Hi,
The Existential Triad of Burgin was missing in my previous post which is
given below:
* World of structures *
* / \*
* / \*
* / \*
* Physical world ---------- Mental world *
*Figure 1. *The Existential Triad of the world. Reproduced from [1].
If ITR (Irreversible Triadic Relation) indeed applies to Figure 1 as
suggested in Figure 3 in my previous post, the following logical inferences
may be made:
(1) The World cannot be reduced to any one or two of the triad, e.g., to
the duality of the Physical world and the Mental world, as advocated by
Descartes.
(2) The World of Structures are as real as the Physical or the Mental
world, meaning that, just as the Mental World is unthinkable without the
Physical World, so is the Mental World unthinkable without the World of
Structures. Nor the Physical World thinkable without the World of
Structures.
(3) In other words, the World may be ultimately *irreducibly triadic, *i.e,
*Peircea*n !
(4) The World is also recursive with respect to ITR. That is, there are
many ITR's embedded within each of the three worlds, reminiscent of the
Russian babushka dolls. Each ITR can be visualized as a babushka doll, or
simply as a 'bab', the term introduced by the Austrian theologian, H.-F.
Angel, in 2006 in connection with his theory of the believing processes
called "credition" [2].
(5) If (4) is right, it would follow that the World is the Largest Bab
enclosing many smaller babs which divide into three groups belonging to the
Physical world (I), the Mental world (II), and the World of structures
(III)".
*Bab = Bab (I)*Bab (II)*Bab (III) *
(I)
where the symbol * indicates the irreducibly triadic relation depicted in
Figure 3.
With all the best.
Sung
Reference:
[1] Burgin, M. (2010). Theory of Information: Fundamentality, Diversity
and Unification. World Scientific, New Jersey, p. 60.
[2] *Angel, H.-F. (2015). A Process of Merging Interior and Exterior
Reality: A Short View on the Structure of Credition, in: Teixeira,
Maria-Teresa (Ed): **Mind in Nature, in: European Studies in Process
Thought, 2016, Cambridge Scholars Publishing [in press].*
On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 7:22 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
> Stephen, Jeffrey, Edwina, lists,
>
> (1) In connection with the debate on nominalism vs. realism, it may be
> of some interest to consider the Existential Triad of Burgin proposed in
> [1] (see the figure below) that seems similar to the triadic models of the
> world advocated by Popper and Penrose [2]. What is interesting to me is
> that in all these models, a distinction is made between the Mental world
> and the World of structures (which I used to think to be equivalent):
>
>
> [image: Inline image 1]
> (Reproduced from [1])
>
> (2) As the possible 'residents' (or constituents) of the World of
> structures (WS), I am inclined to suggest the concepts of (i) ITR
> (Irreducible Triadic Relation) [3], (ii) the Golden ratio [3], (iii)
> Fibonacci series [3], and PDE (Planckian distributions equation) [4] which
> I have already discussed on these lists.
>
> (3) The main purpose of this post is to bring to your attention my recent
> findings
>
> (a) that a Gaussian distribution (indicating randomness) can be
> transformed into a right or a left long-tailed histogram (indicating
> non-randomness or order) simply by replacing the x-coordinates of the
> Gaussian distribution with Fibonacci numbers (or their derivatives such as
> F^0.5 and log(log F), where F is a segment of the Fibonacci series),while
> keeping its y coordinates invariant, and
> (b) that such Gaussian-derived long tailed histograms can be simulated
> with PDE using as its x-coordinates the same Fibonacci numbers used in
> (a). I will refer to this combined procedure as the "*Fibonacci
> number-based transformation of Gaussian to Planckian distribution*"
> (FTGP), which can be schematically represented thus:
>
>
> i)
> replace x with F
> * Gaussian Distribution*
> -----------------------------> *Planckian Distribution *
> (Random processes) ii) keep y invariant
> (Non-random, i.e., ordered processes)
> [Thermal or Brownian motions]
> [Selection processes driven by free energy]
>
>
> *Figure 1.* A diagrammatic representation of FTGP. The transformation of
> the Gaussian distribution to the Planckian distribution by carrying out two
> operations, i) and ii), where F indicates a segment of the Fibonacci
> series, e.g., F = (5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 133, 277, 410).
>
> (4) The findings in (3) indicate that the Gaussian distributions (or
> Brownian) motions are essential (or prerequisite) for Planckian processes
> that underlie LTHs, and PDE (or mathematics) is the sign that connects
> them:
>
> f
> g
> Gaussian Distribution -----------> PDE
> -----------> Observed LTH
> |
> ^
> |
> |
> |
> |
>
> |_____________________________________|
>
> h
>
> *Figure 2.* The Gaussian distribution as a pre-requisite for observed
> LTHs (long tailed histograms). f = FTGP; g = the numerical values of the
> PDE parameters conform to shape of Observed LTH; h = Gaussian distribution
> underlies Observed LTHs. The commutativity condition is thought to hold:
> f x g = h.
