BEN - I'll try to respond below...
-----
1) BEN: Edwina, you said that Gary's calling the sign priman or first
confines it.
"After all, if the representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do below?"
EDWINA: Ah, now I see what you meant by my use of 'confine'. Again, the
Representamen is a Relation, not a thing - and so, I don't see how it can be
JUST, always, defined as you do, as 1ns. The Representamen Relation can be in
any of the three modes - check out the ten classes of signs.
2) BEN: Or if you're distinguishing between representamen and representamen
relation, Gary is quoting Peirce as saying that the sign is a first that stands
in a _triadic_ relation.
EDWINA: No, I am distinguishing between 'representation' and 'representamen'.
See 1.339. These are two different completely different terms and with
completely different meanings. The Representation is the full triadic SIGN. The
Representamen is the mediation Relation.
3) BEN:As for the sign's being a 'triad', I don't understand that kind of
description since I'm used mainly to Peirce's way of talking about it. A triad
of sign-object-interpretant may, as a whole, be an object or sign or even an
interpretant, as far as I can tell. I don't see the reason to characterize it
particularly as a sign. I'm not feigning incomprehension Socrates-style or in
any other sense. I just don't get it.
EDWINA: But Peirce himself refers to the sign as a triad. See his diagram at
1.347. In 2.234-6, he discusses the triadic relations, and outlines clearly,
the ten classes of Signs, each made up of three Relations or correlates. I
think we have to be careful talking about terms, for Peirce uses them, often,
interchangeably. He sometimes refers to the Representamen as a 'sign' and as a
'ground'. And sometimes refers to the Relations as signs!
4) BEN: When Peirce discusses monadic, dyadic, and triadic, in cases where
all three are irreducible, as he does in one of the quotes below, then he IS
discussing the categories, and he's doing so in connection with object, sign,
interpretant. He lays it out in "On a New List of Categories."
EDWINA: Peirce himself (2.340) was not pleased with his analysis in his 1867
New List of Categories, (1.559) . The monadic references, in my reading, are
not references to the three categories, but to the nature of the Semiosic
Structural Relations. There is only ONE Representamen Relation. There are two
Object Relations: Dynamic Object or/and Immediate Object); and three
Interpretant Relations: immediate, dynamic and final. These are well discussed
by Peirce elsewhere..See, for example. 5.475 (emotional, energetic and logical).
Edwina
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 6:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Ben, now I'm confused. Where did I say that a sign (which I consider a
triadic set of Relations) is 'priman' or first, i.e., confined to Firstness in
all respects? I certainly don't agree with that - there is only one Sign
(triad) whose three Relations are all in a mode of Firstness. The other 9 signs
certainly are not. So - I'm not sure where you get that impression from me.
The various manuscript quotes you provide are about the interaction of the
Three Relations and are not about the Three Categories of Firstness,
Secondness, Thirdness. I keep saying that one must be careful not to mix up
these two analytic frameworks.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Udell
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 6:07 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Edwina, list,
I don't understand why you speak of _confinement_. To say that a sign is
priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not to say that it is confined to
firstness in all respects.
["Lectures on Pragmatism," CP 5.43, Quote]
The particular categories form a series, or set of series, only one of
each series being present, or at least predominant, in any one phenomenon. The
universal categories, on the other hand, belong to every phenomenon, one being
perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than another but all of
them belonging to every phenomenon.
[End quote]
It seems a great deal like Peirce does not generally regard categorial
characterizations as particularly confining. If you disagree with Peirce, then
fine, I disagree with him on some important things myself. But what is your
argument that saying that a sign is a priman in respect of object and
interpretant involves a confinement of the sign to 'a mode of firstness'?
[1905 - MS 939 - Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise of1 Human
Nature". Quote]
[...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something
which is in such a relation to an object that it determines, or might
determine, another sign of the same object. This is true but considered as a
definition it would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is
meant by the interpretant being a "sign" of the same object. However, this much
is clear ; that a sign has essentially two correlates, its object and its
possible Interpretant sign. Of these three, Sign, Object, Interpretant, the
sign as being the very thing under consideration is Monadic, the object is
Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic. We therefore look to see, whether
there be not two Objects, the object as it is in itself (the Monadic Object),
and the object as the sign represents it to be (the Dyadic Object). There are
also three Interpretants; namely, 1°, the Interpretant considered as an
independent sign of the Object, 2°, the Interpretant as it is as a fact
determined by the Sign to be, and 3° the Interpretant as it is intended by, or
is represented in, the Sign to be. [...]
[End quote]
So, first off, he's saying that there is a sense in which, at the same
time, the Sign is Monadic, the Object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is
Triadic. He doesn't seem worried that this will somehow prevent the Sign from
being a sinsign, legisign, index, symbol, dicisign, or argument.
Then he relates this to the subdivisions of the correlates: the Sign
unsubdivided, remains ONE, the Object is divided into TWO, the Dynamical and
Immediate Objects, and the Interpretant into THREE, though it is not either of
his familiar trichotomies of interpretants. This is a familiar pattern.
This question of what is the very thing under consideration goes back to
"On A New List," where the bearer of firstness is the quale (which is what is
under consideration); the bearers of secondness are the relate (under
consideration) and its correlate; and the bearers of thirdness are Sign (under
consideration), a correlate of it the Object and its other correlate the
Interpretant. This is reflected again in the phaneroscopy - normatives -
metaphysics distinction. The phenomenon is the _appearance_ under
consideration. It's not that far conceptually from appearance to manifestation.
