Mary- yes, I have checked out my copy of Spencer-Brown's Laws of Form - he does
reference Peirce; I have long admired Spencer-Brown's focus on morphology,
without much of an ability to understand his complex analysis.
Ben - I'm beginning to think that a basic reason for our 'two parallel walks'
with reference to your and my understanding of Peirce is that you (and others)
acknowledge that there is a pre-semiotic world, whereas, I do not. For me,
everything, from the smallest atom to a society is a triadic 'morpheme' of a
semiosic process.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Libertin, Mary
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 8:19 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6529] Re: Abduction,
Edwina, Ben, Gary, Helmut, Sung and list,
I appreciate the confusion. Mine is limited to understanding the process of
musement in Peirce's “The Neglected Argument.” I applied the play of musement,
Peirce’s abduction, deduction, induction, to James Joyce’s works in 1983, but I
changed my mind and switched induction and deduction, temporarily, in my
classes on Joyce. Recently I returned to defining musement as abduction,
deduction and induction.
I have no answer that explains the interaction of the Three Relations and the
Three Categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. I think Peirce would
try to consider the purpose behind the application. I also think it worthwhile
to understand it in relation to Peirce’s Existential Graphs, using the Phemic
sheet or sheet of assertion.
I am thinking of George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form, chapter 12, in relation
to this discussion of Peirce. It illustrates the importance of the position of
the observer. I will provide an extensive quote rather than try to paraphrase
him. I do not have the ability to draw circles to copy his figures, but I
provide instructions on how it can be drawn. I believe that it is interesting
even to those not interested in Brown’s ideas. His ideas do we much to Peirce,
who is referenced in Brown’s notes. Here is the passage that puts Peirce into
perspective in my opinion:
Let us imagine that, instead of writing on the surface of the Earth. Ignoring
rabbit holes, etc, we may take it to be a surface of genus 0. Suppose
[here Brown inserts a figure with one large circle with a small letter a
outside of the circle. Imagine that in the space below. Then inside the large
circle draw two separate smaller circles. The circle on the left is labeled b
and the circle on the right is labeled c. You will see that b and c are in a
circle that is inside another circle. A is outside.]
To make it readable from another planet, we write it large. Suppose we draw
the outer bracket trough the Equator, and make the brackets containing b and c
follow the coastlines of Australia and the South Island of New Zealand
respectively.
Above is how the expression will appear from somewhere in the
Northern Hemisphere, say London. But let us travel.
Arriving at Capetown we see
[here Brown draws three separate circles containing b, c, and a, respectively]
Sailing on to Melbourne, we see [end of page 83 in Laws of Form]
[here there is the original format with two circles inside a larger circle
but the letters are different. A and c are in the left and right circles. B is
outside]
And proceeding from there to Christchurch, we see
[here there is the original format but A and b are on the inner circles and C
is outside.]
These four expressions are distinct and not equivalent. Thus it is evidently
not enough merely to write down an expression, even on a surface of genus 0,
and expect it to be understood. We must also indicate where the observer is
supposed to be standing in relation to the expression. Writing on a plane, the
ambiguity is not apparent because we tend to see the expression from outside of
the outermost bracket. When it is written on the surface of a sphere, there
may be no means of telling which of the brackets is supposed to be outermost.
In such a case, to make an expression meaningful, we must add to it an indictor
to present a place from which the observer is intended to regard it.
(Spencer-Brown, Laws of Form, 5th English edition, 200883-84)
I do not mean to offer anything more than a connection between Peirce’s
Existential Graphs and Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form. Spencer-Brown’s suggestion
concerning knowing the position of the observer and his example of writing on
a surface of a sphere, and thus, not knowing what is outermost is not offered
as a conclusion or even a position. I see a fascinating relationship.
I will read your posts grateful for your insight but unable to offer any of
my own.
Best,
Mary Libertin
From: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
Reply-To: "biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee" <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>
Date: Monday, August 25, 2014 at 6:19 PM
To: Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com>, "peirce-l@list.iupui.edu"
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>, "biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee" <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>
Subject: [biosemiotics:6522] Re: Abduction,
Ben, now I'm confused. Where did I say that a sign (which I consider a
triadic set of Relations) is 'priman' or first, i.e., confined to Firstness in
all respects? I certainly don't agree with that - there is only one Sign
(triad) whose three Relations are all in a mode of Firstness. The other 9 signs
certainly are not. So - I'm not sure where you get that impression from me.
