Gary F., lists,
I didn't say that the discussion is not directly relevant to _Natural
Propositions_, I just don't know whether it is. Regarding EP, I usually
get by by Googling up EP pages, but last night I was just too tired.
From "Nomenclature..." in CP 2 and EP 2. Occasional font enlargement &
reddening is mine:
CP 2.247. EP 2:291 [....]
An _/Icon/_ is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes
merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses,
just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not. It is
true that unless there really is such an Object, the Icon does not
act as a sign; but this has nothing to do with its character as a
sign. Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law,
is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used
as a sign of it.
CP 2.248. EP 2.291. An _/Index/_ is a sign which refers to the
Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that
Object. [....]
CP 2.249. EP 2.292. A _/Symbol/_ is a sign which refers to the
Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of
general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted
as referring to that Object. [....]
CP 2.254. EP 2.294. [....]
First: A Qualisign [e.g., a feeling of "red"] is any quality in so
far as it is a sign. Since a quality is whatever it is positively in
itself, a quality can only denote an object by virtue of some common
ingredient or similarity; so that a Qualisign is necessarily an
Icon. Further, since a quality is a mere logical possibility, it can
only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as a Rheme.
[....] [End quotes]
A symbol denotes only a general, but a symbol's individual instance
(individual replica) is an indexical sinsign serving as an index to
one's experience of an instance of the denoted general. (Toward the idea
that denotation times comprehension equals information, I think there
needs to be at least an idea of whether the general has actual instances
or not.)
While an icon denotes, it doesn't indicate to you or lead you to what it
denotes, it doesn't tell you whether any of its denotation is an actual
existent, while an index indicates that which it denotes. Hence, as
Peirce said elsewhere:
CP 6.338 from "Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth Curiosity", circa 1909
[....] The Icons chiefly illustrate the significations of
predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of subject-thoughts.
[....]
[End quote]
Among icons, only a qualisign in some sense "leads" you to that which it
denotes, insofar as it presents the quality that it denotes; but then
something (e.g., a copula) serving as an index may be needed to point
out where the qualisign is in the complex sign.
Gary R., regarding the '—<' as copula, it was another passage that I was
thinking of. In it, Peirce mentions how various languages handle the copula.
Best, Ben
On 10/7/2014 8:18 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Ben, you wrote
I don't know what argument Frederik is making in NP, since I don't
have the book, which is not in electronic form, and, since I have
one good eye, it has become rather difficult for me to read
anything except on a computer screen where I can zoom the view
That explains a lot about your posts in this thread. I know exactly
what you mean, as I’m finding it increasingly hard to read print, and
do more of my reading in electronic form. As Frederik remarked some
time ago, it’s unfortunate that NP is not available in that format.
But what is available in e-format is /The Essential Peirce/ v.2, and
it’s the /Syllabus/ texts in there that we need to study in
conjunction with NP. If you (or anyone) don’t have e-access to EP2,
there are two possible solutions: get the Kindle edition (which of
course does have resizable text); or I could simply post the most
relevant sections here, if anyone requests it.
If you want to develop your argument further, you will need to cite
the texts you have in mind, for instance any text where Peirce says
that an icon denotes anything. But that should be a separate thread,
since (as you say) it’s not directly relevant to the argument of NP.
gary f.
From: Benjamin Udell
*Sent:* 6-Oct-14 9:36 PM
*To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:7123] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter
Gary R., lists,
I'm arguing against the idea that the subject alone denotes and the
predicate alone comprehends. It's difficult to maintain Peirce's
'breadth times depth equals information' unless each rheme (subject
or predicate) both denotes (has breadth) and comprehends (has depth).
(Added note for many readers: in "Prolegomena to an Apology for
Pragmaticism" on existential graphs (1906), Peirce reserves "rhema"
for the predicate and calls "seme" that which he elsewhere calls
"rheme".) I don't know what the implication is for Frederik's
argument in _Natural Propositions_.
I don't know what argument Frederik is making in NP, since I don't
have the book, which is not in electronic form, and, since I have one
good eye, it has become rather difficult for me to read anything
except on a computer screen where I can zoom the view. I mean, I can
read things on a page, but switching back and forth between pages and
so on, that's rather frustrating.
Best, Ben
On 10/6/2014 9:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:/p>
Ben, lists
Is this the copula == if - then quote you had in mind?
The forms A -< B, or A implies B, and A ~-< B, or A does not
imply B, embrace both hypothetical and categorical propositions.
Thus, to say that all men are mortal is the same as to say that
if any man possesses any character whatever then a mortal
possesses that character. To say, 'if A, then B ' is obviously
the same as to say that from A, B follows, logically or
extralogically. By thus identifying the relation expressed by
the copula with that of illation, we identify the proposition
with the inference, and the term with the proposition. This
identification, by means of which all that is found true of
term, proposition, or inference is at once known to be true of
all three, is a most important engine of reasoning, which we
have gained by beginning with a consideration of the genesis of
logic. CP 3.175
Peirce goes on to say in a footnote to this passage:
In consequence of the identification in question, in S -< P, I
speak of S indifferently as subject, antecedent, or premiss, and
of P as predicate, consequent, or conclusion. CP 3.175 Fn P1 p 113
So, now I'm a bit confused. I guess the question that first comes to
mind is: How do you see these logical/terminological distinctions
impacting the argument being made by Frederik in NP?
Best,
Gary
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