Edwina, lists,
EW wrote:
"If you would bother to read Peirce, you would see that there are THREE
Relations. (062415-1)
The relation between the Object-Representamen; the Relation between the
Representamen
and the Interpretant. AND..the Relation of the Representamen in itself. You
have no clue
about this."
Sung: Yes. I knew about this long ago because I wrote about it in Figure
1 attached to [biosemiotics 46] dated December 26, 2012. As you can see in
the attached figure, all the relations you are talking about in Statement
(062415-1) are there in the first column.
Besides, the relations between Object and Representamen and between
Representamen and Interpretant are also indicated in the figure under
discussion, the former being denoted as Þ and the latter as ϒ:
Þ ϒ
B -----> A -----> C
| ^
| |
|______________|
µ
Figure 1. A proposed diagram to represent the definition of the sign given
by Peirce in *1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft)
presumably July 1905, as quoted in #30, *
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM:
So your conclusion in Statement (062415-1) that "You have no clue about
this." is obviously inaccurate.
All the best.
Sung
On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 8:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Sung - I don't agree with your outline.
>
> 1) You write - 'how can anyone think otherwise'? How? Simple. You are the
> one who wrote both assertions and there is absolutely no inherent reason
> for the reader to assume that when you first wrote:
> 'missing in Peirce's definition of the irreducible triad'...that you
> *actually* meant what you wrote later as.."missing in the quoted
> definition". There is no grammatical or metaphorical or even magical way
> that you can show us how your first assertion actually means the second
> assertion...
>
> I, on the other hand, suspect that you are simply slithering out of
> accountability.
>
> 2) I don't agree with the rest of your explanation - It would benefit you
> if, instead of simply dashing through a collated list of quotations from
> Peirce, that you would actually read Peirce in his full and detailed
> explanations in his essays/articles. A decontextualized quotation - which
> is what you always solely rely on - can't take the explanatory place of a
> *full
> article*. Since you refuse to read Peirce's articles - then...you make,
> constantly, major errors in your views on Peirce.
>
> If you would bother to read Peirce, you would see that there are THREE
> Relations. The relation between the Object-Representamen; the Relation
> between the Representamen and the Interpretant. AND..the Relation of the
> Representamen in itself. You have no clue about this.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, June 23, 2015 7:45 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory • 1
>
> *Edwina wrote:*
>
> EW: 3) Again, the exact reference ought to have been provided.
> Sung: The quote was from Definition #30 listed at
> *http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
> <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM>:*
>
> *30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably
> July 1905 .*
> EW: 4) You state that the 'g' or the Relation between the Representamen
> and the Interpretant, is missing in Peirce - and you don't say 'missing in
> the quoted definition' but instead clearly say 'missing in Peirce's
> definition of the irreducible triad" - a totally different statement.
>
> Sung: Of course, I meant the former. How can anyone think otherwise ?
>
> If you analyze Peirce's definition of the sign, #30, carefully, you will
> recognize that his definition contains three nodes or relata (A = sign, B=
> object, C= intepretant), two 'dyadic relations' (Þ, µ), and a 'triadic
> relation', which he did not represent with any symbol. So if I am allowed
> to take the liberty of using 'ϒ' (Greek letter gamma) for this missing
> symbol, the following scheme would result:
>
>
>
> Þ ϒ
> B -----> A -----> C
> | ^
> | |
> |______________|
> µ
>
> Figure 1. A proposed diagram to represent the definition of the sign
> given by Peirce in *1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby
> (Draft) presumably July 1905, as quoted in #30, *
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM:
>
>
> One way to express Figure 1 in words would be:
>
> "A is determined by B and determines C in such a way that C is in turn
> determined by B." (062315-1)
>
> or
>
> "A sign is determined by its object and determines an interpretant in
> such a way (062315-2)
> that the interpretant is in turn determined by the same object."
>
>
> In Definition #30 (reproduced below), Peirce used the word "sign" in two
> senses -- 'dyadic' (see (2)) and 'triadic' (see (3)). Therefore, Statement
> (062315-2) does not do justice to Definition #30, since it uses "sign" only
> in a dyadic sense. One way to remedy this deficiency may be to use
> "representamen" to indicate the sign in a dyadic relation to its object and
> "sign" in its triadic relation to both object and interpretant, leading to
> the following statement:
>
> "A sign is the irreducibly triadic relation among representamen, object,
> and interpretant (062315-3)
> where representamen is determined by its object and determines an
> intepretant in
> such a way that the interpretant is in turn determined by the same
> object."
