I disagree with you, Gary. The Representamen relation is not the same as
'representation'. The sign is a triad and can indeed be called a
'representation'. The sign, which is a triad, is composed of three Relations:
the Object Relation, the Representamen Relation and the Interpretant Relation.
Please don't confuse the term of 'representation' with 'Representamen'.
The Interpretant Relation moves the full semiosic triad into 'another
representation' , i.e., into another triad, (1.339) but this is NOT the same as
a 'Representamen'!
The sign-in-itself, that triad of three relations, is not a qualisign,
sinsign, legisign; the Representamen is a qualisign, sinsign, legisign, which
is to say, the Representamen in a mode of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
The categories are not 'flavours' but are actual modes of organization of
matter/energy.
How could a single sign have THREE Representamen Relations?...ie.. have its
Representamen as qualisign, sinsign and also legisign? Whew. The fact that 'no
sign stands alone' is valid but this doesn't mean that that same sign is a
merged collation of ALL signs! Networking is not the same as a smoothie.
(forgive the simplistic metaphor)..
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 5:48 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Edwina, Helmut, list
As I've argued my position repeatedly in the past, all I'll add to what I've
already said is that, for Peirce, the interpretant is itself a representamen as
is the object (immediate object).
CP 1.339. The easiest of [the ideas in which Thirdness is predominant] which
are of philosophical interest is the idea of a sign, or representation. A sign
stands for something to the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, it is a
vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for which it
stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea
to which it gives rise, its interpretant. The object of representation can be
nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the
interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing the
one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. The
meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it is
nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant
clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only
changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here.
Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the
torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant
again. Lo, another infinite series.
So, "sign, or representation"
and "the object of representation can be nothing but a representation"
and "the first representation is the interpretant"
and "the meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation"
and "the interpretant is nothing but another another representation [and] it
has its interpretant again.
So it is all "sign, or representation."
And yet it is a leading principal of Peircean semiotics that these (sign,
object, interpretant) stand in triadic relation, that they can be
distinguished, but I'd maintain, only de post facto and analytically. There is
nothing 'linear' about that even while it is possible to imagine that semiosis
happens in time and is processual in at least that sense (although I certainly
have never held for something along the lines of 'object then representamen
then interpretant'--the very passage above argues against such a linear
progression).
And why shouldn't there be characteristic types of firstness in consideration
of the sign in itself--qualisign, sinsign, and legisign--and yet these all be
expressions of firstness with categorial 'flavors' shall we say? It's not as if
these three are necessarily characters of the same sign (although they could
be). There are myriad firstnesses, so that in the analysis of signs one can
distinguish these three characters, the monadic, the dyadic, and the triadic,
which Peirce does--thus, for example, the statement of a syllogism taken as a
sign has the dominant character of a legisign (while one can find aspects of
sinsign and qualisign as well--no sign stands alone, and far from it)
To try to clarify this somewhat from a standpoint emphasizing the categories
more than the application of phenomenological insights to semiotics, the
phaneron is one, yet there are to be discovered in it three categories.
Further, one finds that, expect in certain types of analyses, one never finds
one category independent of the others (although it might dominate). Well,
that's just a hint. But surely it would be an error to hypostatize the three
categories, would it not?
Returning to semiotics, I'd say that taking an ax to these analytical matters
represents to me the profoundest error. After all, the several trichotomies and
the various classes of signs (10-classes, 64-classes, etc.) are meant to be
guides to our analysis and understanding, and it appears to me to be a grave
mistake to hypostatize them (this, of course, holds a fortiori for the
categories as well).
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Mon, Aug 25, 2014 at 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to confuse Peirce's
linear order of the processing semiosis of the triad (moving from Object via
Representamen to Interpretant and also, within the mediative Representamen
reasoning, to Object to Interpretant)..as having anything at all to do with the
modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness!
Therefore, your (Gary R's) outline of the Sign - even though you declare
that 'many' agree with you - I certainly don't - and I'm not going to bring in
any 'ad populum' appeal. Again, I consider it a profound error to merge the
three categorical modes with the linear processing order of the act of
semiosis. Your outline below contradicts the other small tables, a, b, c,
which show the nine Relations - with which I DO agree. After all, if the
representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do below?
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 4:02 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Helmut,
I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of the
interpretant as 3ns is reflected in this passage:
CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of
determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The
triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it
in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is
the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation
to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen
itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which the Third stands be merely
similar to that in which the First stands, for this would make the relation of
the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. The Third must indeed
stand in such a relation, and thus must be capable of determining a Third of
its own; but besides that, it must have a second triadic relation in which the
Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to its Object, shall be its own
(the Third's) Object, and must be capable of determining a Third to this
relation. All this must equally be true of the Third's Thirds and so on
endlessly; and this, and more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign. . .
Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe, see the following
categorial relation in semiotics.
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Then I think we all agree that each of these has it tricategorial
relations:
(a) Representamen:
qualisign (1ns)
|> legisign (3ns)
sinsign (sin==single, 2ns)
(b) Object:
icon (1ns)
|>symbol (3ns)
index (2ns)
(c) Intepretant:
Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns)
|> Argument (3ns)
Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns)
In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the 10-adic sign
classification, Peirce writes:
CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first [(a) above],
according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is
a general law; secondly [(b) above], according as the relation of the sign to
its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some
existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant;
third [(c) above], according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of
possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.
Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy, Peirce virtually
always means some categorial trichotomy involving1ns, 2ns, and 3ns) based on CP
2.243 we get:
(a) Representamen:
qualisign (the sign is a mere quality)
|> legisign (the sign is a general law)
sinsign (the sign is an actual existent)
(b) Object:
icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some character in itself)
|>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a relation to the
interpretant)
index (the relation of the sign to its object is an existential one)
(c) Intepretant:
Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of possibility)
|> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as one of reason)
Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of fact)
Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign classification and
descriptions of the 10 sign classes Peirce writes:
CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing
Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of which numerous subdivisions have to be
considered. The ten classes are as follows: [he then gives descriptions of the
10]
So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the Interpretant as in
itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is correct that only the Argument is an
Interpretant representing its sign as a sign of reason, or, 3ns. Yet each and
all of the 10 signs has within it a relation to its interpretant which is
either rhematic, dicentic, or argumentative.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Mon, Aug 25, 2014 at 3:08 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Edwina, with my classification of representamen, object, and
interpretant as 1ns, 2ns, 3ns I have meant just the overall role in a sign,
like Peirce said "a first, a second, a third". With "overall role" I mean,
before you look at the sign classes. Object being nontemporal, ok, that was an
exaggeration: I meant to say, that it is (quite) permanent in the looked-at
time scale (and a representamen is not. It is rather like an impulse: It
appears, calls the object, then it is gone). Final interpretant turning into
immediate object: Complicated, so just a reference: (Charles S. Peirse´s
philosophy of signs, essays in comparative semiotics" by Gerard Deledalle, page
74, Indiana University Press 2001.)
This was not an attempt to convince you, Edwina, I am just hoping to
not disagree with you about absolutely everything.
Best, Helmut
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
Helmut - we'll just have to disagree - on just about everything.
In my view, the Interpretant is NOT always in a mode of Thirdness.
Indeed, in Peirce's classification of signs (CP 2.254)...you will see that the
Interpretant Relation is in a mode of Thirdness only in ONE sign - the pure
Argument. Otherwise, in the other nine classes of signs, it is in a mode of
either Firstness or Secondness.
I also disagree that Secondness is atemporal (nontemporality). It is,
in my view, very specifically temporal (in perfect time; i.e., like a clock).
If a sign was atemporal, then, it couldn't exist 'as itself'..in brute
interaction with another sign. Matter organized in a mode of Secondness is in
local space and 'this hic-et-nunc' time.
The Representamen Relation, the relation of mediation, can be in any
one of the three categorical modes. When it is in Thirdness, it is in
progressive or continuous time. When it is in Secondness, it is in 'perfect'
hic et nunc time. When it is in Firstness it is in 'now' time..which is
non-linear with no past or future.
I don't see how a final interpretant turns into an immediate object;
the final interpretant is objective while the immediate object is subjective.
And I think your speculation about induction/deduction is too 'hopping
convoluted' to answer in a reasonable manner.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Helmut Raulien
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 2:12 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6512] Abduction,
And I think, nonlocality and nontemporality (into the future)
indicates an interpretant (3ns), while locality (and nontemporality) indicates
an object (2ns). (Temporality indicates a representamen (1ns)) Might it be,
that the question whether deduction is 2ns or 3ns is based on the fact, that
the conclusion in a deduction is true, therefore a final interpretant (3ns),
but a final interpretant then turns into an immediate object (2ns)? And the
question, whether induction is 2ns or 3ns maybe based on the following: There
are three kinds of induction: crude, quantitative, qualitative, said Peirce. I
havent read it, but: If the induction is complete, it is a deduction (3ns). And
if the number of elements in the set is known (I have seen only 309 frogs, all
green, and there are 16754391 frogs existing), a deduction (3ns) about
subjective probability (eg. that the next hopping-by frog will be green, or
that all frogs are green) is implied in the elsehow 2ns induction.