The various manuscript quotes you provide are about the interaction of the
Three Relations and are not about the Three Categories of Firstness,
Secondness, Thirdness. I keep saying that one must be careful not to mix up
these two analytic frameworks.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From:Benjamin Udell
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 6:07 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Edwina, list,
I don't understand why you speak of _confinement_. To say that a sign is
priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not to say that it is confined to
firstness in all respects.
["Lectures on Pragmatism," CP 5.43, Quote]
The particular categories form a series, or set of series, only one of
each series being present, or at least predominant, in any one phenomenon. The
universal categories, on the other hand, belong to every phenomenon, one being
perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than another but all of
them belonging to every phenomenon.
[End quote]
It seems a great deal like Peirce does not generally regard categorial
characterizations as particularly confining. If you disagree with Peirce, then
fine, I disagree with him on some important things myself. But what is your
argument that saying that a sign is a priman in respect of object and
interpretant involves a confinement of the sign to 'a mode of firstness'?
[1905 - MS 939 - Notes on Portions of Hume's "Treatise of1 Human Nature".
Quote]
[...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something which
is in such a relation to an object that it determines, or might determine,
another sign of the same object. This is true but considered as a definition it
would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is meant by the
interpretant being a "sign" of the same object. However, this much is clear ;
that a sign has essentially two correlates, its object and its possible
Interpretant sign. Of these three, Sign, Object, Interpretant, the sign as
being the very thing under consideration is Monadic, the object is Dyadic, and
the Interpretant is Triadic. We therefore look to see, whether there be not two
Objects, the object as it is in itself (the Monadic Object), and the object as
the sign represents it to be (the Dyadic Object). There are also three
Interpretants; namely, 1°, the Interpretant considered as an independent sign
of the Object, 2°, the Interpretant as it is as a fact determined by the Sign
to be, and 3° the Interpretant as it is intended by, or is represented in, the
Sign to be. [...]
[End quote]
So, first off, he's saying that there is a sense in which, at the same
time, the Sign is Monadic, the Object is Dyadic, and the Interpretant is
Triadic. He doesn't seem worried that this will somehow prevent the Sign from
being a sinsign, legisign, index, symbol, dicisign, or argument.
Then he relates this to the subdivisions of the correlates: the Sign
unsubdivided, remains ONE, the Object is divided into TWO, the Dynamical and
Immediate Objects, and the Interpretant into THREE, though it is not either of
his familiar trichotomies of interpretants. This is a familiar pattern.
This question of what is the very thing under consideration goes back to
"On A New List," where the bearer of firstness is the quale (which is what is
under consideration); the bearers of secondness are the relate (under
consideration) and its correlate; and the bearers of thirdness are Sign (under
consideration), a correlate of it the Object and its other correlate the
Interpretant. This is reflected again in the phaneroscopy - normatives -
metaphysics distinction. The phenomenon is the _appearance_ under
consideration. It's not that far conceptually from appearance to manifestation.
As a manifestation of an object, something is a sign.
[1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July
1905]
So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a
priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:
A "sign" is anything, A, which,
(1) in addition to other characters of its own,
(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive
correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a
dyadic relation, μ, to B, the relation μ corresponding in a recognized way to
the relation Þ.
Then look at how Peirce is trying to work out relationships with sign and
category in successive drafts. He is not worried about "confining" the sign to
firstness or secondness or thirdness, even though he sees it as having those
categories in various ways *irrespectively* of whether the sign is qualisign,
sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign, or argument. The
priman-ness of the sign consists in its being the thing under consideration,
and in its material characters of its own, considered apart from relations to
other things.
[MS 793 -On Signs, four versions of a certain page 11. Quote]
a - A Sign would be a Priman Secundan to something termed its Object and
if anything were to be in a certain relation to the sign called being
Interpretant to it, the Sign actively determines the Interpretant to be itself
in a relation to the same Object, corresponding to its own.
b - b - A "Sign" is a genuinely genuine Tertian. It would generally be
Priman in some characters, called its "Material Characters". But in addition,
it is essentially (if only formally) Second to something termed its "Real
Object", which is purely active in the Secundanity, being immediately
unmodified by this secundanity; and these characters of the Real Object which
are essential to the identity of the Sign constitute an ens rationis called the
"Immediate Object". Moreover, the Sign is conceivably adapted to being Third to
its Immediate Object for an ens rationis constituted thereby in the same
(generic) relation to that Object in which the Sign itself stands to the same ;
and this Third is termed the "Intended Interpretant", but the ... [unfinished]
c - A Sign would be in some respects Priman, and its determination as
Priman are called its Material characters. But in addition it is Second to what
is termed its Real Object, which is altogether active, and immediately
unmodified by this Secundanity, and in so far as the Sign is second to it, it
is termed the immediate Object. The Sign is conceivably adapted to being third
to its Immediate Object for something in so far termed its Intended
Interpretant; and the Sign only functions as such so far as the Intended
Interpretant is Second to it for an Actual Interpretant which thus becomes
adapted become a sign of the Immediate [there is a question mark above this
word] Object for a further intended Interpretant, and in so far as the
Interpretant is such Third it is termed Reflex Interpretant.