>
> *http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
> <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM>*
>
> #30. A "sign" is anything, A, which,
>
> (1) in addition to other characters of its own,
>
>
>
> (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
>
>
>
> (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
> C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic
> relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the
> relation Þ.
>
> It seems to me that Statement (062315-3) is consistent not only with
> Definition #30 but also with Definitions #8, #9, and #10 reproduced
> below. If you do not agree, let me know:
>
>
> *http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
> <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM>*
>
> *8 - 1896 - C.P. 1-480 - The logic of mathematics .*
>
> [...] Indeed, representation necessary involves a genuine triad. For it
> involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, inward or outward,
> mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. [...]
>
> *9 - v. 1897_- C.P. 2-228 - Division of signs .*
>
> A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign or perhaps a more
> developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the
> first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that
> object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I
> have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. [...]
>
> *10 - v 1899 - C.P. 1-564 - Notes on "A new list of categories" .*
>
> [...] A very broad and important class of triadics characters [consist of]
> representations. A representation is that character of a thing by virtue of
> which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place
> of another thing. The thing having this character I term a representamen,
> the mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it
> stands, its object.
>
> With all the best.
>
> Sung
>
> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 10:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> 1) But that's not how the Peircean Sign (the triad) operates - in a
>> reverse cycle. The Interpretant informs not only the existential reality of
>> the Object but also, vitally, the reality of the Representamen.
>>
>> 2) Your refusal to read Peirce, and your reliance on singular
>> decontextualized quotes found in a collection of quotes means that you
>> don't understand the infrastructure of the Sign. Why predict? Why not
>> simply read Peirce.
>>
>> 3) Again, the exact reference ought to have been provided.
>>
>> 4) You state that the 'g' or the Relation between the Representamen and
>> the Interpretant, is missing in Peirce - and you don't say 'missing in the
>> quoted definition' but instead clearly say 'missing in Peirce's definition
>> of the irreducible triad" - a totally different statement. (And I don't
>> know how you can claim this). Therefore, Peirce's definition of the
>> irreducible triad and your diagram have no analogy.
>>
>> 5) And, of course, your misuse of the categories is another problem.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Sent:* Monday, June 22, 2015 9:19 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory • 1
>>
>> Edwina,
>>
>> (1) First, Sung, I do indeed find a deficiency in your Firgure 1.
>> Thus, if your arrows are deterministic, then, the whole set is linear.
>>
>> It depends on how the deterministic arrows are connected:
>>
>> linearly thus A -----> B ------> C
>>
>> or cyclically thus A -----> B -----> C
>> | ^
>> | |
>> |____________|
>>
>>
>> (2) Second, if you state that 'g' is missing in Peirce's definition,
>> then you cannot include it in your diagram and tell us that this diagram
>> is of a 'Peircean sign'.
>>
>> If the Pericean sign is irreducibly triadic (as Peirce clearly pointed),
>> then there has to be the structure-preserving mapping "g" from
>> representamen to "intepretant", although he may not have mentioned it
>> explicitly in the quoted definition. If Peirce's definition of the sign
>> lacks an equivalent of "g", I would have to conclude that \ Peirce's sign
>> is not a member of the ur-category and hence is not irreducibly triadic.
>> On the other hand, if the Peircean sign is irreducibly triadic, there has
>> to be an equivalent of "g" in one of his many definitions of signs (this
>> would be my prediction).
>>
>> (3) Third, your quotation (and a scholar ought to provide the exact
>> reference) doesn't have a thing to do with your diagram.
>>
>> The reference is given as given
>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM: from which any
>> one can find the more exact reference if needed.
>>
>>
>> You say my quotation "doesn't have a thing to do with your diagram." You
>> must have some good reasons to come to such a definite conclusion. Can you
>> explain what they are ?