>
>
> (5) I suggest, for possible discussions on these lists, the following
> tentative conclusions:
>
> (a) All the 'Peirce's simple concepts' discussed above (i.e., the Golden
> ratio, Fibonacci numbers, ITR, and PDE) are "innate properties" of the
> Universe in which we reside and belong to the "World of Structures" of
> Plato, Popper, Penrose, and Burgin [1], and
>
> (b) Since humans are the products of the Universe, so are these concepts
> innate to the human mind, which would be consistent with the practopoiesis
> model of the human mind [6].
>
> (c) The "Peirce's simple concepts are *Signs* that refer to the *Physical
> World* and determine the *Metal World *in such a manner as to make it
> compatible with the Physical World:
>
> f
> g
> *Physical World *------> *World of
> Structures* ------> *Mental World*
> |
> ^
> |
> |
> |
> |
>
> |_________________________________________|
>
> h
>
>
> *Figure 3. *The irreducible triadic relation (ITR) among the three
> worlds of Popper, Penrose, and Burign [1].
> f = natural sciences; g = human sciences; h = innate
> knowledge (?)
>
>
> With all the best.
>
> Sung
> ____________________________________________
> Sungchul Ji, Ph. D.
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Rutgers University
> Piscataqwy, N.J. USA
>
> httP//www.conformon.net
>
>
> References:
> [1] Burgin, M. (2010). *Theory of Information: Fundamentality,
> Diversity and Unification*, World Scientific, New Jersey, p. 60.
> [2] Penrose, R. (2000). *The Lalrge. the Small, and the Human Mind*.
> Cambridge University Press, New York.
> [3] Ji, S. (2015). The Irreducible Triadic Relation (ITR) as a
> Universal Principle. A [biosemiotics] post dated May 14, 2015.
> [4] Ji, S. (2015). PDE(Planckian Distrigtuion Equaiton) as a token of
> the ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) type.
> [5] Peirce, C. S. (1898). A Guess at the Riddle, as cited in Collected
> Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Hartshorne, C and Weiss, P, eds.),
> Harvard Universality Press, Boston, 1931, p. vii.
> [6] Nikolic, D. (2015). Practopoiseis: Or how life fosters a mind. *J.
> Theoret. Biol*. *373*:40-61.
>
> On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 11:01 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> It seems to me that Nominalism and Peirce are mutually exclusive. As he
>> is at some pains to state. Some things are real and universal.
>>
>>
>> §1. NOMINALISM †1
>>
>>
>>
>> 15. Very early in my studies of logic, before I had really
>> been devoting myself to it more than four or five years, it became quite
>> manifest to me that this science was in a bad condition, entirely unworthy
>> of the general state of intellectual development of our age; and in
>> consequence of this, every other branch of philosophy except ethics -- for
>> it was already clear that psychology was a special science and no part of
>> philosophy -- was in a similar disgraceful state. About that time -- say
>> the date of Mansel's Prolegomena Logica†2 -- Logic touched bottom. There
>> was no room for it to become more degraded. It had been sinking steadily,
>> and relatively to the advance of physical science, by no means slowly from
>> the time of the revival of learning -- say from the date of the last fall
>> of Constantinople.†3 One important addition to the subject had been made
>> early in the eighteenth century, the Doctrine of Chances. But this had not
>> come from the professed logicians, who knew nothing about it. Whewell, it
>> is true, had been doing some fine work; but it was not of a fundamental
>> character. De Morgan and Boole had laid the foundations for modern exact
>> logic, but they can hardly be said to have begun the erection of the
>> edifice itself. Under these circumstances, I naturally opened the dusty
>> folios of the scholastic doctors. Thought generally was, of course, in a
>> somewhat low condition under the Plantagenets. You can appraise it very
>> well by the impression that Dante, Chaucer, Marco Polo, Froissart, and the
>> great cathedrals make upon us. But [their] logic, relatively to the general
>> condition of thought, was marvellously exact and critical. They can tell us
>> nothing concerning methods of reasoning since their own reasoning was
>> puerile; but their analyses of thought and their discussions of all those
>> questions of logic that almost trench upon metaphysics are very instructive
>> as well as very good discipline in that subtle kind of thinking that is
>> required in logic.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.16 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>> 16. In the days of which I am speaking, the age of Robert of
>> Lincoln, Roger Bacon, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, the question of
>> nominalism and realism was regarded as definitively and conclusively
>> settled in favor of realism. You know what the question was. It was whether
>> laws and general types are figments of the mind or are real. If this be
>> understood to mean whether there really are any laws and types, it is
>> strictly speaking a question of metaphysics and not of logic. But as a
>> first step toward its solution, it is proper to ask whether, granting that
>> our common-sense beliefs are true, the analysis of the meaning of those
>> beliefs shows that, according to those beliefs, laws and types are
>> objective or subjective. This is a question of logic rather than of
>> metaphysics -- and as soon as this is answered the reply to the other
>> question immediately follows after.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.17 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>> Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
>> Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 10:49 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
>> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>>
>>> Stephen, List,
>>>
>>> You draw the conclusions: Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can
>>> only ever be subjective.