Helmut
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
To add another twist, isn't it the case that deduction determines
non-local necessary conclusions while induction is strictly local? That is, in
my view, deduction provides a general rule that is valid and thus necessary in
ALL cases, regardless of spatial and temporal domain. Induction, on the other
hand does provide a general rule but it is valid only for the local spatial
domain and current time. Therefore deduction operates within a mode of
Thirdness and induction within a mode of Secondness. Secondness, as Phyllis
points out, is most certainly 'necessary' in that the interactions are
determined by the facts of existentiality, but they are confined to that local
space and current time.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Phyllis Chiasson
Cc: peirce-l@list iupui. edu ; biosemiotics@lists ut. ee ;
cl...@waikato.ac.nz ; Mary Libertin ; Helmut Raulien
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 9:39 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: PEIRCE-L] Abduction, 1ns, Induction,
2ns, Deduction, 3ns and Peirce's brief "confusion"
Phyllis, all,
It may be that rather then your brain being fogged, Phyllis, that I
am simply wrong in, perhaps, overstating my position. Peirce remained
indecisive, not completely certain in this matter as the material he
substituted for the undelivered notes suggests. And there is even some
hesitancy to come down definitively in the direction I've suggested in those
very notes.
As Nathan Houser suggests somewhere, Peirce never quite fully
reconciled in his own thinking the relationship between those two trichotomies,
that is, the three categories and the three inference patterns.
As for "where I'm headed," all I can say is that I have not been
able to see things differently than I've presented them and I've found
following this way of seeing things helpful. But fallibility remains my
watchword in this as in other philosophical matters.
So, keep getting stronger, take your meds, listen to your doctors,
and don't stop posting!--it may well be that my analytical abilities are the
ones that are muddy.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 9:24 PM, Phyllis Chiasson
<ath...@olympus.net> wrote:
Gary, et all,
Well, the docs warned me that there would probably be any of
several cognitive consequences while I am taking these high doses of
prednisone. This posting is probably a result of one or more of these effects,
as I can't grasp where you are headed and I have a sense that my posting may be
coming from an entirely different planet than this discussion is on. I think I
know what I mean, but can't think how to clarify it.
So, my response will have to wait until my brain fog clears (if
ever). Meanwhile, I'm going to refrain from posting until I feel confident that
at least some of my analytical abilities have returned.
Regards,
Phyllis
Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Phyllis,
I must say that I find some of your remarks confusing, You wrote:
PC: Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a little
like brute actuality to me.
But necessity (as lawfulness, as habit-taking, as necessary, that
is, mathematical reasoning) is itself a character of thirdness for Peirce and
exactly requires that there be brute actuality (vizl, that which has no reason,
2ns) for it to work on (embodied laws, existential 'results').
This is also the notion of would-be's (i.e., would necessarily be
if the habits/conditions were to come into being) in Peirce's letters to James.
Would-be's are 3ns, as May-be's are 1ns and Is's are 2ns.
On the other hand brute actuality is most decidedly given by
Peirce as existential synonym for secondness.
Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in it. I
instance putting your shoulder against a door and trying to force it open
against an unseen, silent, and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided
consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably
near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of
being of one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call that
Secondness. (CP 1.24)
You continued:
PC: Also, hasn't the later Peirce always ascribed generalization
to induction of all kinds (universal propositions as crude; qualitative &
quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction as
explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as classification, testing,
verification (which seems like a generalizing process to me) = 3rd.
I see it differently: "deduction as explication" is, in inquiry,
the explication of the hypothesis for the purpose of devising tests to see to
what extent the hypothesis conforms to reality. In such reasoning the
'demonstrations' are essentially mathematical, necessarily following from the
hypothesis if true. While any given test certainly has it "generalized"
characters, the testing is typically in the context of some 'brute actuality'.
PC: Of course, the collapse of a universal proposition is a
second, but I think that would be because the collapse is a necessary because
the proposition (premise, etc) no longer holds. Not because it was inductively
derived.
I'm afraid I don't follow your reasoning here. For example, what
do you mean by "the collapse of a universal proposition" in this context?
For my own part, I'm thinking along the line of this quotation,
that the general "consists in governing individual events":
The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its
governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its
being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a state of
incipiency, of growth. , , [T]he development of Reason requires as a part of it
the occurrence of more individual events than ever can occur. It requires, too,
all the coloring of all qualities of feeling, including pleasure in its proper
place among the rest. This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in
embodiment, that is, in manifestation. (CP 1.615)
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 6:27 PM, Phyllis Chiasson
<ath...@olympus.net> wrote:
Gary asked: Are you saying that you see him changing his mind
yet again in that regard, Phyllis?
