Jeff, I don't disagree with what you say here. My own path for some time has been to follow a minimal path of metaphysics adequate for current science. The basic ideas are in the book Every Thing Must Go, except that I disagree with my coauthors in that they accept the possibility of static structures. I limit myself to dynamic structures. Many of my recent papers are titled "A Dynamical Approach to ..." The position puts observers into the world as dynamical entities and thus is inherently realist. It is no accident that at the beginning of the book we refer to a version of Peirce's pragmatic maxim.
John -----Original Message----- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: April 26, 2015 5:06 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions, Lists, The conversation about whether or not there are real general properties, natural kinds, habitual regularities an/or laws in nature--and where such things might or might not be at work governing actual things--continues to surface on both lists with remarkable regularity. It would seem that there is something at work behind the scenes that forces the conversation back to these kinds of questions. Having said that, we should probably take note of the fact that, for Peirce, there is no way to settle these kinds of questions based upon empirical evidence and the methods of the special sciences alone. On his account, the basic questions pose problems in the normative science of logic. Any empirically grounded explanations that seem to involve convictions about the reality or lack thereof about some kind of general thing in one area of inquiry or another rests, ultimately, on claims about the nature of the validity of different kinds of reasonings and what is presupposed by those forms of reasoning. So, on Peirce's view, it is reasonable to suppose that the community of scientists who are working in the special sciences do tend make claims about the real nature of generals. This does seem to fit what many physicists, chemists, biologists, economists (etc.) say in many cases. They ask, for instance if the principles articulated in their theories adequately explain the regularities that are observed. But philosophers and special scientists alike will be wasting their breath if they think this fact about the conviction of the special scientists settles the matter as to whether or not those claims are adequately justified. Similarly, those who are skeptical about the truth of claims about the real nature of generals in one area of inquiry or another can point to difficulties we face when trying to show that abductive, deductive or inductive arguments are themselves well grounded. But they, too, will be wasting their breath if they think that empirical evidence and the methods of the special sciences will settle these claims about the validity of the forms of reasoning and the related assumptions about the nature of the real. Notice that is not just Peirce, but Plato, Aristotle, Plontinus, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Mill and Hegel as well, who all agree that when it comes to such questions about fundamental principles of reasoning and the underlying assumptions about such reasoning, that these kinds of questions can't be settled in the special sciences (e.g., in psychology, biology, sociology, or what have you). As such, philosophers who want to model their inquiries on a scientific approach need to think hard about how they might use something like an experimental method to find the truth about these kinds of questions. Having developed competing theories of logic, we can then see what kinds of metaphysical theories naturally follow from such competing accounts. In turn, we can see if the competing theories of logic and metaphysics square with the ongoing practice and results of the different special sciences. For what it is worth, I think it would be worth the effort needed to separate these different arguments for or against the reality of generals--at least insofar as we'd like to continue the debate in a manner that is respectful of the larger philosophical context in which Peirce was working. We can, of course, follow the lead of others, such as Heidegger, who suggest that the entire tradition in logic and metaphysics rests on some deep confusions and mistakes. If some are following such a track, or trying to forge their own path in this kind of direction, it would be good to lay their cards on the table so that we will have a better idea why they are saying the things they do. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:55 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; Peirce-L Subject: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions, No, I definitely classify my sensations as I have them. I did have one weird experience where I did not classify a colour while I was on DMT, so I think I get the idea. People have noted how quick I am at picking things out - it happens automatically for me. It is an empirical question how the sensory system works. First it distinguishes differences. People working on it haven't got much further except for vision, which definitely classifies before things are conscious (Lettvin et al, Marr), so shapes come preclassified. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 26, 2015 1:47 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> Subject: [biosemiotics:8467] Re: Natural Propositions, John, I experience qualities as such and often before I've labeled them x, y, or z. Walking along the street on a windy day a sharp dust particle hits my eye. Although there is certainly some secondness involved, I experience pain before I think 'pain'. Maybe other people do experience such things differently. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 12:37 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>> wrote: Gary, I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>] Sent: April 26, 2015 1:05 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>> Cc: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions, John, The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a rhematic iconic qualisign. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>> wrote: I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no problem with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are judgments. Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction coming first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which requires and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this first classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out). John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>] Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. Frederik, lists, Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's paper "The Scent of Truth" (Semiotica 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I recommended the paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well. Nathan writes: The importance of perception is that in what Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of text, at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an intellectual component into consciousness. We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the perceptual judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it against us, and we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . . (CP 7.643) We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and secondness, are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other' that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness. What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of the word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A judgment involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at this primitive level of thought. Strictly speaking, according to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational, so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component in perception is called) by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that 'abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them' and that 'our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences' (CP 5.181). This helps explain Peirce's commitment (somewhat reconceived) to the maxim: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.' (CP 5.181). (The scent of truth, 461-2) These passages seem to support what you just wrote. Do you agree? Btw, Cathy Legg wrote that in the Q&A of a paper she presented at APA recently she was asked exactly what is a percept in the perceptual judgment. She thought it was "a good question." I think Nathan's parenthetical remark in the paragraph just above provides a neat answer: it is "the sensory component in perception"). Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 1:19 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk<mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk<mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk<mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>>> wrote: Dear Gary, lists In the discussion of this P quote : "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150) it may be too easy to get the impression that as there is "no immediate consciousness of generality", there must be, instead, perception as immediate consciousness of First- and Secondness from which generatlity is then, later, construed by acts of inference, generalization etc. But that would be to conform Peirce to the schema of logical empiricism which seems to have grown into default schema over the last couple of generations. And that is not, indeed, what Peirce thought. What IS "immediate consciousness" about in Peirce? He uses the term in several connections. Sometimes he says it is a "pure fiction" (1.343), sometimes he says it is identical to the Feeling as the qualitiative aspect of any experience (1.379) but that it is instantaneous and thus does not cover a timespan (hence its fictionality because things not covering a timespan do not exist). But Feelings are Firstnesses and, for that reason, never appear in isolation (all phenomena having both 1-2-3 aspects). So immediate-consciousness-Feelings come in company with existence (2) and generality/continuity (3). That is why what appears in perception is perceptual judgments - so perception as such is NOT "immediate consciousness". It is only the Feeling aspect of perception which is immediate - and that can only be isolated and contemplated retroactively (but then we are already in time/generality/continuity). Immediate consciousness, then, is something accompanying all experience, but graspable only, in itself, as a vanishing limit category. Thus, it is nothing like stable sense data at a distance from later generalizations. Best F
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