>>>
>>> My suggestion was that, until we have understood how Peirce is using the
>>> conception of the innate (or how Plato, or Descartes are using the
>>> conception, for that matter), then we are just talking past each other.
>>> The temptation I would like to resist is that of re-conceiving the meaning
>>> of well established concepts unless there is some compelling reason to do
>>> so. Doing so causes too much confusion. As such, my aim is to clarify the
>>> conceptions--and the pragmatic maxim supplies us with a nice method for
>>> doing so.
>>>
>>> So, I think Peirce can accept many of the claims you are making about
>>> the plasticity of the brain and the variation between one kind of organism
>>> and another--and still conclude that the conceptions of space and time are
>>> innate for us. More importantly, he has good reasons to reject your
>>> reasons for drawing the conclusion that "Experience/knowing can only ever
>>> be subjective." The study of the validity of the inferences that are
>>> fundamental for scientific inquiry is part of a normative science. None of
>>> the conclusions that you are drawing from the special science of biology
>>> are dispositive for the questions we face about the validity of abduction,
>>> deduction or induction.
>>>
>>> This ground is all well worn, so I'll leave it at that.
>>>
>>> --Jeff
>>>
>>> Jeff Downard
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> NAU
>>> (o) 523-8354
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: Stephen Jarosek [sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
>>> Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 12:57 AM
>>> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
>>> Cc: 'Peirce-L'
>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in
>>> recent
>>> years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in
>>> the
>>> embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are
>>> "innate."
>>>
>>> Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling
>>> through
>>> it... the reaching begins in the womb.
>>>
>>> Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space
>>> below
>>> an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different
>>> meaning
>>> to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one
>>> metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the
>>> dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences
>>> to a
>>> tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and
>>> gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this
>>> empty
>>> space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer
>>> different
>>> consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different
>>> meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass.
>>>
>>> As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was
>>> struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that
>>> young
>>> age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the
>>> houses have changed in actual size, but the meaning that I attribute to
>>> size
>>> had changed.
>>>
>>> Same with time. The passage of time for a fly resting on a table is very
>>> different to the passage of time for someone looking at it... 5 seconds
>>> to
>>> me will be felt as far longer than that for an insect (insofar as it can
>>> be
>>> suggested that time "matters" for an insect). Notice how giant tortoises
>>> move so slowly. We infer a metabolic rate to match, with equipment (the
>>> shell) that protects it from the much nimbler creatures that might annoy
>>> or
>>> threaten it. Our life spans are no match for the 255 years of giant
>>> tortoise
>>> Adwaitya, that died recently at the Calcutta Zoo. Though, given its
>>> metabolic rate, its 255 years might be experienced as closer to our 70
>>> years. An angry tortoise hasn't much hope of catching the much nimbler
>>> creatures that might annoy it:
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjtCS0EEoCY
>>>
>>> Conclusion? Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be
>>> subjective.
>>>
>>> sj
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:16 AM
>>> Cc: 'Peirce-L'
>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> List,
>>>
>>> Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to
>>> differ, in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using
>>> the
>>> term. The notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biologically
>>> inherited appears to fit with the explanations given, for instance, in
>>> the
>>> Stanford Encyclopedia entry on the subject. As such, it appears to be a
>>> prevalent 20th century way of conceiving the matter.
>>>
>>> Here are a couple of things Peirce says about innate ideas:
>>>
>>> CP 4.92 The very word a priori involves the mistaken notion that the
>>> operations of demonstrative reasoning are nothing but applications of
>>> plain
>>> rules to plain cases. The really unobjectionable word is innate; for that
>>> may be innate which is very abstruse, and which we can only find out with
>>> extreme difficulty. All those Cartesians who advocated innate ideas took
>>> this ground; and only Locke failed to see that learning something from
>>> experience, and having been fully aware of it since birth, did not
>>> exhaust
>>> all possibilities.
>>>
>>> So, on his account, calling an idea innate does not mean that a creature
>>> has
>>> been aware of the idea since birth. Two examples he gives of innate
>>> ideas
>>> are the conceptions of time and space:
>>>
>>> 6.416 That time is not directly perceived is evident, since no lapse of
>>> time is present, and we only perceive what is present. That, not having
>>> the
>>> idea of time, we should never be able to perceive the flow in our
>>> sensations
>>> without some particular aptitude for it, will probably also be admitted.
