Edwina,
You wrote:
Please, Gary, don't move into personal insults. I am not a 'speed reader'
and I object to your characterizing me as such.
Ha! You who never personally insult. . . Anyhow, I AM a speed read, I spent
many years studying to be one (including working with several instructors,
using speed increasing machinery, etc). My point is that quickly reading
something as difficult and potentially useful (even profound) as the
quotations Ben offered is not the same as studying them. That is why I--who
is, as just noted, a proud speed reader--wrote in response to Ben that I
would also *study* those quotations. Anyhow, I did not mean to insult you,
only to prod you in the direction of not making such quick decisions on
Peircean texts you might benefit from studying, or at least, perusing.
I think I have a legitimate set of points - which I explained to Ben, and
to you. Just discuss the points; namely, that I think there is a difference
between the semiosic process of the Three Relations - which move from
object Relation via Representamen mediation Relation to Interpretant
Relation...all of which together make up the SIGN....and the three modal
categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. To deny that there IS a
semiosic process would be, I think, difficult; after all, these three
Relations have different functions/actions and thus, must 'work with each
other' to produce the whole triadic SIGN.
It seems to me, Edwina, that you immediately translate* everything* into
your own theory without much reflection, witness your rapid fire responses.
This is meant as an observation, not an insult. Meanwhile, I've read and
studied (reread, reflected) on your theory as presented in your WFF paper
and, where I can make sense of what you're saying, I do not agree with you.
So, I've done my homework.
I pointed out to you also, that 'representation' is totally different from
'Representamen'. Therefore, I don't see anything in Peirce that contradicts
what I am saying.
Edwina, you *never* "see anything in Peirce that contradicts" what you're
saying. But the quotations I gave show Peirce as showing how
'representation' and 'representatmen' have much more in common than you're
acknowledging. It seems to me that you pick and choose the quotations you
want to attend to. Please reread *that* quotation from Peirce to discover
that you are totally incorrect in saying that it is Peirce's view that "
'representation' is totally different from 'Representamen' " A dose of
fallibility here might come in handy (and that is not an insult, just a
suggestion).
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Mon, Aug 25, 2014 at 6:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Please, Gary, don't move into personal insults. I am not a 'speed
> reader' and I object to your characterizing me as such.
>
> I think I have a legitimate set of points - which I explained to Ben, and
> to you. Just discuss the points; namely, that I think there is a difference
> between the semiosic process of the Three Relations - which move from
> object Relation via Representamen mediation Relation to Interpretant
> Relation...all of which together make up the SIGN....and the three modal
> categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. To deny that there IS a
> semiosic process would be, I think, difficult; after all, these three
> Relations have different functions/actions and thus, must 'work with each
> other' to produce the whole triadic SIGN.
>
> I pointed out to you also, that 'representation' is totally different from
> 'Representamen'. Therefore, I don't see anything in Peirce that contradicts
> what I am saying.
>
> Edwina
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Cc:* Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 6:27 PM
> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:6523] Re: Abduction,
>
> Ben,
>
> Thanks for this post which included some quotations I hadn't seen before
> and certainly haven't studied. Your post supports and expands my expressed
> views (expands them even for me!)
>
> And rather than rejecting this analysis--which is Peirce's!--out of hand
> and without studying, I would suggest to Edwina (who appears to be a speed
> reader) that she read Peirce--this Peirce in particular.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 25, 2014 at 6:14 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Edwina, list,
>>
>> I don't understand why you speak of _*confinement*_. To say that a sign
>> is priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not to say that it is confined
>> to firstness in all respects.
>>
>> ["Lectures on Pragmatism," CP 5.43, Quote]
>> The particular categories form a series, or set of series, only one of
>> each series being present, or at least predominant, in any one phenomenon.
>> The
>> universal categories, on the other hand, belong to every phenomenon, one
>> being perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than another
>> but all of them belonging to every phenomenon.
>> [End quote]
>>
>> It seems a great deal like Peirce does not generally regard categorial
>> characterizations as particularly confining. If you disagree with Peirce,
>> then fine, I disagree with him on some important things myself. But what is
>> your argument that saying that a sign is a priman in respect of object and
>> interpretant involves a confinement of the sign to 'a mode of firstness'?
>>
>> [1905 - MS 939 - Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise of1 Human Nature".
