John, I experience qualities *as such* and often before I've labeled them x, y, or z. Walking along the street on a windy day a sharp dust particle hits my eye. Although there is certainly some secondness involved, I experience pain before I think 'pain'. Maybe other people do experience such things differently.
Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 12:37 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > Gary, > > > > I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where > abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that > is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different. > > > > John > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* April 26, 2015 1:05 PM > *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions, > > > > John, > > > > The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as > saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a > rhematic iconic qualisign. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > > > On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that > I have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained > there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages > and discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no > problem with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are > judgments. > > > > Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction > coming first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which > requires and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this > first classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out). > > > > John > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* April 25, 2015 2:46 PM > > > *To:* Peirce-L > *Cc:* <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural > Propositions, Ch. > > > > Frederik, lists, > > > > Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the > recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's > paper "The Scent of Truth" (*Semiotica* 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I > recommended the paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well. > Nathan writes: > > > > The importance of perception is that in what > > Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of > text, > > at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an > > intellectual component into consciousness. > > > > We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the > perceptual > > judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it > against us, and > > we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . . > (CP 7.643) > > > > We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and > secondness, > > are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component > > is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other' > > that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception > > adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces > > the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness. > > > > What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations > > to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second > > level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of > the > > word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the > > starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A > judgment > > involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what > > else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of > > inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at > this > > primitive level of thought. > > > > Strictly speaking, according to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result > > of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational, > > so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from > > sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component in perception is called) > > by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that 'abductive > inference > > shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation > > between them' and that 'our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, > > are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences' > > (CP 5.181). This helps explain Peirce's commitment (somewhat reconceived) > > to the maxim: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.' > > (CP 5.181). (The scent of truth, 461-2) > > > > These passages seem to support what you just wrote. Do you agree? Btw, > Cathy Legg wrote that in the Q&A of a paper she presented at APA recently > she was asked exactly what is a percept in the perceptual judgment. She > thought it was "a good question." I think Nathan's parenthetical remark in > the paragraph just above provides a neat answer: it is "the sensory > component in perception"). > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > > > On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 1:19 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk> > wrote: > > Dear Gary, lists > > > > In the discussion of this P quote > > : > > "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, > I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the > general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in > our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on > necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the > perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150) > > > > it may be too easy to get the impression that as there is "no immediate > consciousness of generality", there must be, instead, perception as > immediate consciousness of First- and Secondness from which generatlity is > then, later, construed by acts of inference, generalization etc. But that > would be to conform Peirce to the schema of logical empiricism which seems > to have grown into default schema over the last couple of generations. > > And that is not, indeed, what Peirce thought. What IS "immediate > consciousness" about in Peirce? He uses the term in several connections. > Sometimes he says it is a "pure fiction" (1.343), sometimes he says it is > identical to the Feeling as the qualitiative aspect of any experience > (1.379) but that it is instantaneous and thus does not cover a timespan > (hence its fictionality because things not covering a timespan do not > exist). > > But Feelings are Firstnesses and, for that reason, never appear in > isolation (all phenomena having both 1-2-3 aspects). So > immediate-consciousness-Feelings come in company with existence (2) and > generality/continuity (3). That is why what appears in perception is > perceptual judgments - so perception as such is NOT "immediate > consciousness". It is only the Feeling aspect of perception which is > immediate - and that can only be isolated and contemplated retroactively > (but then we are already in time/generality/continuity). Immediate > consciousness, then, is something accompanying all experience, but > graspable only, in itself, as a vanishing limit category. Thus, it is > nothing like stable sense data at a distance from later generalizations. > > > > Best > > F > > > > > > >
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