>>> The
>>> idea of force -- at least, in its rudiments -- is another conception so
>>> early arrived at, and found in animals so low in the scale of
>>> intelligence,
>>> that it must be supposed innate. But the innateness of an idea admits of
>>> degree, for it consists in the tendency of that idea to present itself to
>>> the mind. Some ideas, like that of space, do so present themselves
>>> irresistibly at the very dawn of intelligence, and take possession of the
>>> mind on small provocation, while of other conceptions we are
>>> prepossessed,
>>> indeed, but not so strongly, down a scale which is greatly extended.
>>>
>>> So, it appears the Peirce thinks of innate ideas as those that consist
>>> in a
>>> natural tendency for the idea to present itself to the mind and to grow.
>>> The idea need not be present at the birth of the organism in order for
>>> the
>>> idea to be innate. The larger question is one of where the natural
>>> tendency
>>> finds its source or perhaps its authority for us. Those ideas that are
>>> innate in the power of reason, such as the ideas involved in logical self
>>> control, may take some time and effort on our parts in order for the
>>> natural
>>> growth to come to fruition. Calling such ideas innate is a way of saying
>>> that they are necessary for the realization of ends that are entirely
>>> natural for us--such as the end of seeking truth--and that the seeds of
>>> these ideas are already present in us. They may be present in us
>>> regardless
>>> of the temptations that some might feel at times to call those ideas
>>> "social
>>> conventions" or even to try to stamp those ideas out when they appear to
>>> run
>>> contrary to other interests we might have--such as the interests of
>>> cultivating social status, political power, or what have you.
>>>
>>> --Jeff
>>>
>>>
>>> Jeff Downard
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> NAU
>>> (o) 523-8354
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: Stephen Jarosek [sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
>>> Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 2:52 PM
>>> To: 'Edwina Taborsky'; 'Ozzie'
>>> Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L'
>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> Edwina, perhaps my long-winded reply was another way of saying that I do
>>> not
>>> believe that there is any such thing as innate knowledge. So on this
>>> specific point, it turns out that we do not agree. My problem with innate
>>> knowledge is that it cannot be incorporated into an axiomatic framework
>>> as
>>> readily as can the empty bucket theory.
>>>
>>> Basically, it is not at all unreasonable to suggest that maybe all
>>> inheritance of behaviour across the generations and across families CAN
>>> take
>>> place without the need for innate (genetically inherited) knowledge. You
>>> can
>>> do away entirely with any reference to genes/DNA, and still have a
>>> reasonable explanation for inheritance of behaviour across the
>>> generations
>>> (I posted on this a couple of times to this forum, most recently on Thu
>>> 30/04/2015 on "DNA nonlocality for a scientific Buddhism").
>>>
>>> And many of the claims of evidence supporting the genetic inheritance of
>>> behaviour, such as the Minnesota twins studies, are controversial, and
>>> debunked as often as they are affirmed. With all the recent news of
>>> corruption in the peer-review process, colour me sceptic:
>>>
>>> http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retract
>>> ions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1
>>> <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retractions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1>
>>>
>>> http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)60696-1.pdf
>>>
>>> So to summarize, this is my biggest problem with the notion of innate
>>> knowledge... it is not possible to establish for it, an axiomatic
>>> framework
>>> that hangs together. By contrast, an axiomatic framework for the empty
>>> bucket interpretation is much more workable, á la Peircean biosemiotics.
>>> Without an axiomatic framework for the life sciences (analogous to what
>>> Isaac Newton provided for the physical sciences), we have no life
>>> science...
>>> hence my rejection of the innate knowledge interpretation.
>>>
>>> sj
>>>
>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
>>> Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 10:21 PM
>>> To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie'
>>> Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L'
>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> Stephen J. - I'm not sure that your response deals with the point of my
>>> comment, which was that 'knowledge' is not all gained by experience -
>>> that
>>> was the 'Empty Bucket' theory to which I was referring. Instead, my point
>>> was that a certain amount of knowledge is innate, more so in plants,
>>> insects, animals and less so in the human species - but - nevertheless,
>>> our
>>> species has an innate capacity for symbolic language, for reasoning, for
>>> imagination which enables hypothetical or anticipatory decision-making,
>>> etc.
>>>
>>> Therefore, knowledge is not confined to experience. This has nothing to
>>> do
>>> with total genocentric determinism (is there such a thing?) nor with
>>> 'naive
>>> cultural relativism'. Instead, the question focuses around two issues:
>>>
>>> 1) How much of the knowledge base is innate, i.e., genetic. As I
>>> suggested,
>>> I think the ability to use symbolic language, to think rationally etc..is
>>> genetic. And how does this affect the community as well as the individual
>>> (i.e., mathematical ability, musical ability which can be shown in many
>>> cases to be genetic rather than learned)..
