This concluding part of the article on “Scientific Method” from Baldwin’s
Dictionary, by Peirce and Baldwin, seems apropos here.

 

gary f.

 

(2) The most vital factors in the method of modern science have not been the
following of this or that logical prescription — although these have had
their value too — but they have been the moral factors. First of these has
been the genuine love of truth and conviction that nothing else could long
endure. Given that men strive after the truth, and, in the nature of things,
they will get it in a measure. The greatest difference between the
scientific state of the modern scientific era from Copernicus and the middle
ages, is that now the whole concern of students is to find out the truth;
while then it was to put into a rational light the faith of which they were
already possessed. The chief obstacle to the advance of science among
students of science in the modern era has been that they were teachers, and
feared the effect of this or that theory. But the salvation from this danger
has been the fact that there was no vast institution which anybody for a
moment hoped could withstand the mighty tide of fact. The next most vital
factor of the method of modern science is that it has been made social. On
the one hand, what a scientific man recognizes as a fact of science must be
something open to anybody to observe, provided he fulfils the necessary
conditions, external and internal. As long as only one man has been able to
see a marking upon the planet Venus, it is not an established fact. Ghost
stories and all that cannot become the subject of genuine science until they
can in some way be welded to ordinary experience. On the other hand, the
method of modern science is social in respect to the solidarity of its
efforts. The scientific world is like a colony of insects, in that the
individual strives to produce that which he himself cannot hope to enjoy.
One generation collects premises in order that a distant generation may
discover what they mean. When a problem comes before the scientific world, a
hundred men immediately set all their energies to work upon it. One
contributes this, another that. Another company, standing upon the shoulders
of the first, strike a little higher, until at last the parapet is attained.
Still another moral factor of the method of science, perhaps even more vital
than the last, is the self-confidence of it. In order to appreciate this, it
is to be remembered that the entire fabric of science has to be built up out
of surmises at truth. All that experiment can do is to tell us when we have
surmised wrong. The right surmise is left for us to produce. The ancient
world under these circumstances, with the exception of a few men born out of
their time, looked upon physics as something about which only vague surmises
could be made, and upon which close study would be thrown away. So,
venturing nothing, they naturally could gain nothing. But modern science has
never faltered in its confidence that it would ultimately find out the truth
concerning any question in which it could apply the check of experiment. 

 

 

 

From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] 
Sent: 8-Sep-14 4:39 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
Subject: [biosemiotics:6710] Re: Side issue: science

 

Dear Stan, Howard, list 

 

I certainly agree with Howard here. My emphasis on the "chain of reasoning"
in recent list discussions may have given some a wrong impression of my
position. Again, the reason for this emphasis was to claim that the overall
process of knowledge-acquisition in a broad sense comes before any of the
single aspects gradually acquired by that process during evolution. 

 

So the "chain of reasoning", on a Peircean view, involves all sorts of
abductions - including Howard's open attitudes, thought experiments,
imaginations, more or less educated guesses, pattern matchings,
associations, analogies, metaphors, toyings with pictures and diagrams,
synaesthetic couplings, Peircean "play of musement"  etc. - all possible
ways leading to the articulation of new hypotheses to be subsequently tested
by de- and inductions.

 

Best

F

 

Den 08/09/2014 kl. 22.11 skrev Howard Pattee <hpat...@roadrunner.com>

:





At 10:06 AM 9/8/2014, Stan wrote:



Scientific reasoning is a matter of concentrated focus, while poetic musing
is an unfocused search among (verbal) possibilities, an opening up.


HP: Philosophers often pigeonhole science with reasoning and this is
misleading. It is true that "scientific reasoning" may be used at the end of
discovery, usually checking the math. Unfortunately, bad curricula emphasize
logic and reasoning as the "scientific method." 

As Poincaré, Peirce, Polanyi, and others emphasize, science is not fairly
characterized by such methods but rather by a detached open attitudetoward
the search for meaning. Einstein's elusive, "intuitive searching for the
meaning of facts" (ein intuitives Heranführen an die Tatsachen) is not
unlike the poet's "unfocused search among conceptual possibilities. But
because scientists' search for meaning seldom depends on words, their
thinking is often inscrutable. Aesthetics always plays a generative role
(e.g., simplicity, symmetry, invariance, clarity, generality, etc.)  

"Three things have been established beyond reasonable doubt: the power of
intellectual beauty to reveal truth about nature; the vital importance of
distinguishing this beauty from merely formal attractiveness; and the
delicacy of the test between them, so difficult that it may baffle the most
penetrating scientific minds." [Polanyi]

Howard  

 

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