Jeff, Ben, lists,
Jeff wrote:
On Peirce's account, quality is single reference to ground, reaction is
double reference to ground and object, and mediation is triple reference to
ground, object and interpretant.
Here 'ground' seems to point only to a 'character' or a 'quality'.
In consideration of the 9th Lowell Lecture (1866) your analysis is:
1. In reaction . . . the references are separable in equiparance and
inseparable in disquiparence.
(It would be helpful to flesh out a bit the meanings of 'equiparance' and
'disquiparence'.)
2. In mediation . . . we have the following: in likeness the references
are all separable, in indication reference to ground (i.e, quality, GR) is
not separable but the first two references are separable together, and in
symbolization all three of these references are inseparable
I'm not sure what to make of this, Jeff. While the Lowell Lecture you
reference would seem to allow for multiple (at least two) interpretations
of breadth x depth = information, Frederik has made a point that his
analysis principally concerns Peirce's late (i.e., early 20th century)
characterization of the proposition, now generalized for semiotics as the
diciisign. In a word, a lot has happened in Peirce's semiotic since 1867,
and some of his early ideas on categorial associations seem to have
developed rather considerably by the time of the *Syllabus *and *Kaina
Stoicheia *(I have a lot to say on this, but certainly not in this post).
Still, I think the question you pose is an interesting one, Jeff. So, I'm
hoping that Frederik and Gary F and others will sound in on this soon to,
hopefully, help clarify this twisted knot of termino/logical complication.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 10:36 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
> Ben, Gary R., Lists,
>
> How might we fit the semiotic account of logical breadth, depth and
> information onto the account of reference provided in the explanation of
> the categories? That is, how might the points each of you are trying to
> make about the way the subject, predicate and proposition as a whole
> indicate, denote, resemble, etc. fit onto the account reference that is
> supplied in his account of the categories? On Peirce's account, quality is
> single reference to ground, reaction is double reference to ground and
> object, and mediation is triple reference to ground, object and
> interpretant.
>
> Here are a series of points that Peirce makes Lowell Lecture IX (1866).
>
> 1. In reaction (he calls the category relation at this early point), the
> references are separable in equiparance and inseparable in disquiparence.
> 2. In mediation (which he calls representation at this stage) we have the
> following: in likeness the references are all separable, in indication
> reference to ground is not separable but the first two references are
> separable together, and in symbolization all three of these references are
> inseparable.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeff Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> NAU
> (o) 523-8354
> ________________________________________
> From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
> Sent: Monday, October 06, 2014 7:08 PM
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions,
> Chapter 3.7
>
> Gary R., lists,
>
> To be clear, we need to distinguish indicating and designating from
> denoting. An index denotes that which it indicates, designates, etc., of
> course. But an icon denotes that which it resembles, independently of
> whether the icon is attached to an index indicating something that the icon
> denotes, resulting in the compound index-icon's denotation being narrowed
> to the index's denotation if the compound is true of something (otherwise
> the compound's denotation is empty). There are more distinctions to be made
> too, among comprehension, resemblance, and symbolizing.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 10/6/2014 9:36 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> Gary R., lists,
>
> I'm arguing against the idea that the subject alone denotes and the
> predicate alone comprehends. It's difficult to maintain Peirce's 'breadth
> times depth equals information' unless each rheme (subject or predicate)
> both denotes (has breadth) and comprehends (has depth). (Added note for
> many readers: in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" on
> existential graphs (1906), Peirce reserves "rhema" for the predicate and
> calls "seme" that which he elsewhere calls "rheme".) I don't know what the
> implication is for Frederik's argument in _Natural Propositions_.
>
> I don't know what argument Frederik is making in NP, since I don't have
> the book, which is not in electronic form, and, since I have one good eye,
> it has become rather difficult for me to read anything except on a computer
> screen where I can zoom the view. I mean, I can read things on a page, but
> switching back and forth between pages and so on, that's rather frustrating.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 10/6/2014 9:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> On 10/6/2014 9:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Ben, lists,
>
> Is this the copula == if - then quote you had in mind?
>
> The forms A -< B, or A implies B, and A ~-< B, or A does not imply B,
> embrace both hypothetical and categorical propositions. Thus, to say that
> all men are mortal is the same as to say that if any man possesses any
> character whatever then a mortal possesses that character. To say, 'if A,
> then B ' is obviously the same as to say that from A, B follows, logically
> or extralogically. By thus identifying the relation expressed by the copula
> with that of illation, we identify the proposition with the inference, and
> the term with the proposition. This identification, by means of which all
> that is found true of term, proposition, or inference is at once known to
> be true of all three, is a most important engine of reasoning, which we
> have gained by beginning with a consideration of the genesis of logic. CP
> 3.175
>
> Peirce goes on to say in a footnote to this passage:
>
> In consequence of the identification in question, in S -< P, I speak of S
> indifferently as subject, antecedent, or premiss, and of P as predicate,
> consequent, or conclusion. CP 3.175 Fn P1 p 113
>
> So, now I'm a bit confused. I guess the question that first comes to mind
> is: How do you see these logical/terminological distinctions impacting the
> argument being made by Frederik in NP?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> C 745
> 718 482-5690
>
> On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 8:31 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com<mailto:
> bud...@nyc.rr.com>> wrote:
>
> Gary R., Gary F., Frederik, Jeff D., lists,
>
> I don't have the quotes handy at this late (for me) time of day, but:
>
> The predicate does denote the subject. "Jack is blue": blue denotes Jack,
> not _only_ Jack, but still _also_ Jack. Jack, in turn, 'comprehends' blue.