>>> vs
>>> 2) And how much is social; i.e., collective knowledge - which is NOT
>>> subjective but communal, (and not necessarily truthful to objective
>>> reality)
>>> and how does the collective knowledge base adapt and change?
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: Stephen Jarosek<mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>
>>> To: 'Edwina Taborsky'<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ;
>>> 'Ozzie'<mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com>
>>> Cc: 'Matt Faunce'<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com> ;
>>> 'Peirce-L'<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
>>> Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 3:29 PM
>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> Edwina, on the face of the points you raise, I won't disagree with you.
>>> However, for clarification, let us draw a clear distinction between naive
>>> idealism versus realistic (semiotic) idealism. In the spirit of naive
>>> idealism (naive cultural relativism), we cannot just wake up one morning
>>> and
>>> announce "today is the first day of the rest of my life" and then
>>> proceed to
>>> become a different person from that point forwards, simply by the force
>>> of
>>> will.
>>>
>>> As you would realize, one must contend with mind-body predispositions and
>>> how they relate to pragmatism and semiotic principles, within the
>>> context of
>>> a compelling axiomatic framework. Thus there is an objective Truth in the
>>> sense of a Truth about semiotic principles, but experience (knowing) can
>>> only ever be subjective.
>>>
>>> Naive idealism is the flip-side of the genocentric paradigm. One says
>>> "it's
>>> all in the genes." The other says "no it's not, don't oppress me... I
>>> can be
>>> whatever I want to be." Both are embodiments of the same kind of
>>> simplistic
>>> linear thinking.
>>>
>>> sj
>>>
>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
>>> Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 3:03 PM
>>> To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie'
>>> Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L'
>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> To my understanding, Stephen J., you subscribe to what is known as the
>>> 'Empty Bucket' or tabula rasa theory of the mind (Locke's theory) where
>>> the
>>> human species is born with an empty brain and 'learns how to be' from
>>> almost
>>> passive experience. A subjectivist theory - i.e., there is only one kind
>>> of
>>> knowledge - that possessed by a knowing subject. This of course leads to
>>> nominalism and relativism and of course precludes Truth, which can't
>>> exist
>>> in such an epistemology.
>>>
>>> See Karl Popper's strong criticism of this approach in his 'Objective
>>> Knowledge'. He opts instead, as did Peirce, for the existence of 'the
>>> real',
>>> the objective reality which exists outside of human cultural beliefs;
>>> and
>>> human knowledge can examine this reality and arrive at its truth, as a
>>> Peircean 'community of scholars' - within our innate dispositions to be
>>> rational, to imagine, to be analytical and to communicate - such as the
>>> disposition to learn a language.
>>>
>>> Now, you also seem to define the acquisition of knowledge as based on and
>>> only on individual subjective experience; that is, you reject any common
>>> will to knowledge or any innate capacity for examination of the objective
>>> world. I don't subscribe to the extreme reductionism of Dawkins, who
>>> places
>>> all causality in 'the genes' - and I totally reject his memes theory of
>>> culture - BUT, I think that all species have both innate knowledge of
>>> 'how
>>> to be' and the human species has the least amount of innate knowledge -
>>> and
>>> this is genetic. What the human species has, genetically, is the
>>> capacity
>>> for logic, order, organization and symbolic communication. These permit
>>> its
>>> knowledge base of 'how to be' to evolve, adapt, change, while the
>>> knowledge
>>> base of, let's say a frog, is limited, and it must change its physiology
>>> to
>>> adapt, while the human species changes its technology - a far easier and
>>> faster method of adaptation. Language - and the rational analysis of the
>>> world - which are both genetic within our species - enables man to
>>> critique,
>>> describe, the objective reality and change his methods of interaction
>>> with
>>> it.
>>>
>>> Your references to the Buddhist and Zen 'emptying the bucket' so to
>>> speak,
>>> are merely desires to empty oneself of one's beliefs - the subjectivist
>>> beliefs that one has learned - but this action doesn't include obtaining
>>> another set of beliefs to 'fill the bucket' but to open the mind to the
>>> objective world such that one's innate capacity for reason and analysis
>>> can
>>> view it objectively.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: Stephen Jarosek<mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>
>>> To: 'Ozzie'<mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com>
>>> Cc: 'Matt Faunce'<mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com> ;
>>> 'Peirce-L'<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
>>> Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 5:09 AM
>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> Hi Tom, list,
>>>
>>> >”Can we use it [knowing how to be] to animate our logic and make
>>> predictions about behavior? “
>>>
>>> Absolutely. There are several ways that an entity “learns how to be” and
>>> none of that has anything to do with instinct or programming within a DNA
>>> blueprint. Central to this concept is pragmatism... or is that
>>> pragmaticism... establishing how said entity defines the things that
>>> matter.