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 7:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> First, Sung, I do indeed find a deficiency in your Firgure 1. Thus, if
>>> your arrows are deterministic, then, the whole set is linear. Second, if
>>> you state that 'g' is missing in Peirce's definition, then you
>>> cannot include it in your diagram and tell us that this diagram is of a
>>> 'Peircean sign'. Third, your quotation (and a scholar ought to provide the
>>> exact reference) doesn't have a thing to do with your diagram.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> *Sent:* Monday, June 22, 2015 6:09 PM
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory • 1
>>>
>>> Edwina wrote:
>>>
>>> "Sung's diagram doesn't represent the Peircean triad (which, if one
>>> wants (062215-1)
>>> to diagram it, is better done as a 'spoked umbrella') because Sung's
>>> diagram
>>> is simply a linear cumulation, and the Peircean sign is definitely not
>>> that."
>>>
>>> My diagram (reproduced below) is not "simply a linear cumulation" as the
>>> evidence will show.
>>>
>>>
>>> f g
>>> Object ------> Representamen ------> Interpretant
>>> | ^
>>> | |
>>> |_____________________________ __|
>>> h
>>>
>>> Figure 1. The Peircean sign viewed as a mathematical category (i.e., as
>>> members of the ur-category).
>>> f = sign production; g = sign intepretation; f = grounding (or
>>> information flow).
>>> the commutative condition is satisfied in that f x g = h. The arrows
>>> can be read as "determines".
>>>
>>> This diagram is almost identical to Peircean definition of signs (given
>>> below), if you accept the following identities:
>>>
>>> f = Þ
>>> h = µ
>>> g = missing in Peirce's definition of the irreducible triad.
>>>
>>> A = Representamen
>>> B = Object
>>> C = Interpretant
>>>
>>> Peirecan defintion of signs, reproduced from
>>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A "sign" is anything, A, which,
>>>
>>> (1) in addition to other characters of its own,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive
>>> correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a
>>> dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way
>>> to the relation Þ.
>>>
>>>
>>> The concept of the ur-category introduced in my post dated 7/23/14 (to
>>> be forwarded separately for your reference) has been proven useful (at
>>> least for me) and seems to apply to defining Peircean signs as indicated in
>>> Figure 1. Obviously Figure 1 cannot capture all the rich details of the
>>> Peircean sign but only some of its key features.
>>>
>>> If you see any deficiency in Figure 1, let me know.
>>>
>>> All the best.
>>>
>>> Sung
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I agree with Jon here. Sung's diagram doesn't represent the Peircean
>>>> triad (which, if one wants to diagram it, is better done as a 'spoked
>>>> umbrella') because Sung's diagram is simply a linear cumulation, and the
>>>> Peircean sign is definitely not that.
>>>>
>>>> In addition, Thirdness is a categorical mode of organization, and
>>>> no-one considers that it operates only in the Interpretant. If you check
>>>> the ten Peircean classes of signs (2.256), you'll see that the Interpretant
>>>> is in a mode of Thirdness in only ONE Sign - the Argument. In the other 9
>>>> classes, it is never in a mode of Thirdness but is either in a mode of
>>>> Firstness or Secondness. In addition, the term 'Thirdness' also doesn't
>>>> apply to 'the whole 3-node network'; the triad's three Relations are only
>>>> ALL in a mode of Thirdness in that one Sign: the Argument.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
>>>> To: "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>>>> Cc: "Helmut Raulien" <h.raul...@gmx.de>; "Peirce List" <
>>>> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> Sent: Monday, June 22, 2015 3:32 PM
>>>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory • 1
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sung, List,
>>>>>
>>>>> Like I keep saying, but maybe some folks haven't heard it yet,
>>>>> the main problem with the diagram you keep drawing is that it
>>>>> does not represent an irreducibly triadic sign relation at all.
>>>>> What it does represent is the decomposition of the function or
>>>>> dyadic relation h as a composition f o g of two other functions
>>>>> or dyadic relations f and g. But decomposability is just another
>>>>> word for reducibility and so your diagram depicts the very opposite
>>>>> of the property you keep saying it depicts.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon
>>>>>
>>>>> On 6/22/2015 2:57 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "So it's perfectly okay to say that relations exist in the world and
>>>>>> you can even say that thirdness is the essence of triadic relations,
>>>>>> meaning that all triadic relations have a property in common that
>>>>>> you might as well call “thirdness” as anything else, but when you
>>>>>> turn to saying that thirdness inheres in one of the places of the
>>>>>> relation and not the others then that is a matter of another sort
>>>>>> and it does not automatically follow. Here we risk what I have
>>>>>> called the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Essence” (FOME) and avoiding
>>>>>> that takes quite a bit more care."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I agree.