As a manifestation of an object, something is a sign.
[1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July
1905]
So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a
priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:
A "sign" is anything, A, which,
(1) in addition to other characters of its own,
(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive
correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a
dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to
the relation Þ.
Then look at how Peirce is trying to work out relationships with sign and
category in successive drafts. He is not worried about "confining" the sign to
firstness or secondness or thirdness, even though he sees it as having those
categories in various ways *irrespectively* of whether the sign is qualisign,
sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign, or argument. The
priman-ness of the sign consists in its being the thing under consideration,
and in its material characters of its own, considered apart from relations to
other things.
[MS 793 -On Signs, four versions of a certain page 11. Quote]
a - A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed its Object
and if anything were to be in a certain relation to the sign called being
Interpretant to it, the Sign actively determines the Interpretant to be itself
in a relation to the same Object, corresponding to its own.
b - b - A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would generally be
Priman in some characters, called its "Material Characters". But in addition,
it is essentially (if only formally) Second to something termed its "Real
Object", which is purely active in the Secundanity, being immediately
unmodified by this secundanity; and these characters of the Real Object which
are essential to the identity of the Sign constitute an ens rationis called the
"Immediate Object". Moreover, the Sign is conceivably adapted to being Third to
its Immediate Object for an ens rationis constituted thereby in the same
(generic) relation to that Object in which the Sign itself stands to the same ;
and this Third is termed the "Intended Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished]
c - A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its determination as
Priman are called its Material characters. But in addition it is Second to what
is termed its Real Object, which is altogether active, and immediately
unmodified by this Secundanity, and in so far as the Sign is second to it, it
is termed the immediate Object. The Sign is conceivably adapted to being third
to its Immediate Object for something in so far termed its Intended
Interpretant; and the Sign only functions as such so far as the Intended
Interpretant is Second to it for an Actual Interpretant which thus becomes
adapted become a sign of the Immediate [there is a question mark above this
word] Object for a further intended Interpretant, and in so far as the
Interpretant is such Third it is termed Reflex Interpretant.
d - A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its determinations
as such are called its "Material characters". But in addition, it is Second to
something termed its "Real Object", which is purely active being immediately
unmodified by this Secundanity; and in so for as the sign is Second to it, it
is termed the "Immediate Object" thereof. The Sign is conceivably adapted bo
being Third to its Immediate Object for something which should thereby be
brought into the generically same dyadic relation to that Object in which the
Sign itself stands to that Object, and this Third is called the "Intended
Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such only in so far as the Intended
Interpretant is Second to it and is Third to it for an existent termed the
"Actual Interpretant", the modes of... [unfinished]
[End quote]
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to confuse
Peirce's linear order of the processing semiosis of the triad (moving from
Object via Representamen to Interpretant and also, within the mediative
Representamen reasoning, to Object to Interpretant)..as having anything at all
to do with the modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness!
Therefore, your (Gary R's) outline of the Sign - even though you
declare that 'many' agree with you - I certainly don't - and I'm not going to
bring in any 'ad populum' appeal. Again, I consider it a profound error to
merge the three categorical modes with the linear processing order of the act
of semiosis. Your outline below contradicts the other small tables, a, b, c,
which show the nine Relations - with which I DO agree. After all, if the
representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do below?
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 4:02 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Helmut,
I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of the
interpretant as 3ns is reflected in this passage:
CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of
determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The
triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it
in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is
the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation
to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen
itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which the Third stands be merely
similar to that in which the First stands, for this would make the relation of
the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. The Third must indeed
stand in such a relation, and thus must be capable of determining a Third of
its own; but besides that, it must have a second triadic relation in which the
Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to its Object, shall be its own
(the Third's) Object, and must be capable of determining a Third to this
relation. All this must equally be true of the Third's Thirds and so on
endlessly; and this, and more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign. . .
Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe, see the
following categorial relation in semiotics.
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Then I think we all agree that each of these has it tricategorial
relations:
(a) Representamen:
qualisign (1ns)
|> legisign (3ns)
sinsign (sin==single, 2ns)
(b) Object:
icon (1ns)
|>symbol (3ns)
index (2ns)
(c) Intepretant:
Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns)
|> Argument (3ns)
Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns)
In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the 10-adic sign
classification, Peirce writes:
CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first [(a)
above], according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual
existent, or is a general law; secondly [(b) above], according as the relation
of the sign to its object consists in the sign's having some character in
itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to
an interpretant; third [(c) above], according as its Interpretant represents it
as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.
Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy, Peirce
virtually always means some categorial trichotomy involving1ns, 2ns, and 3ns)
based on CP 2.243 we get:
(a) Representamen:
qualisign (the sign is a mere quality)
|> legisign (the sign is a general law)
sinsign (the sign is an actual existent)
(b) Object:
icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some character in
itself)
|>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a relation to the
interpretant)
index (the relation of the sign to its object is an existential one)
(c) Intepretant:
Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of possibility)
|> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as one of reason)
Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of fact)
Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign classification and
descriptions of the 10 sign classes Peirce writes:
CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing
Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of which numerous subdivisions have to be
considered. The ten classes are as follows: [he then gives descriptions of the
10]
So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the Interpretant as in
itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is correct that only the Argument is an
Interpretant representing its sign as a sign of reason, or, 3ns. Yet each and
all of the 10 signs has within it a relation to its interpretant which is
either rhematic, dicentic, or argumentative.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
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