>>> The simplest and most obvious example I can think of here is imitation.
>>> Richard Dawkins based his memetic theory on imitation. But there are
>>> other
>>> ways of defining the things that matter, not just imitation. Imitation
>>> is a
>>> subset of “knowing how to be.”
>>>
>>> Animals have to “know how to be.” In the absence of human contact, we
>>> recognize their untamed feral natures in the wild. But subject to being
>>> raised among humans, they learn from humans civil behaviour,
>>> incorporating
>>> it within the terms of their bodily predispositions. By the same token,
>>> there are records (of varying credibility) of children raised by wild
>>> animals (e.g., the “Wild Boy of Aveyron or the Dog Girl from the Ukraine,
>>> variously affirmed or debunked by “experts” who know nothing of neural
>>> plasticity, pragmatism, or semiotic principles). There is nothing
>>> necessarily “wrong” or “broken” with the brains of feral children...
>>> their
>>> brains do what brains are meant to do, when learning how to be. Thomas
>>> Szasz
>>> has it mostly right... mental illness is a fiction... it’s about
>>> experience,
>>> choices and wiring.
>>>
>>> Then there is culture and “knowing how to be” within culture. Most
>>> people,
>>> when they travel, force-fit their observations into the pigeon-holes of
>>> their home culture. It does not occur to them that the new narratives
>>> that
>>> they must contend with are entirely different to the narratives back
>>> home.
>>> Often, radically different. In this there is utility in the theory of
>>> “knowing how to be” by realizing the extent to which one’s personal
>>> narratives are alien to those of the new culture. You make the same
>>> transactions as everyone else does, in your new culture, so you assume
>>> that
>>> they are connecting with the same narratives... nothing could be farther
>>> from the truth.
>>>
>>> So what sort of prediction would you like to make? I can predict that an
>>> animal in the wild, beyond the sphere of human knowing, will become
>>> feral. I
>>> can predict that a child raised in a knowing of abuse and violence, is
>>> going
>>> to grow up knowing the narratives of abuse and violence. And whether or
>>> not
>>> they rise above it will be contingent on the experiences to which they
>>> are
>>> exposed and the choices that they make. If they are lucky, they might
>>> chance
>>> upon a role model who might show them an alternative way of “knowing how
>>> to
>>> be.” In Christianity, Jesus provides a role model, an example of “knowing
>>> how to be.” How practical is that? Religious conflicts arise from
>>> different
>>> ways of “knowing how to be.”
>>>
>>> But of course this is where the entrenched objectivist, genocentric
>>> narrative kicks in... “it’s all in the genes, silly.” No, it’s not in the
>>> genes. It’s about knowing how to be. It’s about plasticity, especially
>>> neural plasticity, and how the brain wires itself to incorporate
>>> experience
>>> into its narratives and its identity. Genes and DNA are important, of
>>> course, but nothing as described in the spirit of the genocentric
>>> narrative.
>>>
>>> >”Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA
>>> (you suggest that I probably do) “
>>>
>>> Might I suggest that, while you have an appreciation for the semiotic
>>> theory
>>> of Peirce, your narratives continue to be influenced by the established
>>> genocentric narrative. The scaffolding* for your semiotic theory is not
>>> complete, it is a work in progress. And therefore you do not have an
>>> intuitive feel for the reach of semiotic theory. This is why you have
>>> trouble with “knowing how to be” and still see it is vague.
>>>
>>> As an engineering/business graduate ignorant of Peirce, I first
>>> formulated
>>> my own theoretical outline, independently of Peirce, a couple of decades
>>> ago. And prior to that, I devoted much effort to trying to understand
>>> what
>>> motivates people in a cultural context... why are they so trapped in
>>> their
>>> cultural bs? So my scaffolding has been a work in progress for a very
>>> long
>>> time... and yet to this day, I continue to be surprised that I am still
>>> learning new things... the adventure continues. Putting the scaffolding
>>> in
>>> place takes a long time and requires considerable effort. And each stage
>>> yields more insights, more layers to work on. When I talk about the
>>> domestication of animals, for example, some less experienced Peirceans
>>> might
>>> think to themselves “how nice, I buy that” and then fail to grasp the
>>> reach
>>> of what I am trying to say because, continuing to whisper into their
>>> ears,
>>> is the genocentric narrative, along the lines of “yes, what sj is saying
>>> sounds pretty cool, but instinct because genes.” You can entertain a
>>> theory
>>> on the surface, but remain mired in a scaffolding that continues to
>>> inform
>>> the rest of your thinking.
