Gary F - see my replies:
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Gary Fuhrman 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List' 
  Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 4:17 PM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:6919] Re: Being Trivially A Sign


  1) GF: Edwina, you're ignoring (or denying?) the distinction between a 
process or connection that may be taken as semiosic and one that actually 
functions semiotically (i.e. must be taken as a sign if it is to be recognized 
at all). 



  EDWINA: 'may be taken as semiosic'...by WHOM? Why does the semiosis process 
require an external agent to recognize it as such? And 'functions 
semioticially'...to me, means...'exists morphologically'.  And there's your 
phrase again...'taken as a sign'..and my question is: BY WHOM? 

   

  2) GF: This kind of distinction can be made at many levels. For instance, 
consider the distinction Peirce makes between "genuine" (or "complete") and 
"degenerate" (or "fragmentary") signs in "Kaina Stoicheia", where he says of 
the icon that "The relation to its object is a degenerate relation. It asserts 
nothing. If it conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the object 
that it is used to represent may be said to convey information" (EP2:306). When 
you say that "morphology = semiosis", your implicit logic runs like this: 
morphology is cognizable; cognition is semiosis; therefore morphology is 
semiosis.



  EDWINA: Agreed; The iconic relation is 'degenerate' in the sense that, yes, 
it ASSERTS nothing other than a connection between one 'morpheme' and another 
'morpheme'. No, I don't say that 'morphology is cognizable; I say that it is 
existential.  Morphology is the process of..forming instantiations. Such 
instantiations are always formed within a semiosic process. 

   

  3) GF: But as you indicated last week, you don't see this kind of distinction 
- and that's why you don't see the problem with that argument. Your pansemiosis 
collapses the distinction between semiosis and purely physical processes, and 
your definition of a sign as a "well-formed formula" collapses the distinction 
between formulation (a semiotic process) and that which is formulated. Which is 
rather like collapsing the distinction between representamen and object. Sure, 
any object can be said to represent itself, but that doesn't mean that it 
actually represents anything, as a sign surely must do if the term means 
anything.



  EDWINA: My 'pansemiosis' doesn't collapse the 'distinction between semiosis 
and purely physical processes'. I maintain that a physical process is, as 
morphological, carried out within a triadic semiosic process. Of course I don't 
collapse the distinction between the semiosic process and 'that which is 
formulated', i.e., the morpheme. That would be to deny the existential reality 
of the individual particular morpheme. I dont' do that. Semiosis as a process 
of forming individual instances, within the semiosic process, is constant - as 
Peirce himself said. 



  And of course one can't collapse the distinction between the Representamen 
and the Object! That makes no sense. The Representamen does NOT represent the 
Object (which is what you seem to be saying). And no, the  Sign (ie, the WHOLE 
triad not just the  Representamen) does not 'represent' an external object. 
That's Saussurian. The SIGN (The WHOLE TRIAD not just the Representamen) is a 
morphological result of one organism's interaction with another....whether that 
result be a molecule, a cell, a thought, an image..

   

  3) GF:But I might as well stop, because if I'm right about your logic, you 
won't be able to make any sense of this distinction.



  EDWINA: Please don't move into insults. I'm a reasonably logical and 
intelligent person. Don't you think it would be more courteous if you just said 
that 'If I'm right about your perspective, you won't agree with my views'. 





   

  gary f.

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: 21-Sep-14 2:01 PM
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
  Subject: [biosemiotics:6919] Re: Being Trivially A Sign

   

  Then why, if these connections: causal, morphological, formal, 'may be taken 
as a basis for signs'...then why is this considered a 'pre-semiotic world'?

   

  My view is that morphology = semiosis; therefore, any process that 'makes 
forms' is a semiosic process - and that goes on within the physico-chemical as 
well as biological realms.

   

  The major, vital, difference in the biological realm is that the 
process-of-evolution or adaptation, moved within the organisms, such that 
adaptation became 'self-organized'. This enabled an explosion not merely of 
diversity but also exponentially increase the rate-of-adaptation and change. 
The function? To enable the world to 'hold onto matter'.

   

  Edwina

   

    ----- Original Message ----- 

    From: Frederik Stjernfelt 

    To: Peirce List ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee 

    Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 1:21 PM

    Subject: [biosemiotics:6915] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Being Trivially A Sign

     

    Dear Jon, Tom, lists 

    Well spoken Jon, I think this also covers my position. 

    The pre-semiotic world is full of connections, causal, morphological, 
formal, which may be taken, in the semiotic processes of biology, as a basis 
for signs.

    Best

    F

     



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