Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16298
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16299
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16300
Exactamundo! that's the very tag I had in mind.
Jon
On 4/25/2015 1:50 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon, Frederik, lists,
Jon, please see the last paragraph of my just posted excerpt from one of
Nathan Houser's papers — exactly to your point, I'd say.
Best,
Gary
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*Gary Richmond*
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On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 1:36 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Frederik, Gary, List,
We have had several long discussions over the years regarding Peirce's
use of the words "direct" and "immediate" in this context. The matter
always comes down in the end to a study of his "Cotary Propositions". So
maybe we can steal a march or three by passing Go and cutting straight to
those whetstones of wit.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Apr 25, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk> wrote:
Dear Gary, lists
In the discussion of this P quote
:
"If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality,
I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the
general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in
our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on
necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the
perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150)
it may be too easy to get the impression that as there is "no immediate
consciousness of generality", there must be, instead, perception as
immediate consciousness of First- and Secondness from which generatlity is
then, later, construed by acts of inference, generalization etc. But that
would be to conform Peirce to the schema of logical empiricism which seems
to have grown into default schema over the last couple of generations.
And that is not, indeed, what Peirce thought. What IS "immediate
consciousness" about in Peirce? He uses the term in several connections.
Sometimes he says it is a "pure fiction" (1.343), sometimes he says it is
identical to the Feeling as the qualitiative aspect of any experience
(1.379) but that it is instantaneous and thus does not cover a timespan
(hence its fictionality because things not covering a timespan do not
exist).
But Feelings are Firstnesses and, for that reason, never appear in
isolation (all phenomena having both 1-2-3 aspects). So
immediate-consciousness-Feelings come in company with existence (2) and
generality/continuity (3). That is why what appears in perception is
perceptual judgments - so perception as such is NOT "immediate
consciousness". It is only the Feeling aspect of perception which is
immediate - and that can only be isolated and contemplated retroactively
(but then we are already in time/generality/continuity). Immediate
consciousness, then, is something accompanying all experience, but
graspable only, in itself, as a vanishing limit category. Thus, it is
nothing like stable sense data at a distance from later generalizations.
Best
F
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