> You may remember Peirce's discussion of the copula as a relation of
> 'if-then' or 'is included in'.
>
> Jack --< blue.
> Jack is included in blue.
> If Jack, then blue.
> Jack materially implies blue.
> Comprehension is implication. Somewhere Peirce also says that a
> proposition comprehends the further propositions that it implies, and
> denotes the propositions that imply it. I wonder whether that applies only
> in deductive implication (i.e., 'entailment' as it is nowadays called) or
> in all inference modes of implication (I'm not sure how to say that, but I
> hope readers understand me). I also have wondered whether an icon may
> properly be said to have a comprehension. This depends on whether an icon
> 'comprehends' the character that it presents. I once searched CP, W, & CN
> for discussion of comprehension in relation to icons and found nothing.
>
> Peirce speaks of index, icon, and symbol alike as 'denoting.' The icon
> denotes by virtue of a character of its own. While, as Gary F. recently
> said, an icon denotes a possible range of objects, some of that range may
> also be actual. An icon may have actual denotation.
>
> The copula as index is index in a 'meta' sense. In a 1908 effort at the
> ten sign-trichotomies, Peirce classified 'copulants', or 'distributive
> signs', as Thirds in the trichotomy of (1) descriptive (2)
> designative/denominative, and (3) copulant / distributive. Peirce did not
> complete the ten-trichotomy system to his own satisfaction but his effort
> indicates that he regarded the copula basically as a Third, not as a
> Second, although it works as a Second at the syntactical level.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 10/6/2014 7:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,
>
> I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological
> discussions relating, on the one hand, to the subject (such as denote,
> designate, indicate, etc). and on the other to the predicate, (such as
> signify, comprehend, connote, etc.) It seems to me that Frederik here
> employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his
> extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the
> dicisign concept in, especially, the Syllabus and Kaina Stoicheia ca.1903.
>
> I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis
> that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying:
>
> In considering the proposition (dicisign):
> [the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the
> Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign)
>
> And, further, for Peirce these two are joined not, as they've
> traditionally been, by a copula, but rather by an index of a peculiar kind,
> indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the real fact
> joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, the
> formulation breadth x depth = information (i.e,, the sum of these two as
> equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that true
> information represents a real fact in some world of experience.
>
> In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that
> Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact
> being represented, the index being the necessary sign for joining the
> replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This
> syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in
> this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their
> co-localization, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.
>
> The
> co-localization of the elements of the dicisign:
> [Subject](Predicate)
>
> (Such a co-localization syntax is further understood to be primitive and
> pre-linguistic.)
>
> This syntax claims that the dicisign "is really indexically connected to
> the real fact to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt,
> 66), and how this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this
> section and some of the next (centering on the two objects of the
> co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like
> to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the
> terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents
> the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?
>
> Understanding that there are in this syntax two objects helps explain how
> Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the
> fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica
> (Secondary Object) that the existential relation especially applies, while
> the reality (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of
> Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its
> replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a
> bit unnerving to me for both Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and the
> Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language of
> reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus)
> where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be
> making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply
> loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued
> for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in
> terminology from the Syllabus to KS)
>
> Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the
> Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather
> complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization
> syntax were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> C 745
> 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>
>
> On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 8:01 AM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:
> g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
> Lists,
>
> We have now arrived (slightly behind schedule) at NP 3.7, which is
> considerably longer and more difficult than the previous sections of
> Chapter 3. Readers who have taken in those previous sections should be
> prepared to take on 3.7, but instead of adding any commentary of mine to
> it, I'm going to simply direct your attention to it and wait a few days for
> questions about it, before we move on to 3.8. According to the schedule
> (attached), we have another two weeks to 'cover' Chapter 3. I'd encourage
> those who haven't yet posted questions about NP to do so now. Don't worry
> if you feel that your command of the terminology is imperfect; I doubt that
> anyone, including me, has it 'down pat', with the possible exception of
> Frederik! As you've probably seen by now, the Dicisign is a complex and
> difficult concept, but an important one, so we need whatever questions can
> make it a little easier.
>
> gary f.
>
> } {
> www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm<http://www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm> }{
> gnoxics
>
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