At 01:39 PM 10/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman quotes Peirce:
Peirce: "When an assertion is made, there really
is some speaker, writer, or other signmaker who
delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will
be, some hearer, reader, or other interpreter
who will receive it. It may be a stranger upon a
different planet, an æon later; or it may be
that very same man as he will be a second after.
In any case, the deliverer makes signals to the receiver."
HP: Here is another view of how this works. In
our case, from the moment we type an assertion,
draw a diagram, or attach a photo, all the
communicated information is immediately coded
into bit sequences by Boolean algebra (not logic)
and transmitted worldwide by Hertzian waves or
light (the same thing at shorter wavelengths). In
principle, all the coding can be done by Peirce
Arrows (NAND gates) and all the electrons and
waves obey Maxwell's equations. At the receiver
sequences are decoded, and the sender and
receiver do not care about the math, physics, or
the bit sequences, which is precisely why the bit
sequences are pure symbols and not icons,
indices, or any tokens with intrinsic physical similarities or meanings.
In the language of physics, the conditions for a
pure symbol vehicle with the function of
efficiently communicating information of any type
is that neither the physical structure nor the
sequential order of the symbols are determined or
influenced by physical laws. That means the
sequences do not differ significantly in energy
or forces between them. All efficient information
structures like sequences and memories are called energy degenerate.
That does not mean communication is independent
of laws. The 2nd law of thermodynamics says that
every bit of information added, erased, coded,
decoded or used will dissipate a little energy
(On the Internet this adds up to enormous energy
dissipation). Also, the speed and size of symbol
manipulating chemistry in brains or hardware
gates is limited by quantum mechanics.
In the language of Communication Theory, for
efficient communication of any type of
information, all the meaning should be hidden by
codes that translate the information into meaningless symbols.
Howard
Some of these signs (or at least one of them)
are supposed to excite in the mind of the
receiver familiar images, pictures, or, we might
almost say, dreams that is, reminiscences of
sights, sounds, feelings, tastes, smells, or
other sensations, now quite detached from the
original circumstances of their first
occurrence, so that they are free to be attached
to new occasions. The deliverer is able to call
up these images at will (with more or less
effort) in his own mind; and he supposes the
receiver can do the same. For instance, tramps
have the habit of carrying bits of chalk and
making marks on the fences to indicate the
habits of the people that live there for the
benefit of other tramps who may come on later.
If in this way a tramp leaves an assertion that
the people are stingy, he supposes the reader of
the signal will have met stingy people before,
and will be able to call up an image of such a
person attachable to a person whose acquaintance
he has not yet made. Not only is the outward
significant word or mark a sign, but the image
which it is expected to excite in the mind of
the receiver will likewise be a sign a sign by
resemblance, or, as we say, an icon of the
similar image in the mind of the deliverer, and
through that also a sign of the real quality of
the thing. This icon is called the predicate of
the assertion. But instead of a single icon, or
sign by resemblance of a familiar image or
dream, evocable at will, there may be a
complexus of such icons, forming a composite
image of which the whole is not familiar. But
though the whole is not familiar, yet not only
are the parts familiar images, but there will
also be a familiar image of its mode of composition.
Now, the tramps chalk mark is NOT an icon of
its object, rather its a conventional symbol;
but its replication on a particular fence is a
proposition and a dicisign, and functions as
such because its placement there is an index
involving an icon, which is the predicate of the
proposition (and thus of the assertion).
I thought this worth quoting because it might be
a more perspicuous example of a nonverbal
proposition than the Gun Country example.
Besides, the last two sentences anticipate
Peirces later doctrine (covered in NP 3.7) of
the syntax of the proposition, which is itself
iconic in a special way. (So I changed the
subject line here from Chapter 3.5 to 3.6.)
gary f.
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: 3-Oct-14 3:11 PM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.5
On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian
Downard <<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
Perhaps we should distinguish between different
ways that the word 'intention' is used in
Peirce's texts. There is the common meaning
that is expressed when I say, for instance, that
my intention in writing the sentences above is
to engage in a discussion with colleagues in the
hopes of improving our shared understanding of
these questions. There is also the more
technical meaning of the term that is involved
in the distinction between first and second intentions in the theory of logic.
I think this is right. The word intention has
so many connotations that can lead us astray if we arent careful.
Although when Gary says intention need not be
conscious I think hes moving us to the world of
virtuality within Peirce and so its not
intentionality of the sort we usually encounter in philosophy of mind.
Frederick definitely does not see intentional
acts necessarily accompanying the dicisign. (See his post of Sept 1)
As for an example, I cant think of an
unintentional dicisign off the top of my head.
(Give me time - Im sure someone will) However
this statement by Peirce on icons might be of
interest in determining his use of intents.
The sort of idea which an icon embodies, if it
be such that it can convey any positive
information, being applicable to some things but
not to others, is called a first intention. The
idea embodied by an icon which cannot of itself
convey any information, being applicable to
everything or to nothing, but which may,
nevertheless, be useful in modifying other
icons, is called a second intention. (CP 3.433)
and a few pages later
Neither the predicate, nor the subjects, nor
both together, can make an assertion. The
assertion represents a compulsion which
experience, meaning the course of life, brings
upon the deliverer to attach the predicate to
the subjects as a sign of them taken in a
particular way. This compulsion strikes him at a
certain instant; and he remains under it forever
after. It is, therefore, different from the
temporary force which the hecceities exert upon
his attention. This new compulsion may pass out
of mind for the time being; but it continues
just the same, and will act whenever the
occasion arises, that is, whenever those
particular hecceities and that first intention
are called to mind together. It is, therefore, a
permanent conditional force, or law. The
deliverer thus requires a kind of sign which
shall signify a law that to objects of indices
an icon appertains as sign of them in a given
way. Such a sign has been called a symbol. It is
the copula of the assertion. (CP 3.435)
This is interesting since it does break with
traditional speech act theory where
intentionality plays such a significant role.
Personally I see Peirces semiotics reversing
the usual way signs or interpretation are
thought of in philosophy. Thus its objects that
determine the interpretant rather than an
interpreter interpreting an object to create an
interpretation. Rather than a traditional
interpretation with conscious creation we have compulsions.
And of course, since Ive brought up Derrida &
Heidegger a few times that last sentence is
relevant to what Ive spoken of before.
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