Then why, if these connections: causal, morphological, formal, 'may be taken as
a basis for signs'...then why is this considered a 'pre-semiotic world'?
My view is that morphology = semiosis; therefore, any process that 'makes
forms' is a semiosic process - and that goes on within the physico-chemical as
well as biological realms.
The major, vital, difference in the biological realm is that the
process-of-evolution or adaptation, moved within the organisms, such that
adaptation became 'self-organized'. This enabled an explosion not merely of
diversity but also exponentially increase the rate-of-adaptation and change.
The function? To enable the world to 'hold onto matter'.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Frederik Stjernfelt
To: Peirce List ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 1:21 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6915] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Being Trivially A Sign
Dear Jon, Tom, lists
Well spoken Jon, I think this also covers my position.
The pre-semiotic world is full of connections, causal, morphological, formal,
which may be taken, in the semiotic processes of biology, as a basis for signs.
Best
F
Den 19/09/2014 kl. 20.10 skrev Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
:
Joseph, Tom, List,
Any thing at all (an embedding context, a moment in time, an active
situation, or whatever it may be) that serves to connect an index with its
object may do that without regard to its possible service as a sign in some
other connection.
So it's not so much the existential nexus or point of connection being
trivially a sign as its contemplated status as a sign being irrelevant to its
function as a connector.
Regards,
Jon
Tom Gollier wrote:
Joseph, List:
I haven't seen an answer to your inquiry, but I, like you, would be
interested in what would be trivial and non-trivial when it comes to an
index.
Tom
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