Let's see if I can do better :-) 1. and 2. I understand your point. However, I have argued that the elder Peirce's "re-conceive" religion as science. It is certainly the case that Comte rails against religion but Benjamin says "wait" science needs to explain *everything* as one universe including the many of the things traditionally considered by religion (esp. "the mind," "spirituality," and "social order"), so obviously much can go but let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater. Science as a religion is certainly a re-conception in this sense since it brings in a new epistemology. This seems to me to be more desirable than actually throwing the baby out (per modern atheism).
3. Benjamin Peirce saw "universal will" as a manifest force, and all force as having a "spiritual" source. So his view was, as I said earlier, one of "general covariance" (although the term was not yet invented) rather like gravitation and matter in GR - and he took this view from his own experience. I think this is correct in essence but I see the basis as characterized in a unity of bound shapes in structure (flexible closed structure). It (feeling) is not a distinct force in the sense of electro-magnetism or gravitation (that are one with it) sense and response are a binding in structure that enables its unified action and across structure decisions (also cell division). There is no "outside" force. 5. I understand Charles Peirce to say that his "spontaneity" is the product of no precedence, no law. I am suggesting simply that he may have been misread and that he means this only in the context of fallibility (i.e., discovery) - So, a black swan, for example, would be a spontaneous event, "fresh," and "new" as he says. I understand that many, you and Smolin included, have interpreted Peirce to speak in existential terms on this matter - but for me this is less clear. I much prefer this interpretation then Charles is redeemed in my eyes - but while I have found much that is suggestive of it, I have not found anything definitive. So, if you say it is existential, I'll accept that, but this necessarily means that science is undermined. Regards, Steven On Wed, Mar 18, 2015 at 1:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Thanks for your reply - which raise more questions. > > 1-2)You state that points 1 and 2 -'are deliberately ambiguous to allow > inclusion of existing religions'. But this doesn't answer my question which > was that you seem to have merged the nature of religion (and religious > knowledge) with science (and scientific knowledge). I was differentiating > them. > Then - you added, in this most recent post: " Obviously, not all religions > are scientific". I thought that was the point of religion - that it rests > on faith - not objectivity and empirical evidence! I have no knowledge of a > religion that is also 'scientific'! > > How do you differentiate the two types of knowledge - assuming that both > types have their functionality among the human societal order? > > 3) This also doesn't seem to answer my concern about the kinetics of sense > and response, which ignores the reality of a force outside of kinetics. > > 4) Again- you are just repeating the definition which is, in my view, a > circular one. I don't know what 'naivete' has to do with it. > > 5) With regard to your comment: "If the laws of nature are subject to > small and sustainable (and universal) arbitrary changes as Charles suggests > then necessity is dead (and, therefore, so is science)." But Peirce > didn't say this; his evolutionary capacity is spontaneous not random and > arbitrary. As I've said before - spontaneous freedom is not equivalent to > randomness! > And necessity is not dead, but provides ONE force of the triad: Thirdness > is habits, which constrain and confine - but, the reality of Firstness > introduces novelty, and the informed capacity to change (that's spontaneity > not mechanical randomness). BOTH forces are operative in life. > > You wrote: "lacked the religious and scientific sophistication of his > brother and father. He certainly appears to lack the same deep > sensitivity." I consider this statement 'ad hominem' since it is trying > to persuade us of the unacceptability of Ch. Peirce's analysis by declaring > that aspects of his personality (unsophisticated, lacks deep sensitivity) > form part of that analysis. I think there is no evidence of these > assertions about Peirce. > > 6) My reading of Peirce is that, indeed, Laws DO CHANGE. That's their > power, that the habits of Thirdness can be affected by the spontaneous > 'knocks' of the freedom of Firstness and thus, can change. Thus, we have > seen the biological evolution of organisms from simple forms to complex > forms. No - there is no adherence to a law until it is absolute. Certainly, > Thirdness or the habits-of-formation can become 'hidebound' so to speak and > immune to interaction with other forces - but I think that the basic > existence of freedom, of spontaneity, of freedom - goes far to prevent such > a doom-laden scenario. > > I don't think that spontaneity is discovery, for that suggests that all it > refers to is finding something already existent. Spontaneity is freedom, > the ability to create novel forms and novel interactions - yes, constrained > by the already existent Thirdness/habits of formation - but still, > possible. And, in the more complex networks (CAS or complex adaptive > systems), this flexibility and dynamism is basic to the robust health of > the CAS. > > Edwina > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Steven Ericsson-Zenith <ste...