Ben, lists,
Is this the copula == if - then quote you had in mind?
The forms A -< B, or A implies B, and A ~-< B, or A does not imply B,
embrace both hypothetical and categorical propositions. Thus, to say that
all men are mortal is the same as to say that if any man possesses any
character whatever then a mortal possesses that character. To say, 'if A,
then B ' is obviously the same as to say that from A, B follows, logically
or extralogically. By thus identifying the relation expressed by the copula
with that of illation, we identify the proposition with the inference, and
the term with the proposition. This identification, by means of which all
that is found true of term, proposition, or inference is at once known to
be true of all three, is a most important engine of reasoning, which we
have gained by beginning with a consideration of the genesis of logic. CP
3.175
Peirce goes on to say in a footnote to this passage:
In consequence of the identification in question, in S -< P, I speak of S
indifferently as subject, antecedent, or premiss, and of P as predicate,
consequent, or conclusion. CP 3.175 Fn P1 p 113
So, now I'm a bit confused. I guess the question that first comes to mind
is: How do you see these logical/terminological distinctions impacting the
argument being made by Frederik in NP?
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 8:31 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote:
> Gary R., Gary F., Frederik, Jeff D., lists,
>
> I don't have the quotes handy at this late (for me) time of day, but:
>
> The predicate does denote the subject. "Jack is blue": blue denotes Jack,
> not _*only*_ Jack, but still _*also*_ Jack. Jack, in turn, 'comprehends'
> blue. You may remember Peirce's discussion of the copula as a relation of
> 'if-then' or 'is included in'.
>
> Jack --< blue.
> Jack is included in blue.
> If Jack, then blue.
> Jack materially implies blue.
> Comprehension is implication. Somewhere Peirce also says that a
> proposition comprehends the further propositions that it implies, and
> denotes the propositions that imply it. I wonder whether that applies only
> in deductive implication (i.e., 'entailment' as it is nowadays called) or
> in all inference modes of implication (I'm not sure how to say that, but I
> hope readers understand me). I also have wondered whether an icon may
> properly be said to have a comprehension. This depends on whether an icon
> 'comprehends' the character that it presents. I once searched CP, W, & CN
> for discussion of comprehension in relation to icons and found nothing.
>
> Peirce speaks of index, icon, and symbol alike as 'denoting.' The icon
> denotes by virtue of a character of its own. While, as Gary F. recently
> said, an icon denotes a possible range of objects, some of that range may
> also be actual. An icon may have actual denotation.
>
> The copula as index is index in a 'meta' sense. In a 1908 effort at the
> ten sign-trichotomies, Peirce classified 'copulants', or 'distributive
> signs', as Thirds in the trichotomy of (1) descriptive (2)
> designative/denominative, and (3) copulant / distributive. Peirce did not
> complete the ten-trichotomy system to his own satisfaction but his effort
> indicates that he regarded the copula basically as a Third, not as a
> Second, although it works as a Second at the syntactical level.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 10/6/2014 7:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,
>
> I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting
> terminological discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such
> as *denote*, *designate, indicate*, etc). and on the other to the
> *predicate*, (such as *signify, comprehend, connote, etc.)* It seems to
> me that Frederik here employs such terms relating to the proposition as
> Peirce used them in his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the
> proposition as the *dicisign concept *in, especially, the* Syllabus* and
> *Kaina
> Stoicheia* ca.1903*.*
>
> I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis
> that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying:
>
> *In considering the proposition (dicisign)*:
>
> *[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the
> Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) *
>
>
> And, further, for Peirce these two are joined *not*, as they've
> traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an *index *of a peculiar
> kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real
> fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right,
> the formulation* breadth x depth = information (*i.e,, the sum of these
> two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that *true
> information represents a real fact in some world of experience*.
>
> In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition,
> that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the
> fact being represented, the index being the *necessary *sign for joining
> the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This
> syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in
> this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their
> * co-localization*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.
>
> *The*
> * co-localization of the elements of the dicisign*:
>
> *[Subject](Predicate)*
>
>
> (Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive
> and pre-linguistic.)
>
> This syntax claims that the dicisign "is* really indexically connected* to
> the *real fact* to which the subject and predicate correspond"
> (Stjernfelt, 66), and *how* this happens forms the argumentation of the
> rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the* two objects* of
> the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd
> like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the
> terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents
> the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?
>
> Understanding that there are in this syntax *two objects *helps explain
> how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the
> fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica
> (Secondary Object) that the *existentia*l relation especially applies,
> while the *reality* (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds
> of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than
> its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is
> a bit unnerving to me for* both* Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70
> and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the
> language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the
> Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that
> I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes
> simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've
> argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change
> in terminology from the Syllabus to KS)
>
> Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the
> Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather
> complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization synta
> *x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 8:01 AM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
>> Lists,
>>
>>
>>
>> We have now arrived (slightly behind schedule) at NP 3.7, which is
>> considerably longer and more difficult than the previous sections of
>> Chapter 3. Readers who have taken in those previous sections should be
>> prepared to take on 3.7, but instead of adding any commentary of mine to
>> it, I'm going to simply direct your attention to it and wait a few days for
>> questions about it, before we move on to 3.8. According to the schedule
>> (attached), we have another two weeks to 'cover' Chapter 3. I'd encourage
>> those who haven't yet posted questions about NP to do so now. Don't worry
>> if you feel that your command of the terminology is imperfect; I doubt that
>> anyone, including me, has it 'down pat', with the possible exception of
>> Frederik! As you've probably seen by now, the Dicisign is a complex and
>> difficult concept, but an important one, so we need whatever questions can
>> make it a little easier.
>>
>>
>>
>> gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> } {
>>
>> www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics
>>
>
>
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