>> Quote]
>> [...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something which
>> is in such a relation to an object that it determines, or might determine,
>> another sign of the same object. This is true but considered as a
>> definition it would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is
>> meant by the interpretant being a "sign" of the same object. However, this
>> much is clear ; that a sign has essentially two correlates, its object and
>> its possible Interpretant sign. Of these three, Sign, Object,
>> Interpretant, the sign as being the very thing under consideration is
>> Monadic, the object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is Triadic. We
>> therefore look to see, whether there be not two Objects, the object as it
>> is in itself (the Monadic Object), and the object as the sign represents it
>> to be (the Dyadic Object). There are also three Interpretants; namely, 1°,
>> the Interpretant considered as an independent sign of the Object, 2°, the
>> Interpretant as it is as a fact determined by the Sign to be, and 3° the
>> Interpretant as it is intended by, or is represented in, the Sign to be.
>> [...]
>> [End quote]
>>
>> So, first off, he's saying that there is a sense in which, at the same
>> time, the Sign is Monadic, the Object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is
>> Triadic. He doesn't seem worried that this will somehow prevent the Sign
>> from being a sinsign, legisign, index, symbol, dicisign, or argument.
>>
>> Then he relates this to the subdivisions of the correlates: the Sign
>> unsubdivided, remains ONE, the Object is divided into TWO, the Dynamical
>> and Immediate Objects, and the Interpretant into THREE, though it is not
>> either of his familiar trichotomies of interpretants. This is a familiar
>> pattern.
>>
>> This question of what is the very thing under consideration goes back to
>> "On A New List," where the bearer of firstness is the quale (which is what
>> is under consideration); the bearers of secondness are the relate (under
>> consideration) and its correlate; and the bearers of thirdness are Sign
>> (under consideration), a correlate of it the Object and its other correlate
>> the Interpretant. This is reflected again in the phaneroscopy - normatives
>> - metaphysics distinction. The phenomenon is the _*appearance*_ under
>> consideration. It's not that far conceptually from appearance to
>> manifestation. As a manifestation of an object, something is a sign.
>>
>> [1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July
>> 1905]
>> So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a
>> priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:
>>
>> A "sign" is anything, A, which,
>>
>> (1) in addition to other characters of its own,
>>
>> (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
>>
>> (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive
>> correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a
>> dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way
>> to the relation Þ.
>>
>> Then look at how Peirce is trying to work out relationships with sign and
>> category in successive drafts. He is not worried about "confining" the sign
>> to firstness or secondness or thirdness, even though he sees it as having
>> those categories in various ways **irrespectively** of whether the sign
>> is qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign, or
>> argument. The priman-ness of the sign consists in its being the thing under
>> consideration, and in its material characters of its own, considered apart
>> from relations to other things.
>>
>> [MS 793 -On Signs, four versions of a certain page 11. Quote]
>> a - A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed its Object and
>> if anything were to be in a certain relation to the sign called being
>> Interpretant to it, the Sign actively determines the Interpretant to be
>> itself in a relation to the same Object, corresponding to its own.
>>
>> b - b - A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would generally be
>> Priman in some characters, called its "Material Characters". But in
>> addition, it is essentially (if only formally) Second to something termed
>> its "Real Object", which is purely active in the Secundanity, being
>> immediately unmodified by this secundanity; and these characters of the
>> Real Object which are essential to the identity of the Sign constitute an
>> ens rationis called the "Immediate Object". Moreover, the Sign is
>> conceivably adapted to being Third to its Immediate Object for an ens
>> rationis constituted thereby in the same (generic) relation to that Object
>> in which the Sign itself stands to the same ; and this Third is termed the
>> "Intended Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished]
>>
>> c - A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its determination as
>> Priman are called its Material characters. But in addition it is Second to
>> what is termed its Real Object, which is altogether active, and immediately
>> unmodified by this Secundanity, and in so far as the Sign is second to it,
>> it is termed the immediate Object. The Sign is conceivably adapted to being
>> third to its Immediate Object for something in so far termed its Intended
>> Interpretant; and the Sign only functions as such so far as the Intended
>> Interpretant is Second to it for an Actual Interpretant which thus becomes
>> adapted become a sign of the Immediate [there is a question mark above this
>> word] Object for a further intended Interpretant, and in so far as the
>> Interpretant is such Third it is termed Reflex Interpretant.