@iase.us> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Steven Ericsson-Zenith <ste...@iase.us> ; Jerry LR Chandler > <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> ; Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Wednesday, March 18, 2015 4:20 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] A System Of Analytic Mechanics > > 1. and 2. are deliberately ambiguous to allow inclusion of existing > religions. Obviously, not all religions are scientific. > > 3. The definition is mine and I include the universal "basis of > experience" (per my work) whose effects are unity in structure; i.e., the > causal reason sense and response form, how they are unified and act > together and across structure decisions are made. > > 4. Neither Benjamin nor James, see what I referred to as "the mind of God" > in naive terms. Take what I said as a simple definition: "the mind of God > is means no more or less than whatever science argues, where science > includes the explanation of what Benjamin refers to as "spirituality" or > "universal will." > > 5. This is really very simple. If the laws of nature are subject to small > and sustainable (and universal) arbitrary changes as Charles suggests then > necessity is dead (and, therefore, so is science). I certainly mean this as > no "ad hominem" remark. This is what Charles argued, is it not? And, if it > has an existential basis, it undermines necessity. > > I do, in fact, require necessity and I allow degrees of freedom in terms > of "directional" forces. > > And this necessity is indeed the basis of Benjamin and James > (mathematical) philosophy. > > It is also a principal part of much of Charles (philosophical) work. But > Charles is concerned with Logic. Spontaneity and evolution of law appear to > be an open speculation by Charles and related to his doctrine of > fallibilism. I have not read enough to draw real conclusions. However, I do > wonder if he has not been read wrongly and by it he means only to imply the > progress of science, not that laws change in fact but only in science. > Whenever he speaks of spontaneity is he simply be speaking of discovery. He > argues, for example, that, as law (science?) progresses and is naturally > refined, there is a movement toward a greater adherence to law until a > point at which law is absolute. This suggests that spontaneity in his view > is "merely" epistemic. This would certainly be redeeming and I hope that > this is in fact the case, because I can make sense of that. > > Regards, > Steven > > > > On Wed, Mar 18, 2015 at 6:10 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Steven - I have a few questions: >> >> 1) You wrote: "religion as science or science as religion". With this >> rejection of the differentiation between religion and science - how do you >> define this new approach? My understanding of religion is that it rests on >> a priori axioms that are outside of the realm of objective experience and >> empirical proof. My understanding of science is that its axioms are >> fallible, and must rest on objective experience and empirical proof. How do >> you deal with this conflict? >> >> 2) You wrote: "religion as simply that set of ideas such that we cannot >> look upon the world without their consideration. But this is, in my view, a >> weak description, for it does not define the source of the validity of this >> 'set of ideas'. After all, the idea that the sun goes around the earth, the >> idea that disease is caused by the anger of the recently dead - may indeed >> be religious ideas, and are claimed as valid by 'the Will of God' but can >> they also be scientific? >> >> 3) You wrote: "universal will. I have taken this to imply, in modern >> terms, that we must scientifically consider the biophysics of sensation and >> response." I find this an odd definition of 'universal will' - i.e., the >> biophysics of sensation and response. What do these two kinetic and >> mechanical forces (in Firstness and Secondness) have to do with Universal >> Will which would have to include some element of a force beyond kinetics? >> >> 4) You wrote: "We must view science as "reading the mind of God" where >> "God" means no more or less than whatever this full science offers". Again, >> to equate 'mind' with 'whatever this full science offers' is a circular >> and ambiguous definition. This 'full science' which seems to me from your >> definitions, to be focused around mechanical forces doesn't seem to have a >> thing to do with 'Mind'. Or have you defined Mind as mechanics? Your tactic >> of defining something, eg, God, as X (as full science) doesn't validate >> either science or the notion of God; it's a circular and thus fallacious >> argument. >> >> 5) Then, your rather ad hominem argument for rejecting Charles Peirce's >> view, is, by definition, invalid. You wrote: "It seems reasonable to >> argue that Charles lacked the religious and scientific sophistication of >> his brother and father. He certainly appears to lack the same deep >> sensitivity." This is a conclusion without your providing any reasons. >> Reasonable to whom? And what are those reasons? So far, your above argument >> doesn't provide any such evidence. And 'religious and scientific >> sophistication' and 'lacks the same deep sensitivity' are open and thus >> empty assertions - for they also lack evidence. >> >> 6) You wrote: "I argue that Charles undermines science by arguing for >> spontaneity and evolution of laws. I do not really see how this can be in >> dispute, but I am happy to listen to arguments" >> >> The above seems to include your definition of science, one of its axioms >> being a rejection of sponteneity and evolution of laws. As has been pointed >> out before, this suggests that your view of 'science' accepts a >> deterministic, necessitarian and mechanical view of the world. This seems >> to me at least, to be a rejection of Universal Will. And again, since your >> definition of science (and you provide us with several - and not all are >> equivalent) excludes spontaneity and evolution, then, it is beyond >> argumentation. It is, not a fact, but a dogma for you. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Steven Ericsson-Zenith <ste...@iase.us> >> *To:* Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> >> *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Steven Ericsson-Zenith >> <ste...@iase.us> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 18, 2015 12:01 AM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] A System Of Analytic Mechanics >> >> Thank you for these comments Jerry. When I first came upon these works, >> they also answered many questions for me. >> >> Of particular note is the strong undercurrent of what would later be >> known as positivism, written at the time of Comte and in full awareness of >> Comte's ideas. Yet they, Benjamin and James, by putting science first, and >> in a more forgiving context perhaps than Comte, did not bring on the >> Existential crisis but rather they re-conceived of religion as science or >> science as religion. I argue that this is a unique circumstance in the >> United States where the reconnection of religion was already underway >> (although this movement seems to have reversed during the twentieth >> century). >> >> If we accept religion as simply that set of ideas such that we cannot >> look upon the world without their consideration, then we begin to >> understand the approach. Benjamin, in his "Ideality of the physical >> sciences" goes to some length to argue that science must consider the >> whole. It is he, in this text, that first argues that science must not >> merely consider the easy. >> >> He intended this to mean that we must consider the notion of universal >> will. I have taken this to imply, in modern terms, that we must >> scientifically consider the biophysics of sensation and response. I will >> accept challenges on this point because I understand that this may come >> over as self-serving. I will note that there is more to be said on this >> point in the light of the disruption of logical incompleteness. >> >> It seems reasonable to argue that Charles lacked the religious and >> scientific sophistication of his brother and father. He certainly appears >> to lack the same deep sensitivity. We may also note that in his Neglected >> Argument he echoes his semeiotic triad in the context of the family's >> beliefs. He is echoing his father's view of "God" and creation in Neglected >> Argument. The "neglect" I now assume is, in fact, the neglect of his >> father's argument. >> >> No scholar should consider my remarks to be "against" Charles. I accept >> that we may differ in scholarly interpretations but I do not accept that we >> may deny the facts. >> >> I argue that Charles undermines science by arguing for spontaneity and >> evolution of laws. I do not really see how this can be in dispute, but I am >> happy to listen to arguments. >> >> Regards, >> Steven >> >> >> On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 10:42 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < >> jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> wrote: >> >>> Dear Steven, List: >>> >>> Thank you for posting these files prepared by CSP's brother and father. >>> >>> These files very definitely add support to your assertions concerning >>> the familial logic entailments that are often reflected in CSP texts. >>> >>> It is most unfortunate that logicians and philosophers fail to consider >>> or even acknowledge the magnitude of these familial entailments on CSP's >>> texts. These entailments are readily apparent from a chemist's >>> perspective. >>> >>> Perhaps I will comment a bit on these these texts at a later time after >>> I have digested them a bit further. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >>> >>> On Mar 13, 2015, at 4:50 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: >>> >>> >>> I am posting these files to enable the wider Peirce community to >>> appreciate the environment and influences upon Charles. This is also an >>> OCR'd searchable version of A System Of Analytic Mechanics - a treatise by >>> Charles' father, Benjamin Peirce, and taught at Harvard. Prepared by me in >>> the past few years. >>> >>> You will note in this text many of the ideas that you have come to >>> attribute to Charles and you will note, while Peirce does not use the term >>> "covariance" that this is precisely what he describes, anticipating >>> Einstein's claims for the epistemic power of general covariance. >>> >>> The context of the work is Newtonian mechanics and recall that Peirce >>> spent a good deal of time with the Celestial Mechanics of LaPlace, playing >>> a major role in the translation by his mentor Nathaniel Bowditch. >>> >>> >>> Benjamin Peirce - 1855 - A System Of Analytic Mechanics.pdf >>> <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B-c2CVg9ZQsANld4b1JhQnNBQlE/edit?usp=drive_web> >>> >>> >>> Regards, >>> Steven >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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