>>>>>> The following diagram may help us avoid FOME. That is, the term
>>>>>> "thirdness" applies to the whole 3-node network, not to Interpretant
>>>>>> alone,
>>>>>> as some may be tempted to assume.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> f g
>>>>>> Object ------> Representamen ------> Interpretant
>>>>>> | ^
>>>>>> | |
>>>>>> |_______________________________________|
>>>>>> h
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In other words, "thirdness" to me is the name given to the irreducible
>>>>>> triadicity depicted in this figure consisting of 3 nodes and 3 edges
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> satisfy the commutative condition, which I conveniently represent as
>>>>>> f x g
>>>>>> = h, where f = sign production, g = sign interpretation, h =
>>>>>> validation,
>>>>>> grounding, proof, information flow, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> All the best.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sung
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 9:50 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Helmut, List,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A day in the yard meditatively pulling weeds helped me to clear my
>>>>>>> head and
>>>>>>> I think I can see where this all went agley. I still think that
>>>>>>> what Harry
>>>>>>> wrote is an apt statement of a critical point in Peirce's theory of
>>>>>>> signs
>>>>>>> and I'm sorry if I stepped on it with my nonce-ens words about
>>>>>>> “ontologism”
>>>>>>> so I'll put off the long version explanation of that to another time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Edwina's prompting I did take the trouble to look the word up
>>>>>>> and I see that it really was already in use, however obscurely,
>>>>>>> at least to a non-mediæval scholar like me:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ☞ http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11257a.htm
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> “Ontologism is an ideological system which maintains that God and
>>>>>>> Divine ideas> are the first object of our intelligence and the
>>>>>>> intuition of God the first act of our intellectual knowledge.”
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Although I can dimly see, or imagine a link between that ideology
>>>>>>> and the ideology I was trying to criticize I think it's probably
>>>>>>> best to avoid conflating the two ideas and so I'll go back to
>>>>>>> using words like “essentialism” that I've used before, as in
>>>>>>> this record of an earlier discussion:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ☞ Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis
>>>>>>> that Pragmatism Must Navigate Its Middle Way Between
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/09/21/nominalism-and-essentialism-are-the-scylla-and-charybdis-that-pragmatism-must-navigate-its-middle-way-between/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A famous physicist whose name I've forgotten
>>>>>>> once said something to the following effect:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> “An -ism never did much for science, except for prism.”
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> To prism I'd add pragmatism and maybe schism but the point is that
>>>>>>> I almost always speak of isms in a critical vein, as emphases that
>>>>>>> have closed out their complementary emphases or as ideologies that
>>>>>>> have taken their initial idea a bridge too far. So I was thinking
>>>>>>> of the series ontology, ontologist, ontologism on analogy with the
>>>>>>> series science, scientist, scientism.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So it's perfectly okay to say that relations exist in the world and
>>>>>>> you can even say that thirdness is the essence of triadic relations,
>>>>>>> meaning that all triadic relations have a property in common that
>>>>>>> you might as well call “thirdness” as anything else, but when you
>>>>>>> turn to saying that thirdness inheres in one of the places of the
>>>>>>> relation and not the others then that is a matter of another sort
>>>>>>> and it does not automatically follow. Here we risk what I have
>>>>>>> called the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Essence” (FOME) and avoiding
>>>>>>> that takes quite a bit more care.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jon
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>>>>> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>>>>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
>>>>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
>>>>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>>>>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> -----------------------------
>>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>>>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
>>>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe
>>>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
>>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>>
>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>>> Rutgers University
>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>>> 732-445-4701
>>>
>>> www.conformon.net
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>
>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>> Rutgers University
>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>> 732-445-4701
>>
>> www.conformon.net
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
> Rutgers University
> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>
> ------------------------------
>
>
> -----------------------------
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>
>
>
>
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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