>>
>> d - A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its determinations as
>> such are called its "Material characters". But in addition, it is Second to
>> something termed its "Real Object", which is purely active being
>> immediately unmodified by this Secundanity; and in so for as the sign is
>> Second to it, it is termed the "Immediate Object" thereof. The Sign is
>> conceivably adapted bo being Third to its Immediate Object for something
>> which should thereby be brought into the generically same dyadic relation
>> to that Object in which the Sign itself stands to that Object, and this
>> Third is called the "Intended Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such
>> only in so far as the Intended Interpretant is Second to it and is Third to
>> it for an existent termed the "Actual Interpretant", the modes of...
>> [unfinished]
>> [End quote]
>>
>> Best, Ben
>>
>> On 8/25/2014 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>>
>> As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to confuse Peirce's
>> linear order of the processing semiosis of the triad (moving from Object
>> via Representamen to Interpretant and also, within the mediative
>> Representamen reasoning, to Object to Interpretant)..as having anything at
>> all to do with the modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness!
>>
>> Therefore, your (Gary R's) outline of the Sign - even though you declare
>> that 'many' agree with you - I certainly don't - and I'm not going to bring
>> in any 'ad populum' appeal. Again, I consider it a profound error to merge
>> the three categorical modes with the linear processing order of the act of
>> semiosis. Your outline below contradicts the other small tables, a, b, c,
>> which show the nine Relations - with which I DO agree. After all, if the
>> representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness, Secondness and
>> Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do below?
>>
>> Sign:
>> representamen (1ns)
>> |> interpretant (3ns)
>> object (2ns)
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 4:02 PM
>> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
>>
>> Helmut,
>>
>> I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of the
>> interpretant as 3ns is reflected in this passage:
>>
>> CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a
>> genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable
>> of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
>> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The
>> triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together
>> by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.
>> That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere
>> dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as
>> the Representamen itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which the
>> Third stands be merely similar to that in which the First stands, for this
>> would make the relation of the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness
>> merely. The Third must indeed stand in such a relation, and thus must be
>> capable of determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must have a
>> second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the relation
>> thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must be
>> capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this must equally be
>> true of the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly; and this, and more, is
>> involved in the familiar idea of a Sign. . .
>>
>> Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe, see the following
>> categorial relation in semiotics.
>>
>> Sign:
>> representamen (1ns)
>> |> interpretant (3ns)
>> object (2ns)
>>
>> Then I think we *all *agree that each of these has it tricategorial
>> relations:
>>
>> *(a) Representamen*:
>> qualisign (1ns)
>> |> legisign (3ns)
>> sinsign (sin==single, 2ns)
>>
>> *(b) Object*:
>> icon (1ns)
>> |>symbol (3ns)
>> index (2ns)
>>
>> *(c) Intepretant*:
>> Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns)
>> |> Argument (3ns)
>> Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns)
>>
>> In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the 10-adic sign
>> classification, Peirce writes:
>>
>> CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first [(a) above],
>> according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent,
>> or is a general law; secondly [(b) above], according as the relation of the
>> sign to its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself,
>> or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an
>> interpretant; third [(c) above], according as its Interpretant represents
>> it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.
>>
>> Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy, Peirce virtually
>> *always* means some categorial trichotomy involving1ns, 2ns, and 3ns)
>> based on CP 2.243 we get:
>>
>> *(a) Representamen*:
>> qualisign (the sign is a mere quality)
>> |> legisign (the sign is a general law)
>> sinsign (the sign is an actual existent)
>>
>> *(b) Object*:
>> icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some character in itself)
>> |>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a relation to the
>> interpretant)
>> index (the relation of the sign to its object is an existential one)
>>
>> *(c) Intepretant*:
>> Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of possibility)
>> |> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as one of reason)
>> Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of fact)
>>
>> Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign classification and
>> descriptions of the 10 sign classes Peirce writes:
>>
>> CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing
>> Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of which numerous subdivisions have to be
>> considered. The ten classes are as follows: [he then gives descriptions of
>> the 10]
>>
>> So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the Interpretant as in
>> itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is correct that only the Argument is an
>> Interpretant representing its sign as a sign of reason, or, 3ns. Yet each
>> and all of the 10 signs has within it a relation to its interpretant which
>> is either rhematic, dicentic, or argumentative.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
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