Re: Cathy Legg
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15739

Hi Cathy, brave soul, I'm getting a "resource not found msg"
on that link right at the moment ...

But this one seems to work:

http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/handle/10289/2811

Cheers,

Jon

On 2/24/2015 5:12 PM, Catherine Legg wrote:
Sincere apologies to everyone for the delay in posting. My life has
been a bit chaotic lately.

First of all I want to say how very much I have been enjoying reading
Frederik's book. It combines mastery of the intricacies of Peirce's
semeiotic, early and late (and we all know what a challenge that is),
with a bold march out into contemporary mainstream philosophy of
biology and cognitive science, flying the flag of Peircean ideas. The
book's powerful organising idea of the dicisign's self-referential
'double structure' also has the capacity to blast so much cavilling,
insufficient contemporary nominalistic philosophy of language out of
the water! (Sorry for the somewhat drenching metaphor).

Chapter 9 is a curious excursion on a very specific topic: Peirce's
rationale for "the puzzling sheets containing 99 small
drawings...which accompany MS 725." It seemed that Peirce was playing
with these as a kind of experiment in breaking down the concept of a
"natural class" to its minimal analytical components.

In the background of this discussion is the topic of MS 725: Peirce's
discussion of "Logical Extension and Comprehension" (presented as a
talk in 1867). The tradition of logic contains a lot of discussion of
this distinction (e.g. in Port-Royal Logic, in Mill, in William
Hamilton), where 'extension' referred to 'things picked out', or the
reference of a term, and 'intension' to the ideas evoked, or meaning
of a term. So the subjects of propositions seem more suited to express
extension and the predicates of propositions seem more suited to
express intension. Although strictly speaking, in the proposition "The
cat is on the mat", the phrase 'the cat' does have some intension
insofar as certain ideas about cats pop into my mind when I hear it,
and the phrase 'is on the mat' des have some extension insofar as we
might think there is some (large) set of things that are on mats in
this world of ours.

The tradition was to define an inverse proportionality between
extension and intension, such that by reducing a term's extension we
increase its intension, and vice versa. So if I change "the cat" to
"the brown cat" in the proposition above, I have a term that picks out
fewer things but has a more specific meaning.

But we will see Peirce challenging this simple formula.

Coincidentally I published a paper on this talk of Peirce's in the
Transaction a long time back, connecting it up with discussions of
extensionality and intenionality in C20th philosophy. It's called
"Extension, Intension and Dormitive Virtue". It was just when I was
starting out as a scholar and is not a terribly elegant paper. But if
anyone is interested:
http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10289/2811

I have been wisely advised by our esteemed Peirce-L moderators not to
try to post too much on this chapter in a single go, so I will leave
it there for now, and return anon!

Cheers, Cathy



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