>>>
>>> The full impact of “knowing how to be” came to me only in 2013, as I was
>>> starting a new life in the northern hemisphere. I am reminded of that
>>> cliché, “like a child seeing the world for the first time.” It’s ALL
>>> about
>>> “knowing how to be.” The concept is not vague at all. It is precise,
>>> laser
>>> sharp. It is the core with all the layers removed. You don’t see it
>>> because
>>> you continue to interpret the world with the narratives of the mainstream
>>> and the scaffolding that has established your “knowing how to be.” You
>>> need
>>> to address your scaffolding, along the lines of the following Buddhist
>>> koan:
>>>
>>> A Cup of Tea
>>> Nan-in, a Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868-1912),
>>> received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen.
>>> Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor’s cup full, and then
>>> kept on pouring.
>>> The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could
>>> restrain himself.
>>> “It is overfull. No more will go in!”
>>> “Like this cup,” Nan-in said, “you are full of your own
>>> opinions
>>> and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your
>>> cup?”
>>>
>>> *I only recently stumbled across the fairly new term “scaffolding” (the
>>> structure of narratives) within a semiotic context, without having
>>> access to
>>> the full journal (Biosemiotics, Springer) documents... hope I’m using the
>>> word in the right context.
>>>
>>> sj
>>>
>>> From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com]
>>> Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 11:03 PM
>>> To: Stephen Jarosek
>>> Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> Stephen, List ~
>>> In your account, the old buffalo no longer knows "how to be" while the
>>> young
>>> ones do -- but I don't recall whether (in the story) the old buffalo was
>>> eaten by crocs or made it safely across the river.
>>>
>>> If he survived the swim, then not knowing how to be evidently didn't
>>> endanger his survival. Then, the old buffalo's bulging eyes before being
>>> pushed into the water does not reveal a lot about the evolutionary story
>>> of
>>> his species. Are buffalo who are acting like real buffalo supposed to
>>> volunteer for hazardous duty, disregard their own past experiences, and
>>> not
>>> let their eyes bulge?
>>>
>>> If we don't actually know whether the old buffalo made it across the
>>> river,
>>> drawing any conclusion about evolution from a few frames of video is
>>> premature.
>>>
>>> What about the same old buffalo when he was only half that age. Did he
>>> know
>>> how to be a buffalo when he was younger? What caused the transformation?
>>> Did he have buffalo offspring who did or did not know how to be buffalo?
>>>
>>> I have trouble with "knowing how to be" because it is vague and doesn't
>>> mean
>>> anything specific to me. (Yet, perhaps it does to others.) Can we use
>>> it
>>> to animate our logic and make predictions about behavior?
>>>
>>> Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA
>>> (you
>>> suggest that I probably do) -- but I don't perceive the two are in
>>> conflict,
>>> either. For example, social institutions do not have DNA. Neither do
>>> water
>>> molecules.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Tom Wyrick
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Oct 9, 2015, at 2:16 PM, Stephen Jarosek
>>> <sjaro...@iinet.net.au<mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>> wrote:
>>> >” Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more
>>> complicated than self-interest. I don't believe that any species can
>>> survive (long term) without individual members having a self-interest
>>> motive.“
>>>
>>> But Tom, self-interest relates to pragmatism, and how an entity defines
>>> the
>>> things that matter. And defining the things that matter relates to
>>> “knowing
>>> how to be.” “Knowing how to be” comes first, and the self-interest, as
>>> motivation (firstness?), is established within the context of that
>>> knowing.
>>> This vaguely defined notion “self-interest” infers a deterministic
>>> narrative... it seems to imply an “instinct” “programmed” into the DNA
>>> blueprint, which I for one do not buy into.
>>>
>>> sj
>>>
>>> From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com]
>>> Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 8:42 PM
>>> To: Stephen Jarosek
>>> Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> Stephen, Matt ~
>>> Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more
>>> complicated
>>> than self-interest. I don't believe that any species can survive (long
>>> term) without individual members having a self-interest motive. Perhaps
>>> the
>>> old buffalo knows "how to be," and doesn't want to swim with crocs.
>>> Maybe
>>> that's how he got to be old. And perhaps the young bulls behind him are
>>> impatient and less afraid. Both may be self-interested, though not
>>> endowed
>>> with equal wisdom. (Don't we observe the same behavior in human wars?
>>> The
>>> young soldier charges into a machine gun nest, while the more experienced
>>> soldier keeps his head down. It's a matter of knowing how to be alive
>>> tomorrow.)
>>>
>>> I enjoy the video (and others like it), but I see the discussion as one
>>> that
>>> describes mechanisms in nature in general terms instead of offering a
>>> definitive account of nature's logic. For example, consider the example
>>> of
>>> beautiful fish that attract more mates and also attract more predators.
