Frederik, List: >From the perspective of the chemical sciences, I find your strong conclusions >to be questionable.
More specifically, consider CSP's letter to Lady Welby, p. 7, Oct. 12, 1904. and his clear distinction between Firstness and Secondness. "Secondness is that mode of being of that which is such as it is, without respect to a second but regardless of any third." In this sentence, the critical rhetoric terms are the words Secondness and the second. The direct implication of this sentence is that the two-ness of Secondness is indicative of a difference - the difference that makes a difference in the terminology of Bateson. As a sentential proposition, this sentence does NOT infer AN ORDER RELATIONSHIP between Firstness and Secondness and hence seems to differ from your strong statements about compositionality w.r.t semiotics and metaphysics. Indeed, CSP introduces the concept of thirdness as the third part of his categorization. As I read your interpretation, it seems that your image introduces a portion of thirdness into secondness. >From my perspective, this mis-reading of the the basic logical meaning of >these categories is exceedingly common among philosophers who seek to >understand CSP. In the context of this letter, Secondness is that which today is called an independent function in mathematics. Firstness is also defined, in mathematical language, as an independent function. Further, the practical, symbolic, and mathematical relations essential to describing a chemical reaction depend on a such a rhetorical representation of the relationships between precursors and products, predecessors and successors. Two necessarily separate and distinct objects (as sin-signs) with different indexes of quali-signs and different icons. They are both diagrams. For further insight on CSP's views on the nature of relations, see his papers on copulative logic. Or, am I somehow mis-interpreting your diagrams and and extra-ordinarily strong conclusions you perceive? Cheers Jerry On Apr 26, 2015, at 3:33 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > Dear Gary, John, lists > > It is correct that Firstness is no abstraction in the sense of Hypostatic > Abstraction (even if the term Firstness is such an abstraction). But > Firstness as such is an abstraction in the sense of "prescission" or > "prescissive abstraction" - It is often overlooked how P's categories, > already from their emergence in the 1860s, are tightly connected with the > epistemologic means of accessing them - namely, his three types of > distinction, dissociation, prescission and discrimination, respectively. > In "Diagrammatology" ch. 11 (2007), I made this summary: > > (…) the three categories are interrelated as follows (arrow here meaning > possibility of distinction; broken arrow impossibility): > > 1. <--/--> 2. 2. <--/--> 3. > > The categories may not be dissociated. > > 1. <---- 2. 1. --/--> 2. > 2. <---- 3. 2. --/--> 3. > 1. <---- 3. 1. --/--> 3. > > A lower category may be prescinded from a higher, not vice versa. > > 1. <---- 2. 1. ----> 2. > 2. <---- 3. 2. ----> 3. > 1. <---- 3. 1. ----> 3. > > All categories may be discriminated from the others. > > So, 3. necessrily involves 2. and 1., and 2. involves 1. - so that 1. can be > reached by prescission from 3. and 2. Thus 1. is not "first" in any temporal > or phenomenological sense - it is not like we "begin" with firstness in order > to build up the higher categories - rather, we isolate, by prescission, the > lower from taking our point of departure in the higher. > In cognition, this corresponds to the idea that we are always-already within > the chain of inferences from one proposition to the next - but preconditions > of that chain in terms of simpler signs (e.g. tones, tokens, icons, indices, > rhemas) may be adressed by prescission (so that the whole semiotic theory > forms a sort of anatomy of the chain of arguments which is really, as a > whole, the starting point). This is why neither semiotics nor, correlatively, > metaphysics are compositional in Peirce. > > Best > F > > > > Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.04 skrev Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > : > >> John, >> >> The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as >> saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a >> rhematic iconic qualisign. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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