d - A "Sign" would be in some respects Priman, and its determinations as
such are called its "Material characters". But in addition, it is Second to
something termed its "Real Object", which is purely active being immediately
unmodified by this Secundanity; and in so for as the sign is Second to it, it
is termed the "Immediate Object" thereof. The Sign is conceivably adapted bo
being Third to its Immediate Object for something which should thereby be
brought into the generically same dyadic relation to that Object in which the
Sign itself stands to that Object, and this Third is called the "Intended
Interpretant"; but the Sign functions as such only in so far as the Intended
Interpretant is Second to it and is Third to it for an existent termed the
"Actual Interpretant", the modes of... [unfinished]
[End quote]
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to confuse Peirce's
linear order of the processing semiosis of the triad (moving from Object via
Representamen to Interpretant and also, within the mediative Representamen
reasoning, to Object to Interpretant)..as having anything at all to do with the
modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness!
Therefore, your (Gary R's) outline of the Sign - even though you declare
that 'many' agree with you - I certainly don't - and I'm not going to bring in
any 'ad populum' appeal. Again, I consider it a profound error to merge the
three categorical modes with the linear processing order of the act of
semiosis. Your outline below contradicts the other small tables, a, b, c,
which show the nine Relations - with which I DO agree. After all, if the
representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do below?
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 4:02 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Helmut,
I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of the
interpretant as 3ns is reflected in this passage:
CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of
determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The
triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it
in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is
the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation
to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen
itself does. Nor can the triadic relation in which the Third stands be merely
similar to that in which the First stands, for this would make the relation of
the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. The Third must indeed
stand in such a relation, and thus must be capable of determining a Third of
its own; but besides that, it must have a second triadic relation in which the
Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to its Object, shall be its own
(the Third's) Object, and must be capable of determining a Third to this
relation. All this must equally be true of the Third's Thirds and so on
endlessly; and this, and more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign. . .
Many Peirce scholars, although not Edwina, I believe, see the following
categorial relation in semiotics.
Sign:
representamen (1ns)
|> interpretant (3ns)
object (2ns)
Then I think we all agree that each of these has it tricategorial
relations:
(a) Representamen:
qualisign (1ns)
|> legisign (3ns)
sinsign (sin==single, 2ns)
(b) Object:
icon (1ns)
|>symbol (3ns)
index (2ns)
(c) Intepretant:
Rheme ('term' generalized for semiotic, 1ns)
|> Argument (3ns)
Dicisign ('proposition' generalized for semiotic, 2ns)
In introducing the three trichotomies and, then, the 10-adic sign
classification, Peirce writes:
CP 2.243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first [(a) above],
according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is
a general law; secondly [(b) above], according as the relation of the sign to
its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some
existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant;
third [(c) above], according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of
possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.
Explicating the trichotomies (by which word, trichotomy, Peirce
virtually always means some categorial trichotomy involving1ns, 2ns, and 3ns)
based on CP 2.243 we get:
(a) Representamen:
qualisign (the sign is a mere quality)
|> legisign (the sign is a general law)
sinsign (the sign is an actual existent)
(b) Object:
icon (the relation of the sign to its object is some character in
itself)
|>symbol (the relation of the sign to its object is a relation to the
interpretant)
index (the relation of the sign to its object is an existential one)
(c) Intepretant:
Rheme (the interpretant represents the sign as one of possibility)
|> Argument (the interpretant represents the sign as one of reason)
Dicisign (the interpretant represents the sign as one of fact)
Immediately before introducing the 10-adic sign classification and
descriptions of the 10 sign classes Peirce writes:
CP 2.254. The three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing
Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS, of which numerous subdivisions have to be
considered. The ten classes are as follows: [he then gives descriptions of the
10]
So, in this sense (and whether or not one sees the Interpretant as in
itself expression of 3ns), Edwina is correct that only the Argument is an
Interpretant representing its sign as a sign of reason, or, 3ns. Yet each and
all of the 10 signs has within it a relation to its interpretant which is
either rhematic, dicentic, or argumentative.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
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