>>> I'm
>>> not persuaded that after a female fish lays her eggs in the weeds she
>>> can be
>>> said to be "selecting" handsome suitors for her offspring. Maybe she
>>> can do
>>> so despite having left the area, but her method is not obvious.
>>> ("Internal
>>> fertilization is not the norm for fish, and the majority of species use
>>> external fertilization. In this mating system, eggs and sperm are
>>> released
>>> separately and are fertilized outside of the body.")
>>>
>>> In some species, sex is pleasurable. In those cases an "ugly" male or
>>> female may attract short-term suitors who are looking for a good time.
>>> That
>>> allows the ugly gene to survive, and removes the genetic bias toward
>>> nonfunctional adaptations (that don't promote survival).
>>>
>>> Continuing this example, a lot of sex in nature appears to be what modern
>>> humans would describe as rape. Then, selection is more a case of the
>>> relative strength of one partner and opportunity -- not choice geared
>>> toward
>>> individual survival or that of the species. That institution (rape)
>>> mixes
>>> up the gene pool, selects for size and signals to targets of unwilling
>>> sex
>>> to stay close to home for protection. (This process may describe early
>>> human evolution.)
>>>
>>> Other species may have emotional lives (experiences) we are not aware of,
>>> and those emotions may influence behavior in ways that are presently
>>> attributed to kinship genes.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Tom Wyrick
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Oct 9, 2015, at 4:28 AM, Stephen Jarosek
>>> <sjaro...@iinet.net.au<mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>> wrote:
>>> Matt,
>>>
>>> Good points. The point where you cue the talk, where your ‘expert’ disses
>>> cooperation... we can understand how organisms work for the good of the
>>> group only from a semiotic perspective and the realization that every
>>> organism has to “learn how to be.” As soon as you factor in “knowing how
>>> to
>>> be”, you factor in the motivation for an organism to work for the good of
>>> the group... not directly, of course, but by default... natural selection
>>> meets semiotics. Easy peazy, there is nothing illogical in that crucial
>>> insight. His reference to an elderly wildebeest being pushed into the
>>> river
>>> by the herd can also be understood within the context of “knowing how to
>>> be.” Regarding the passing of the elderly wildebeest, Darwinian natural
>>> selection is SECONDARY to its demise... PRIMARY is its failure to keep up
>>> with the “knowing how to be” of the herd. When it loses its ability to
>>> keep
>>> up with the herd and its behaviour, that is when natural selection kicks
>>> in.
>>> Natural selection is better understood in the context of failing to keep
>>> up
>>> with the group, whereas “knowing how to be” is of greater importance,
>>> first
>>> cause, and the source of complexity. Indeed, factoring in “knowing how
>>> to
>>> be” and its role in cooperation is, imho, much more compelling than
>>> reductionism and Dawkins’ idea of selfish genes. “Knowing how to be”...
>>> humans do it, bees do it, neurons do it, stem cells do it, men and women
>>> do
>>> it. “Knowing how to be” is the first source of variety. Natural
>>> selection is
>>> the filter of variety, the penalty/reward for improper/successful
>>> conduct.
>>> “Knowing how to be” is semiotics.
>>>
>>> sj
>>>
>>>
>>> From: Matt Faunce [mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com]
>>> Sent: Thursday, 8 October 2015 10:48 PM
>>> To: Peirce-L
>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>>
>>> On 10/7/15 8:47 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>>> Matt - I have some logical questions:
>>>
>>> 1) "instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable
>>> perpetuation of the species, but they work only toward the probable
>>> perpetuation of their specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of the
>>> species."
>>>
>>> I always dislike the passive tense "no longer considered to
>>> work'...because
>>> it leaves out the important AGENT. Who says that instincts no longer work
>>> toward the continuity of the species"? Proof? Or just some 'expert'
>>> (Appeal-to-Authority Fallacy).
>>>
>>> Here's my 'expert' cued up to where he explicitly states it:
>>> https://youtu.be/Y0Oa4Lp5fLE?t=16m21s
>>>
>>>
>>> Instincts work only toward the perpetuation of their gene type? Ah, a
>>> reductionist view - and how does the gene harm the species? Examples of
>>> both
>>> privileging the gene and harming the species?
>>>
>>> Reductionism would be the case for a theory that genes determine
>>> behavior,
>>> but I said the opposite, that behavior (instincts) works toward
>>> preserving a
>>> gene type.
>>>
>>> He later mentions fish who choose mates who are bright and colorful
>>> despite
>>> this trait making them more likely to be preyed on.
>>>
>>> A seed beetle's aggressive mating behavior favors its gene type over its
>>> competitor's but harms the species:
>>> http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/paarungsverhalten_en.html
>>>
>>> Matt
>>>
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>>>
>>
>>
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>
>
> --
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
> Rutgers University
> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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