely to benefit greatly by >> researchers practicing personal humility and discipline, fidelity to the >> inquiry (and to other inquirers who may be involved in the inquiry), and to >> the hope that this inquiry could contribute to the growth of knowledge. >> >> As for AI, I agree that responsive systems do not -- and in my view, will >> never -- undergo the 'irritation of doubt' as we human inquirers do. Indeed, >> they possess no autonomous concern for truth, or for rational conduct, or >> for moral responsibility. Nevertheless, as I've been arguing, not every sign >> contributing to inquiry must independently confront its dynamical object, >> that inquiry has always depended on books, diagrams, instruments as well as >> on arguments connecting investigations with realities that individual >> researchers might not have directly experienced. Your emphasis on the >> 'outward clash' is exactly right: The decisive question is whether the >> larger inquiry remains answerable to Reality, typically experiential >> reality. Nonetheless, it seems to me that AI-generated signs can function as >> potentially valuable interpretants after they've been tested, corrected, >> rejected, etc. Although their Jon, Vincent, Gary F, List, >> >> Your Subject in introducing this thread, The End(s) of Inquiry, has rather >> haunted me these past few weeks since “end” may name (a) the particular aims >> of specific inquiries, (b) the ultimate ideal toward which inquiry tends, or >> even, (c) inquiry ending as we know it. Of course, I agree ythat inquiry >> cannot be justified merely by its continuation, that on Peircean principles >> that it needs to be directed toward a most admirable ideal, the summum bonum >> of science being the reasonable in itself. You seem to equate that ideal >> with truth, knowledge, and the growth of concrete reasonableness. No >> argument there -- although I might broaden 'knowledge' to include the growth >> of interpersonal understanding through the development of those habits >> essential to collaborative inquiry. >> >> This how I might distinguish the ends of inquiry from the end of inquiry. >> Particular inquiries seek adequate explanations of facts, valid judgments of >> arguments, etc. The more general end of inquiry, again from a Peircean >> perspective, is the asympotic growth of understanding towards Truth. Truth >> is not 'constructed' by us, as some influential French scholars of the >> mid-20th century would have it, but is something to which we are answerable >> as a community, a point which was recently emphasized by Gary F and Vincent. >> On the way, each particular inquiry would seem likely to benefit greatly by >> researchers practicing personal humility and discipline, fidelity to the >> inquiry (and to other inquirers who may be involved in the inquiry), and to >> the hope that this inquiry might contribute to the growth of knowledge. >> >> As for AI, I agree that responsive systems do not -- and my view, will never >> -- undergo the 'irritation of doubt' as we human inquirers do. Indeed, they >> possess no autonomous concern for truth, rational conduct, or moral >> responsibility. Nevertheless, as I've been arguing, not every sign >> contributing to inquiry must independently confront its dynamical object, >> that inquiry has always depended on books, diagrams, instruments as well as >> on arguments connecting investigations with realities that individual >> researchers might not have directly experienced. Your emphasis on the >> 'outward clash' is exactly right: The decisive question is whether the >> larger inquiry remains answerable to Reality, typically experiential >> reality. Nonetheless, I have argued that AI-generated signs can function as >> potentially valuable interpretants after they've been tested, corrected, >> rejected, etc. Although their participation in inquiry is clearly derivative >> and dependent, I have argued that it doesn't necessarily follow that their >> participation in producing interesting and potentially interesting >> interpretants is necessarily unreal. >> >> The deepest danger of AI seems to be for some that if machine generated >> analysis and discourse were to completely replace observation, collateral >> experience, some more-than-human humanistic criticism,etc., then, yes, AI >> could well contribute to the end of inquiry as we know it. However that >> scenario seems most unlikely to me. If, on the other hand, responsive AI >> were capable of participating in inquiring by, for example, revealing >> inconsistencies or reorganizing material for testing, etc., I believe that >> it has the potential to benefit inquiry. >> >> More specifically, I have argued that AI can participate in the semiosis >> involved in inquiry -- albeit in a derivative, dependent, and incomplete >> way. In this matter I have adopted Doug Engelbart's conception of >> 'Intelligence Augmentation' (AI) as the optimal way to look at these new, >> powerful technologies. Perhaps this goes hand in hand with my opposition to >> any Great Man Theory of Scientific Advancement. (However, this is not at all >> to suggest that there aren't now and haven't always been brilliantly >> creative men and women in all the arts and sciences, people whose >> contribution have been inestimable in moving us towards that summum bonum.) >> >> I suppose that in a word I would conclude -- and, I believe, on Peircean >> principles -- that it is not only men and women who are capable of >> participating in the semiosis of inqury. AI is a candidate for that >> participation. Quoting Peirce, Jon wrote: >> >> "In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the >> ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge >> the most speedily." >> >> I think that it is possible that AI can meaningfully help "develop knowledge >> the most speedily." Meanwhile, let's hope that it, and we, can contribute to >> resolving AI's high electricity, water, and space demands issues as well as >> those related to inequalities of access. I'm beginning to think that the >> problem with AI may prove to be much less with the technology and much more >> with the individuals and corporations that are developing and controlling it. >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 15, 2026 at 5:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Gary R., List: >>> >>> The question in bold below is the subject of a new paper that Vincent >>> Colapietro just published online >>> <https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/cognitiofilosofia/article/view/76328/50654> >>> in Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia, entitled "C. S. Peirce’s Radically >>> Heuristic Conception of Inquiry: Futural Endeavors, Substantive >>> Discoveries, and Sublime Play." As he explains in the text itself, "What I >>> mean by a radically heuristic account of inquiry is one in which inquiry is >>> undertaken for the sake of inquiry, and this implies that it is undertaken >>> for the sake of the growth of inquiry and, by