I'm not sure. Since deduction produces necessary results, it
seems a little like brute actuality to me. Also, hasn't the later Peirce always
ascribed generalization to induction of all kinds (universal propositions as
crude; qualitative & quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction
as explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as classification, testing,
verification (which seems like a generalizing process to me) = 3rd. Of course,
the collapse of a universal proposition is a second, but I think that would be
because the collapse is a necessary because the proposition (premise, etc) no
longer holds. Not because it was inductively derived.
Of course, you're correct that I'm thinking of inferences for
inquiry (methodeutic) rather than
Regards,
Phyllis
Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Phyllis, all,
Ah, so Peirce changes his mind as to the subdivisions he will
make of abduction and induction as he delves ever deeper into these in the
N.A., there in consideration of inquiry, not merely as forms of inference. But
I see no evidence in the N.A. (or elsewhere) that he changed his mind about the
categoriality of induction and deduction. Are you saying that you see him
changing his mind yet again in that regard, Phyllis?
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson
<ath...@olympus.net> wrote:
Gary R wrote:that Induction split, at once, into the Sampling
of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. . . " (*Pragmatism as a
Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on
Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7).
Yet later, in1908 in NA, Peirce identified 1. Retro. 2
deduction types (theorematic & axiomatic sp?) And 3 kinds of induction (crude,
qualitative, quantitative).
Phyllis
Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Helmut, Cathy, Josh, Mary, lists, On several occasions over the years I've
taken up the matter of the categorial assignations Peirce gave deduction and
induction, the most recent being a peirce-l post of March, 2012, in response to
Cathy Legg writing: "I don't see how one might interpret induction as
secondness though. Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the
secondness of surprise due to error."
https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00747.html So, this
is a subject which clearly keeps coming up, most recently by you, Helmut, while
a couple of weeks ago Cathy and Josh Black, at the Peirce Centennial Congress
at U.Mass--or more precisely, on the way from that Congress to Milford, PA,
where a group of us placed a plaque commemorating that Congress on a wall of
Arisbe, Peirce's home there--both held for induction as 3ns and deduction as
2ns, while I've been arguing, as has Mary Libertin on the biosemiotics list
recently, just the reverse, that, except for a brief lapse (discusses below),
Peirce saw induction as 2ns and deduction as 3ns. One can find in Patricia Ann
Turrisi's edition of the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism notes for "Lecture
5: The Normative Sciences" a long note (#3) from which the following excerpt
gives an account of Peirce's lapse (his brief change of mind in the categorial
assignations), the reason for it, and his late tendency to more or less settle
his opinion again as deduction being 3ns and induction 2ns. He writes:
"Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inferencethrough an
Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, ortrying how things will
act, is inference through an Index, and is thusconnected with Secondness;
Deduction, or recognition of the relationsof general ideas, is inference
through a Symbol, and is thus connectedwith Thirdness. . . [My] connection of
Abduction with Firstness,Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with
Thirdness was confirmedby my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction;
that Inductionsplit, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the
Sampling ofQualities. . . " (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of
RightThinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed.276-7).
Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of "confusion" in the matter.
"[In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the JohnsHopkins
University*, while I stated the rationale of induction prettywell, I confused
Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that isthe induction of qualities.
Subsequently, writing in the seventhvolume of the Monist, sensible of the error
of that book but not quiteunderstanding in what it consisted I stated the
rationale of Inductionin a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later
in lectureshere in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with
thethird category and Deduction with the Second" [op. cit, 277].
In the sense that for a few years Peirce was "confused" about
these categorial associations of the inference patterns, he is at
least partially at fault in creating confusion in the minds of many
scholars about the categorial associations of the three inference
patterns. Still, he finally sees the error of his ways and corrects himself:
At present [1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to myoriginal opinion. And
yet he adds that he "will leave the question undecided." Still, after 1903 he
never again associates deduction with
anything but 3ns, nor induction with anything but 2ns. As I wrote in 2012:
GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything
butthirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that Imainly have
stuck to that way of thinking because when, inmethodeutic, Peirce employs the
three categories together inconsideration of a "complete inquiry"--as he does,
for example, verylate in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of
God* in thesection the CP editors titled "The Three Stages of Inquiry" [CP
6.468- 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction(here,
'retroduction', of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of theretroduction's
implications for the purposes of devising tests of it)with 3ns, and induction
(as the inductive testing once devised) with2ns.
Best,
Gary
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to
l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the
message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