implication, the growth of >>> understanding." Here is the full abstract. >>> >>> In a late manuscript (MS 283 [1906]), Peirce addressed the question, "What >>> are signs for, anyhow?" and raised the possibility that they have no >>> purpose other than being instruments of a Spieltrieb (a play-impulse). >>> Peirce however rejected this view and proposed a rival one: signs >>> ultimately serve habituation, the processes by which habits, especially >>> ones more finely and fully attuned to the circumstances of our lives, are >>> formed. But the exercise of our most reliable habits generates sequences of >>> signs apparently displaying a life of their own (e.g., witness the history >>> of science or indeed that of culture). That is, the operation of habits >>> itself seems to be in the service of the generation of novel signs, the >>> furtherance of open-ended processes, destined to transform even some of our >>> most settled habits. Closely connected to this, Peirce appears to slight >>> the monumental achievements of experimental inquiry, treating them as >>> merely the ashes of what was once living science; in effect, he denies >>> their contemporary salience to experimental inquiry. For these and other >>> reasons, the author explores the extent to which inquiry for inquiry’s sake >>> might be seen as an instance of pure play, having its purpose solely in its >>> own perpetuation. While this radically heuristic conception of pure inquiry >>> needs to be qualified, an appreciation of it might require a revision of >>> how the relationship between habits and semiosis is to be understood (a >>> revision in which neither is subordinated to the other). >>> >>> However, it seems to me that there is an important difference between >>> inquiry for its own sake and inquiry for the sake of increased >>> understanding. Peirce himself identified the growth of concrete >>> reasonableness as the summum bonum, the ideal end toward which the entire >>> universe is tending asymptotically (though not monotonically). Accordingly, >>> I suggest that the proper end of inquiry is increased knowledge, i.e., >>> adopting true beliefs--affirming only those propositions whose dynamical >>> objects are realities, such that the corresponding habits of conduct would >>> not be confounded by any possible future experience. "The purpose of every >>> sign is to express 'fact,' and by being joined with other signs, to >>> approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would >>> be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth ... [which] is the ultimate >>> interpretant of every sign" (NEM 4:239-40, EP 2:305, 1901). As I have said >>> before, this is what makes logic as semeiotic a normative science--it >>> identifies the principles to which any sincere inquiry ought to conform. >>> "In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the >>> ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop knowledge >>> the most speedily" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). >>> >>> With that in mind, it seems noteworthy that the dynamical objects of all >>> the signs that "AI" systems generate are other signs. Tracing the entire >>> chain of those signs back far enough would eventually reach dynamical >>> objects that humans actually experienced and then represented in their >>> writings, thereby providing the texts on which the "AI" systems were >>> "trained." However, as Ulysses has pointed out, the latter are always and >>> only processing those symbolic signs iconically; and as a doubly degenerate >>> sign, an icon "gives no assurance that any such object as it represents >>> really exists" (NEM 4:242-3, EP 2:307, 1901). Consequently, as I have said >>> before, "AI" systems cannot verify the truth of any given sentence apart >>> from probabilistically comparing it with a massive collection of other >>> sentences, so it is no wonder that they sometimes suffer from >>> "hallucinations" that produce false or misleading responses to prompts. >>> They lack the "outward clash" that causes the irritation of doubt when our >>> belief-habits are confounded by actual experience with reality, thereby >>> prompting inquiry. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >>> On Mon, Jul 13, 2026 at 10:27 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> Gary F., List,. >>>> >>>> Your examples of the surgical robot and the climate-monitoring AI are >>>> especially helpful in that they help make concrete what we've been >>>> discussing somewhat abstractly. From a Peircean point of view, a crucial >>>> consideration is that inquiry remains answerable to reality. Whether the >>>> relevant observations come through human perception, scientific >>>> instruments, robotic and other sensors, or some future combination of >>>> these (and who knows what else?) reality continues to constrain inquiry by >>>> resisting inadequate interpretants and interpretations and supporting >>>> better ones. Human collateral experience no doubt remains paradigmatic, >>>> but it is conceivable that future AI systems might participate more >>>> directly in the larger web of observations through which communities of >>>> inquiry remain connected to the world. So, perhaps we differ a bit here >>>> (that is, should humanity, let alone life-valuing inquiry survive the >>>> onslaught of planet degrading activity by the 'masters of destruction' -- >>>> you know whom I mean). >>>> >>>> Which brings us to your related question of alignment. For even if future >>>> AI systems were to become increasingly integrated into inquiry through >>>> richer forms of interaction with reality, the normative question would >>>> still remain: To what ends is inquiry directed? That returns us to >>>> Peirce's architectonic where logic ultimately depends upon ethics and >>>> ethics upon esthetics. (There's much more to be said here, but I happen to >>>> be on vacation in the Finger Lakes district of New York State.) >>>> >>>> Suffice it to say that I too radically distrust "the small group of owners >>>> and developers of AI [who] have purposes which are clearly out of >>>> alignment with the purposes and the well-being of life on earth including >>>> the rest of humanity." And I too am frankly horrified by AI's "energy- and >>>> water-sucking data centers." As for the first, the "filthy rich" owners of >>>> AI: they already own so much and control so much of what has become >>>> destructive of humanity and the planet that AI would appear to be just >>>> another 'add on' to their greedy lust for wealth and power if it were not >>>> for the second, the already horrific waste of energy and water of their >>>> data centers. While I personally think AI is 'here to stay', I personally >>>> fear for humanity's and the planet's future. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]> . >>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, >>> if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go >>> to >>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
